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ABSTRACT
Many in the West today talk about the emergent unity of humanity, as social
scientists examine the world through “global values,” assessing “global opinion”;
economists study the “global economy” and “global finance”; historians write of
“universal history;” legal scholars speak of “global domestic politics” and “world
society,” while advocating “transnational justice”; political pundits announce the death of
the nation-state. One could list additional examples illustrating the same apparent fact: a
growing sense of global unity, and a universalist perspective on things social, economic,
legal, historical, and political. To what extent, however, is this phenomenon—often
referred to as “globalization”—an extension of liberalism, or instead an accident
following upon it? Do all liberal thinkers embrace it, whereas opponents are necessarily
anti-liberal thinkers? While some are partisans of universalism, and certain others are
partisans of particularism, there is nonetheless a moderate, middle, and liberal,
perspective. The works of Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and Pierre Manent shed light on
this view, offering resources for understanding the importance of particular political
communities within a broader theoretical horizon of humanity. Each in their own way
defends the integrity of political bodies, denies that the universal perspective is the only
legitimate one, and recognizes that without differences and distinctions across the
political landscape, self-government and the freedom of action is impossible. The
liberalism of Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and Manent, demonstrates that the human
condition is a political condition. Thus, the mediation of political forms is requisite for
human flourishing—particular communities are necessary for individuals and peoples to
manifest their universal humanity.

vi

1. INTRODUCTION
“The drive to the universal and homogeneous state remains the dominant ethical ‘ideal’ to which our
contemporary society appeals for meaning in its activity.”
—George Grant, Technology and Empire, 89
“It is thus evident that virtue must be a care for every city, or at least every one to which the term applies
truly and not merely in a manner of speaking. For otherwise the partnership becomes an alliance which
differs from others—from [alliances of] remote allies—only by location. And law becomes a compact and,
as the sophist Lycophron says, a guarantor among one another of the just things, but not the sort of thing to
make the citizens good and just. But that the matter stands thus is evident. For even if one were to bring
the locations together into one, so that the city of the Megarians were fastened to that of the Corinthians by
walls, it would still not be a single city.”
—Aristotle, The Politics, 1280b5-15

Among the many things Aristotle’s political science teaches is that one may learn
something about the character of a given political situation by paying attention to the
manner and reasons for which honors or prizes are awarded.1 Adopting this insight
suggests we may begin to inquire into the political situation of our day by considering the
circumstances of the 2009 awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize. The Norwegian Nobel
Committee summarized the basis for its decision to honor American President Barack
Obama with its prize as follows: “Now is the time for all of us to take our share of
responsibility for a global response to global challenges.”2 One cannot help but be struck
by the commanding nature of the statement on the one hand and its extreme generality on
the other hand. Under normal circumstances a general command requires a degree of
interpretation, and interpretation often takes its point of departure through questioning.
Thus, we can start by asking some of the following: why above all is now the time for
responsibility as opposed to other moments?; what does it mean for a challenge to be
“global” and in what capacity can “all of us” be organized to respond or act in a “global”
fashion?; and finally, does “our share of responsibility” suggest an allocation of equal

1
2

Aristotle, Politics, 1266b35-1267a8, et passim; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1130b30.
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/press.html
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shares for each individual, or should responsibility be broken down according to certain
loyalties, groups, or other arrangements?
Following this statement of justification the Committee’s press release speaks
more directly about its chosen recipient: “Only very rarely has a person to the same
extent as Obama captured the world’s attention and given its people hope for a better
future. His diplomacy is founded in the concept that those who are to lead the world
must do so on the basis of values and attitudes that are shared by the majority of the
world’s population.” The essence hereby shifts from an appeal for responsibility of
“global” proportion to a statement on leadership of “the world’s population”—that is, it
addresses the “diplomacy” of a single state’s elected executive who has more than
impressed even his own electorate inasmuch as he has “captured the world’s attention.”
Thus the Committee confidently speaks of the “people” of “the world” as singular and
unified with regard to “hope for the future”—that is, of something like humanity’s hope,
and the future of humanity in the singular. Whatever else it might mean for the entire
world’s people to have such a unifocal “attention,” above all, the final sentence
substantiates the entire series of claims regarding President Obama’s reception of the
Nobel Peace Prize. Herein the foundational “concept” is bespoken: global diplomacy
rests upon a presumed set of “values and attitudes that are shared by the majority of the
world’s population.” One recalls Voltaire’s doubtlessness: “There is only one morality
just as there is only one geometry.” The Committee seems to share Voltaire’s sentiment,
and so too do those who applauded its decision. But is even majoritarian unity the world
over in a moral and spiritual sense so decidedly present?3

3

To whatever extent such unity exists within the West, it is more obviously absent outside of European and
North American opinion. Consider Sadakat Kadri’s conclusion after a great deal of travel through the

2

To be clear, our intention is not to engage in partisan polemics or buttress
accounts either for or against particular statesmen or award committees; we are not so
much interested in whether President Obama was or was not a worthy recipient of the
prize by the Committee’s own standards or otherwise. Instead, as suggested, this
particular event points beyond itself by providing a way of entering the discussion on
opinions and sentiments related to a universal “idea of humanity.” To invoke Aristotle
once more, we want to know what such opinions mean and what share of truth they
contain. Furthermore, since political science today must direct its concern to
understanding human action no less than at Aristotle’s time we are interested in knowing
about how this opinion motivates individuals to act and thus what can be said about the
operation of this spiritual unity in practice: in what way might a global majority act, and
with what consequences? To the extent that morality’s singularity does or does not
approximate that of geometry’s unity, the fact remains that particular individuals are the
practitioners of morality: in practice the moral is manifest in well more concrete (albeit
less precise) form than, say, the geometer’s topological or differential concepts. In the
past, moral and political acts either occurred within, or were mediated and even carried
out by, concrete political bodies or forms. Laws, customs, borders, and so on delineated
political space, while particular political deeds were articulated in and through the
concreteness of a specific and to some extent identifiable political community. Have
things so changed?
There is certainly a great deal of talk about the emergent unity of humanity, at
least in the West. Social scientists now examine the world in terms of “global values” and

Islamic world, that “there is no single Muslim approach to reason, revelation or modernity.” Kadri, Heaven
on Earth: A Journey Through Shari’a Law (New York: Random House, 2013).

3

assess “global opinion.”4 Historians increasingly write in light of “universal history,”
some engaging in what is called “The New Global History.”5 Legal scholars speak of
“global domestic politics” and “world society,”6 and among the jurisprudentially minded
there exist various advocates of “transnational justice.”7 Meanwhile, military theorists
and strategists speak of the changing face of war, or even the replacement of intrastate
warfare—war among particular peoples—by a variety of “global policing.”8 More
dramatically still, some consider “global space” as the “new frontierland.”9 Perhaps least

4

The “World Values Survey” (WVS) sufficiently illustrates the point, as found at:
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
5
MIT historian Bruce Mazlish, and member of the New Global History Initiative, recent work offers “both
an essay, as well as a historical analysis” of Global History, and so to “a moral exhortation,” towards the
“construction of Humanity.” Mazlish, The Idea of Humanity in a Global Era (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009), 28-29.
6
See, Jürgen Habermas, “The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and
Citizenship,” in The Inclusion of the Other, eds., C. Cronin and P. De Greiff (Cambridge: The MIT Press,
1998), 105-28. In numerous places he writes additionally about the emergent “post-national constellation,”
and the inevitable surpassing of the nation-state to more global forms of governance. See, Habermas,
“Toward a Cosmopolitan Europe, Journal of Democracy 14:4 (Oct., 2003): 86-100. Christine Min
Wotipka and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, in “Global Human Rights and State Sovereignty: State Ratification of
International Human Rights Treaties, 1965-2001,” Sociological Forum, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Dec., 2008): 724754, speak of a process of “socialization in international society” that has impacted states’ decisions to
ratify human rights treaties, and thereby sacrifice sovereignty. The trend, they argue, is only increasing,
thus solidifying the concreteness of an “international society.”
7
For discussion of representative proponents of this idea—even conceived as a “movement” of scholars,
lawyer, intellectuals, politicians, and the like—as well as a critique of such views, see, John Fonte, “Liberal
Democracy vs. Transnational Progressivism: The Future of the Ideological Civil War Within the West,” in
Orbis (Summer, 2012), available: http://denbeste.nu/external/idealogical_war.pdf. Cf. Jon Kyl, Douglas J.
Feith, and John Fonte, “The War of Law: How New International Law Undermines Democratic
Sovereignty,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 92, No.4 (July/August, 2013): 115-25.
8
Rather than being political actors in any conventional sense, some see today’s agents of war as “thugs”
and “criminals” on a global stage that amounts to a form of perpetual or endless global policing, which is
not unrelated to the contemporary effort to make war “more humanitarian, more civilized, or less cruel.”
Thus, Western war, while waged to defend liberal values is no less “intended to incarnate those values.”
To whatever extent this is true, the following statement is poignant: “As ever, the way in which we respond
to fundamental questions about ourselves and the world around us is reflected in the character of war.”
Caroline Holmqvist-Jonsater, “War as Perpetual Policing,” The Character of War in the 21st Century, eds.,
Caroline Holmqvist-Jonsater and Christopher Coker (London: Routledge, 2010), 103-118; cf. Timothy
Edmunds, “What Are the Armed Forces For? The Changing Nature of Military Roles in Europe,”
International Affairs 82, No. 6 (2006): 1059-75. Adam Elkus, for one, disputes what he sees as exaggerated
claims regarding a change in the very nature of war as well as an end to the “Western way of war” and war
more broadly, in “Only the West has Seen the End of War,” Infinity Journal Exclusives, 4th September,
2012: http://www.infinityjournal.com/article/65/Only_The_West_Has_Seen_The_End_of_War.
9
Zygmunt Bauman, “Reconnaissance Wars of the Planetary Frontierland,” Theory, Culture, and Society,
Vol. 19, No. 4 (2002): 81-90. In this case, it is not something to be necessarily welcomed, as it is an
“obliteration” of previous modes of security—both real and theorized, or strategized. The “changed
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surprising, much attention is paid to the “global economy” and “global finance,” which is
defended by some as the foundation for fostering solidarity and equality among the
world’s peoples, while contrarily proclaimed by others to be an unstable basis for such
unity and a root cause for continued inequality and class disparity in the world, at least in
its present form.10 One could list any number of additional examples that illustrate the
same tendency11: a growing sense of global unity, and a universalist perspective on things
social, legal, historical, and political. Western elite opinion rarely pauses before
appealing to a “global conscience” in defense of the latest cause. As emphatically stated
by one proponent: “At the beginning of the 21st century the conditio humana cannot be
understood nationally or locally but only globally.”12 To what extent is this phenomenon,
often referred to as “globalization,” an extension of liberalism or possibly at odds with it?
There is a sense in the West that the conventions of liberal democracy—or, the
institutions and political culture of liberalism—are in fact most natural. The underlying
contention is that the liberal regime best satisfies human needs and desires in general, if
not in toto. To whatever extent liberal political philosophy is genuinely rooted in

existential condition” that came about by surprise may be summarized as follows: “Il n’y a pas du ‘dehors’
any more…We are all ‘inside’ with nothing left outside. Or, rather, what used to be ‘outside’ has entered
the ‘inside’—without knocking; and settled there—without asking permission. The bluff of local solutions
to planetary problems has been called, the sham of territorial isolation has been exposed. Don’t ask where
the frontierland is—it is all around you, in your town, on the streets you walk” (83-4).
10
Jagadeesh Gokhale, “Globalization: Curse or Cure? Policies to Harness Global Economic to Solve Our
Economic Challenge,” Policy Analysis, No. 659 (Feb., 2010): 1-24. Gokhale rightly suggests that
globalization has different results and prospects for different countries at varying levels of development and
economic strength, and even if one assumes globalization to be a singular process, there is no one single set
of policies to provide success. Moreover, he astutely emphasizes the importance of demographic factors in
considering distinctions among developed and developing nations. For a critique of some of the rhetoric of
globalization and an attempt to compare the “myths” with the “facts,” see, Michael Veseth, Globaloney:
Unraveling the Myths of Globalization (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
11
Another telling place to look is with respect to developments in literature, and the apparent global
readership that certain authors seek to write for, in a globalized style. See, Tim Parks, “The Dull New
Global Novel,” The New York Review of Books, Feb. 9, 2010.
12
Ulrich Beck, “The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies,” Theory, Culture, and Society, Vol. 19, Nos.
1-2 (2002): 17-44.
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“nature,” the elements of liberalism are often considered the only defensible ones—
according to reason, or at least to “public reason.” One may object that this defense
largely stands on the basis of a now enduring set of liberal customs, more than on
continued coherent or rational justification. To speak somewhat more scientifically—to
adopt the language of modern political science—the modern liberal regime is for many
the sole “legitimate” form: it seems most successfully to meet the basic needs of all
human beings. Its customs and conventions are argued to be the most conducive to
satisfying the common, natural desires of man, universally. However, in speaking of
“basic needs” and a universal satisfaction, it may just be that this legitimacy comes at the
price of failing to cultivate the higher aspects of human nature.
Thus, even if the liberal regime can be technically legitimated, must we accept
that it is in fact the best regime, and what form or shape should even the best such liberal
regime take? For that matter, is its legitimacy so universal that the liberal regime is
unconditionally good? Are there conditions or circumstances that make even the liberal
regime less suitable, or bring into question liberalism’s ability to address such conditions
or circumstances?13 And if indeed the liberal regime comes to be unconditionally good,
then on what basis is there a plurality of liberal regimes, rather than one global liberal
regime? In light of this question, one wonders whether “globalization” is not the process
towards global unification under the form of a single such regime, or at least the
emergence of a universal set of rules administering human things so as to maximize

13

The “original antagonist” of liberal theory has arguably returned with force, requiring reconsiderations
from liberal theorists today—that is, due to “the challenge of illiberal revealed theology” and its
contestation of the very foundations of liberal constitutionalism. Consider, J. Judd Owen, “The Task of
Liberal Theory after September 11,” Perspectives on Politics, Vo. 2, No. 2 (Jun., 2004): 325-30; cf. John
Milbank, “The Gift of Ruling: Secularization and Political Authority,” New Blackfriars, Vol. 85, No. 996
(Mar., 2004): 212-38.
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satisfaction? Finally, on what basis does the liberal regime, based as it is on the principle
of consent, require the original framework that gave rise to it, namely, the national state?
From the perspective of consent, all such frameworks appear arbitrary. Indeed, the
phenomenon of globalization seems concomitant with a process of individuation (if not
increasing individualism) and according to the free, equal, and autonomous individual,
any given state may fail to recognize his universal human rights. Thus, the so-called
global society both associates universally and dis-sociates particularly. As one astute
observer writes, “we ever have the impression of being in a world that is at once more
universal and more fragmented.”14 Such radically opposing tendencies cannot help but
instill a sense of disorientation, and if this situation is unlikely to foster the health of the
soul, it is unclear whether it may provide lower levels of satisfaction, after all. While
some argue that the present situation is only a midpoint on the way towards achieving the
promise of further liberating the individual from socio-institutional constrains, ultimately
fulfilling the hope for freedom within a cosmopolitan order, others question the
likelihood, stability, and meaning of such freedom.15 We may therefore ask, “How much
globalization can we bear?”16 Something of a brief theoretical genealogy of the liberal
regime is necessary so as to begin considering these questions.

14

Pierre Hassner, La Violence et la Paix: De la Bombe Atomique au Nettoyage Ethnique (Paris: Éditions du
Seuil, 2000), 324.
15
This promise is inherent in much of Habermas’s thought (see supra note 6) as well as in the work of
Beck (supra note 12); cf. Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe, trans. Ciaran Cronin
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007). Such thinkers argue that the future expansion of freedom resides in
emerging transnational legal structures and democratic norms no longer bound by the nation-state; as
though transcending the nation-state solves the political problem, tout court. In response, Mark Lilla
writes: “It is simply a fantasy to think that the perennial problems of politics can be dissolved through
progressive juridification or humanitarian aid, which is what some very serious European thinkers, notably
Jürgen Habermas, clearly have in mind.” Lilla, “The End of Politics” The New Republic, June 18, 2003,
available at: http://www.well.com/~mp/lilla.html.
16
Rüdiger Safranski, How Much Globalization Can We Bear? Trans., P. Camiller (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2005).

7

It is well known that liberalism is born in and through a thought experiment: the
state of nature. The state of nature might be called (to adopt a Tocquevillian locution) the
“generative fact” of liberal political philosophy: it is its primary intellectual instrument.
There is something striking about a concept with generative capacity, or a generative
instrument of the mind, as it were. So much makes it tempting to say that liberal political
philosophy is an effort of mind moving matter. However, there is nothing accidental
about its capacity as such, for the first liberal political philosophers conceived of the state
of nature in order to influence and change the existing political order of the day, based as
it was on a faulty understanding of things; or so they argued.17 The state of nature was
created to establish true knowledge of human nature—to establish the facts of
anthropology—in contrast to the preceding classical and Christian anthropologies. The
truth of the state of nature and its generative power—which is to say the “effectual truth”
of the state of nature—resides in the fact that, in its inception, it is indeed a state of the
mind, an abstraction, and so in short a no-place. Its chief property, therefore, is its
universality, and its most important content is the individual and his rights. Even if it
never existed in stricto sensu, it has an ever-present presence, as its substance continually
extends itself. Or, to put it differently, being nowhere in particular it can be anywhere
and everywhere, as evidenced by its origination of the most general and decontextualized
form of rights18: human rights.19 The state of nature is therefore the omnipresent

17

“Since the seventeenth century, philosophy has become a weapon, and hence an instrument.” Strauss,
Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 34, cf, 78. “The state of nature is
an accurate image of the internal contradiction of each tradition: it is the ultimate actualization of the
factional disorders of the Greek cities and the wars of religion of Christendom.” Manent, The City of Man
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 34ff. The state of nature is a polemical or destructive, as well
as productive or creative instrument—one may suggest that it both captures and inaugurates the spirit of
modern philosophy that will later manifest under the headings of “creative destruction” and the like.
18
For a contrary argument, see, Carl Schmitt, who argues that “Hobbes’ state of nature is a no man’s land,
but in no way on that account a nowhere. It is locatable, and Hobbes locates it among other places in the
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conceptual foundation of the liberal regime, and the individual of the state of nature
forms the basis for the modern self-understanding of the individual that has continued to
spread the world over. 20 When the generative fact is forgotten, it is merely taken for
granted; its continued success is due to its ability to generate without detection—one may
call it an instrumentum absconditus.
That said, the state of nature does have a history, for all things in and of the world
are born at some point in time. In the case of the state of nature, one may ask, is it not,
after all, the beginning of history, and thus the generative fact of history, or better to say
of History itself?21 Whatever the case, it has two obvious historical aspects. As a

New World.” Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2006), 96-7. Meek, in
Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), takes up Locke’s
famous phrase, “In the beginning all the World was America,” to discuss its concreteness and influence as a
result. Nevertheless, even if these first thinkers claimed it existed in concreto somewhere the point remains
the same: its purported existence only makes its imaginative power over the liberal mind all the greater, and
so too therefore its effects.
19
This is not meant as a critique of human rights as such, or an outright assault on the very idea of rights,
but of an understanding of rights that is unconditional, and either incoherently accounted for ontologically
or altogether unhinged from political reality, so that the extension of rights becomes endless in scope and
number. If it is true that “their very existence…depends on emotions as much as on reason” and that the
“claim of self-evidence relies ultimately on an emotional appeal,” then it surely follows that “the human
rights revolution is by definition ongoing,” and no single definition for rights suffices “because their
emotional basis continues to shift, in part in reaction to declarations of rights.” Lynn Hunt, Inventing
Human Rights: A History (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2007), 26-32ff. Without a properly rational
basis, so much seems to be the case; moreover, this understanding does indeed appear to be the prevalent
one. For discussion in the American context, where “rights discourse” has come to lend itself to “absolute
formulations” that “promotes unrealistic expectations” and a “near-aphasia concerning
responsibilities…without much consideration of the ends to which they are oriented,” see, Mary Ann
Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: The Free Press, 1991).
Even if the “international human rights movement” is a new phenomenon, having emerged only in the
1970s, as historians like Samuel Moyn have argued, this does not contradict the possibility of a relationship
in principle to earlier thought. Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2010).
20
That is to say it is based on an anthropology that speaks of man as, simply, the being with rights. (Rather
than, say, the polis animal, or created in the image of God, etc.) The notion of a reductionistic view of
human nature in modern political philosophy has been much discussed. See, for example, Eric Voegelin,
The New Science of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), esp. 1-26.
21
On the distinction between “history” and “History” see, James Ceasar, “The Idol of History,” Social
Philosophy and Policy Vo. 20, No. 1 (2003): 38-58. Ceasar writes that “History” (with a capital H) has two
typical forms (excluding Providential and religious understandings, even as they may be influenced by such
views), the first of which is “Philosophy of History,” which offers a singular, universal account of history
that may be either progressive or retrogressive on the basis of some guiding principle. The second is a less
rigorous form, known as “Historicism” or “the Historical School,” which is pluralistic in its principles and
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concept it has a history insofar as different thinkers have used it over the centuries since
its inception. It has, therefore, a history in terms of what the Germans call
Begriffsgeschichte. Its most recent historical form goes by the name of the “original
position.” In the second sense, however, the history of the state of nature is the history in
the state of nature, and so the course of development that leads out of the state of nature.
After all, this instrument was conceived for purposes beyond itself, as is true of all
instruments; just as all foundations are themselves meant to be subsequently built on. To
the extent that early thinkers, like Hobbes and Locke, were less concerned about the
details of the actual internal historical development, later thinkers like Rousseau
especially began to attend to the problem with greater interest.
This followed not only from the emergence on the European scene of various
historical accounts of primitive tribes and documents from travelers, further feeding the
imaginations of those thinking in terms of the state of nature, but in the meantime the
state of nature philosophy itself began to have real effects on the governments and states
of Europe. The project of liberal political philosophy was coming into fruition in the
form of the modern sovereign and consensual state, thereby doing away with the older,
hierarchical, divine right-based Medieval realms. Accepting that the real effects of early
liberalism proved its general potency, if not its veracity, it was up to later thinkers to
reexamine the intricacies of the instrument, in order to understand and even expand upon

units, insofar as there are multiple unfoldings that may be grasped, rather than one alone (i.e., on the basis
of civilizations, nations, cultures, peoples, or races). Summarizing what is common between them, he
writes that it “is the view that human meaning is to be found in the unfolding of time.” The “discovery of
history” has as its starting point the denial of man’s natural sociality: individual selves not constituted by
relations with others, or with God, or with any unchanging part of being, can have no history, which is
certainly true in Hobbes’ state of nature. The “discovery of history,” and so the “experience of history,”
follows upon the creation of such relationships, which is tantamount to creating history—man, as a
historical being, who has crossed out from his natural state, creates himself and his world, thus, from this
perspective, all is dependent upon man’s doing.
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what we might call the logic of liberalism and its unfolding. The key to understanding
this logic resides in acknowledging the importance of the state of nature and its elemental
universalism—that is, both as a universally originating concept and as one that
potentially generates a single and universal regime. For, at the risk of oversimplifying, it
is arguable that the unchecked unfolding of liberalism begins with the state of nature and
its outline of individual natural rights, at first partly and artificially protected by particular
yet partial states, and ends in a global and impartial state that recognizes the evercontinuous declaration of human rights.
To keep matters straightforward at this preliminary stage, it is fair to say that there
are two basic alternative forms of the state of nature: one beginning in war and the other
beginning in peace; however, both seek peace, even a just peace as their end. Insofar as
the beginning is a war of all against all, the objective is to move men simply from war to
peace, while if the beginning is peace, then one seeks to return to it, having fallen into an
aberrant state of war. One is tempted to say that the second must come with a more
complex philosophy of history. Either way, it would seem that all thinkers beginning
with a state of nature logically endorse, or open the way, for some sort of theoretical
account of the historical unfolding of things—of man’s transition from the state of nature
to civil society. It is a process that requires time and development, for civil society is an
“artifice,” a “second nature,” and must be created: in a word, civil society is a project,
and it emerges from human creation and consent, based on increased understanding, over
and against the natural situation of man. It is well to recall a particular aspect of the first
elaboration, carried out by Hobbes, namely the extent to which peace was the objective.
Indeed absolute peace, at nearly any and all cost, was what Hobbes sought.
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Hobbes’ determination to secure peace for man requires establishing the requisite
conditions and institutions for avoiding a return to the state of nature. Such
determination necessitates establishing a commonwealth that will not “dissolve.” Or,
following (and even systematizing) Machiavelli as he does, his objective—and it is more
than a hope—is to found a “perpetual republic.”22 Hobbes’ creation of an “artificial
man” aspires to his “artificial eternity of life.”23 But domestic security alone does not
guarantee peace. Rather, the establishment of Hobbes’ commonwealth, or some such
form, must spread to cover the globe: eternal life demands particular death—the death of
particular states and the birth of a global artifice. As Alexander Kojève argued,
beginning from Hobbes, in and through the addition of modern natural science and
technology—a further increase in man’s understanding or intelligence and its application
to nature—the path from war to peace inexorably leads to the “universal and
homogeneous state.”24 The problem of universal war inherent to the state of nature
requires a universal, or global, solution. But is this logic inevitable? Is the dynamic of
liberalism so inexorable as to eventually bind the notions of “perpetual republic” and
“perpetual peace”—or move from the individual imperative of avoiding the summum
malum to that of a global “categorical imperative”? In perhaps more common parlance,
to what extent is globalization our fate? Can liberalism’s drive towards the universal be
moderated; is there a moderate liberal alternative, or are there only radical, reactionary,
and particularistic voices of dissent?
22

Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1998), III.17; see, Translator’s Introduction, xli-xlii.
23
Hobbes, Leviathan, XIX. These claims are far from outlandish to our ears, for we are familiar with the
historical examples of “a war to end all wars,” and of the very outlawing of war by international bodies.
24
Kojève, “Tyranny and Wisdom,” in On Tyranny, eds. Victor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 153-77; Barry Cooper, The End of History: An Essay on Modern
Hegelianism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 13-45, 244-82.
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It is the objective of this dissertation to discuss three thinkers who provide
alternate yet liberal ways of conceptualizing, understanding, and responding to this set of
questions. If forced to summarize the range of problems by way of a single issue, we can
speak of the tension between the universal and the particular inherent to the modern
political world. And it is in the works of Baron de Montesquieu, Alexis de Tocqueville,
and Pierre Manent, that the problem is best approached, as is argued herein.
Furthermore, each stands as something like a witness to an unfolding of things that we
are now experiencing in full. Firstly, Montesquieu is witness to the emergent modern
state with its plurality of regimes, for the question of the particular regime initially
remained rather open.25 Secondly, Tocqueville is witness to the emergent democratic
regime as establishing itself in the position of the sole surviving form within the modern
state, thus proclaiming itself the only legitimate, if not finally most natural, modern
regime. Thirdly, Manent is witness to the logic of the democratic regime spilling over,
and undermining, the very framework of the state that made modern democracy possible
in the first place. That said, if each is a witness in a historical sense, all are at least aware
of additional or alternative possibilities. As we will see, none of them ultimately presume
or defend an inexorable logic or unfolding to the human story: history remains open, as
far as all three are concerned. Before turning to discuss the outline of argumentation,
another word on why these three thinkers have been chosen; this time negatively by way
of why others have not been selected.
If the present political world can be characterized as tending towards ever-greater
political universalism, would the phenomenon not be better studied through thinkers who
25

Both Hobbes and Locke consider multiple possible regimes as legitimate, insofar as for Hobbes, it is
ultimately a matter that sovereignty not be divided, while for Locke, the only regime he vehemently
opposes is that of absolute monarchy, or the Hobbesian variety of absolute sovereignty.
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best themselves exemplify such universalizing tendencies? One can think of Kant’s
transcendental perspective and his political cosmopolitanism, or Hegel with his Absolute
System and historical dialectic regarding its end, as well as Comte and his idea of the
triumph of science, whereby the conquest of nature replaces martial conquest and
competition, alongside his prophecy regarding the “religion of humanity.” Lesser
Enlightenment thinkers as well might be apt for study, such as La Bruyère and his
humanitarianism, Condorcet and his progressivism, or Saint-Simon and his technocraticscientific globalism. The reason we have chosen an alternate course rests in the fact that
while one can certainly come to see the logic of universalization in these thinkers, only
part of the problem is exposed. As partisans of this logic (each in their own way, to be
sure) their works fail to expose the potency of the tension—the true antinomial aspect
inherent to the relationship of universal and particular—and so their thought is, strictly
speaking, less political and more historical (or, historicist).
Insofar as one thinks politically, one must address the problem of distinctions and
oppositions, and one must begin on the level of common experience. That is to say, from
the perspective of shared life within a particular community. Indeed, genuine political
thought is a matter of actively distinguishing and acknowledging disparate parts, as well
as gathering and collecting commonalities, and following threads of continuity.
However, an initial awareness of difference and commonness is only possible through
lived experience among others, who are both like oneself and different. Therefore,
thinking politically is equally distorted by taking one’s point of departure from the
perspective of the isolated individual as it is from the perspective of the global whole.
Rather, political thought begins with reflection by an individual among individuals, in a

14

political world, which does not exhaust the broader political universe, even as it makes up
one part of it.
This essay both takes for granted and defends the idea that at the heart of the
human world—in thinking, reflecting, and acting—is this antinomy of the universal and
the particular—a sort of complexio oppositorum. Therefore the political is, by nature,
pluralistic, for the world is defined by a plurality of actors, opinions, customs, regimes,
and so on. And yet a certain thread of universality can be woven through all such
differences: the human and political world is intelligible. This is an insight at least as old
as Aristotle, who was himself nothing if not a master at attending to the range of detail
and differences in the world before him, while making sense of it in the event. Such
intelligibility was wrought by way of attempting to sort through the difference between
“nature” and “convention,” which are themselves indicative of the problem of the
universal and the particular.26 One of Aristotle’s chief criticisms of Plato, as is well
known, is that the latter sought to bring all such distinctions and differences into unity,
and thereby collapse the differences innate to the actual human world.27
We cannot enter into this ancient debate here, but all this to suggest at least two
things. First, that the problem of the universal and the particular, or of unity and
26

The problem of universals and particulars is a basic and inescapable human problem on various levels,
even if the language of “universal” and “particular” emerges at a given point in history. The problem is
especially pronounced in the realm of the political. Anyone thinking about the political systematically
must develop a certain number of concepts, or symbols, through which they come to understand the order
of political things that otherwise appear so varied. Such concepts have a degree of universality and so
abstract from the particulars of the world, and yet to the extent that they wholly abstract they become
incapable of illuminating political reality. Rather, they become constructs that illustrate either the
creativity or desires of the individual who evokes them. It is often said that “the concept” is born in
Greece: the problem of universals and particulars is first brought to conscious reflection with the birth of
philosophy. See, for example, Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” in The Vocation Lectures, eds. David
Owen and Tracy B. Strong (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2004), 14.
27
For a very thoughtful discussion of this debate, and a careful reading of Plato that qualifies his drive to
unity and the collapsing of differences, see, Arlene Saxonhouse, Fear of Diversity: The Birth of Political
Science in Ancient Greek Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992).
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plurality, is not a new, or simply modern, one. Nor is it something inaccessible to
thought, or reflection. Second, it is by way of partisanship to the political, and so to
experience of the existing political world as it concretely manifests this tension, rather
than to pure universalism or particularism, that the matter is best approached. By
engaging the texts of Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and Manent, the problem comes into
clearer view—and indeed, it is a problem without definitive solution, but one that each
seeks to think and live within. Each of the three undoubtedly varies in his hopes,
expectations, and views regarding the degree of tension and so the amount of
reconciliation that may be expected. To say that they see the tension as a problem is not
to suggest they deny any harmony whatsoever. Broadly speaking, all three thinkers
understand that actualizing universal humanity requires the circumscription of particular
political communities, each of which concretizes and represents something of our shared
human essence—individually, but among other such communities. However, in so
doing, no one such manifestation exhausts humanity. Nevertheless, political study of
humanity requires examination of its particular concretizations. Furthermore, each
thinker likewise understands that particular individuals across these communities are
more or less capable of manifesting excellences, or virtues, that exemplify the greatness
of humanity, and thus a full sense of what it means to be human. Universals only ever
become real in the world through particulars, and perhaps most representatively, in
particular individuals in particular communities, as well as by such particular
communities.
It should be added that the convergence and divergence in the views of
Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and Manent on these matters are not merely due to the times
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in which they find themselves—although this cannot be entirely discounted, since the
intensity of the tension differs over the ages. Differences in each follow from their
respective forms of political science. In so bringing them together we risk overlooking
important points of dissimilarity. But while all such matters will not be lost, whatever
oversights occur, the fruit gained will be a deeper understanding of our general problem,
and thus a greater possibility for orientation in our own, present situation. It is not our
intention to offer an exhaustive interpretation of any of the three. What our reading
ultimately offers is a window on their restoration of the perspective that human
experience is fundamentally political, and that neither political life, nor political thought,
can be undermined or overridden by abstractions of a universalist or particularist variety.
All three, in their own ways begin from, and engage with, something like the ordinary
experience of the citizen, even as they manage to see further than the average citizen, not
least of all because each engages in something of a comparative approach—discussing
and comparing polities and regimes, speeches and deeds, over the course of space and
time.28 Over the course of such examination, the merits of the liberal regime are not lost
on either of them, but each is attentive to its shortfalls as well, which is to say its
conventions do not wholly satisfy the exigencies of human nature. One may readily ask
with each of them then whether any political regime simply can.
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For example, Montesquieu, when discussing the nature of the three initial varieties of government he
analyzes, says, “To discover the nature of each, the idea of them held by the least educated of men is
sufficient.” Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Book II, Ch.1. Tocqueville, famously writes at the end of
his Introduction to Democracy in America, the following: “This book is written to favor no particular
views, and in composing it I have entertained no designs of serving or attacking any party; I have
undertaken not to see differently, but to look further than parties, and whilst they are busied for the morrow
I have turned my thoughts to the Future.” Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Introduction (concluding
sentence). Finally, Manent emphasizes the importance of the political philosopher contributing to the
“civic conversation,” and he likewise refers to the need to move to and from great texts and the present
situation. Manent, Democracy Without Nations?, 5-10.
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The following discussion is divided into three parts, each devoted to one of the
three thinkers. We begin with Montesquieu, who sets the stage for the larger problem of
universalism. The initial discussion of chapter two opens by examining the matter
through the debate between the ancients and moderns. The ancients were nothing if not
attentive to particularity—of family, community, and so on—and Montesquieu
illuminates this fact. However, Montesquieu discusses with great interest some of the
ancient examples of empires and conquest. His views are curiously ambiguous on such
matters. His own interest in diversity and difference leads him to examine the ancients
with a certain amount of sympathy, culling insights regarding the human heart and its
passions; however, as one moves through the text, Montesquieu’s advocacy for modern
liberty becomes apparent, alongside his depiction of a world increasingly open or, as we
are wont to say today, globalized. Indeed, at the heart of this phenomenon of an opening
world is commerce, which we address at length in the third chapter.
Montesquieu was one of the earliest and keenest observers, as well as supporters,
of commerce, noting its ability to transform politics both domestically and
internationally. Discussing commerce as such, we reflect upon his views of war, the law
of nations, the possible softening of mores in modern times, the importance of geography,
and whether there are not certain natural and intractable divisions among the world’s
peoples. While his endorsement of modern liberty and its concomitant commercial
activities is strong, he does signal reservations. Thus, many of the questions regarding
globalization of concern to us—such as peoples’ mixed or conflicting allegiances and
loyalties, the ability of a community to maintain its integrity or even its sovereignty,
whether there can be a balance between patriotism and cosmopolitanism, what
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relationship between the economic and the political is healthiest for society, and so
forth—can all be asked in and through Montesquieu’s great work, The Spirit of the Laws.
The second part proceeds to examine Tocqueville. In many ways, Tocqueville
adopted a political science akin to Montesquieu’s, with its concern for understanding and
knowing the movements of the human heart, in terms of its desires and passions, as well
as its habits and sentiments. While similar in approach, however, Tocqueville’s context
is much more our own, insofar as he is writing in the midst of the ongoing democratic
revolution. Consequently, there are important differences in method between
Montesquieu and Tocqueville, to which we draw attention, as we think with Tocqueville
about politics in a globalizing world. Among the many facets of the democratic
revolution and the various ways of interpreting it, it becomes apparent that globalization
is an important element, which Tocqueville himself well knew; democratization includes
a degree of increasing universalization and homogenization. Chapter four discusses the
extent to which this democratic revolution has reached, addressing both Tocqueville’s
hopes and fears regarding the state of the human spirit under such a regime. What
becomes clear is that the logic of equality carries great weight in the democratic heart and
soul—but its weight is an ambivalent one—as it can instill unprecedented doubt
alongside the comfort of conformity, may diminish civic participation even as it extends
rights, and may offer freedom while risking intellectual and even political despotism.
That said, this logic is not altogether inexorable.
In examining Tocqueville’s account we discuss the resources to which he turns
and the strategies he offers in order to maintain the integrity of the community, and the
health of souls among the citizenry, in a democratizing world. Chapter five turns more
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specifically to discuss his concern with the generalization and abstraction of ideas and
sentiments that tend to emerge in democratic times. The problem is especially relevant
given that projects of global governance rest very much upon vague notions of
universality, derived as they are from the logic of equality. Tocqueville keenly analyzes
how equality—particularly manifest in the idea and sentiment of similitude—gives rise to
intellectual independence that may culminate in a form of weakness with respect to
action; the different role that compassion takes upon its generalization; how the most
general of general ideas, namely pantheism, stands athwart to human freedom; and the
role poetry plays in shaping as well as propagating ideas, not least of all the idea of
humanity, another most general of ideas. Thinking through Tocqueville’s analysis of
such matters helps us to understand our present. Moreover, we are offered an example of
how to reinstate an epistemological balance between general and particular ideas in the
very study of politics.
In the third part we turn to look at the work of a great student of both
Montesquieu and Tocqueville, the contemporary political philosopher Pierre Manent.
Manent has become one of the most thoughtful critics of the contemporary European
project, based on its attempt to depoliticize or transcend the political. However, rather
than offer a conventional critique on the basis of Euroskepticism or nationalism, per se,
his argument is political, and it emerges out of his approach to political philosophy. He
has developed what he calls a history of political forms, that offers a fascinatingly
compact yet detailed account of self-government in the West, examined through the
continued attempt of human beings to put words and deeds in common—that is, framed
by different forms of communities as well as constituted by a variety of regimes.
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Manent’s method, as it were, is to take something of a classical approach to political
science while adding a modern modification. It is classical insofar as the nation can be
understood as something of an extension of—or still somehow tethered to—the polis, but
it is modern insofar as the nation nonetheless differs from the ancient city.
We provide an overview of his history of political forms in the sixth chapter, for it
is from this perspective that one best understands precisely why humanity cannot
constitute a political form. Moreover, what comes of this discussion is just how
remarkable the nation has been, and indeed continues to be, as a political form. An
understanding of the nation is not exhausted by the study of nationalism. Therefore, a
defense of the nation need not be nationalistic in the strict sense. Manent’s argument,
rather, is political, and his defense is one that defends the capacity for human action and
for self-government. By better understanding the genesis of the modern nation, the
present opinion of outright rejecting it in turn becomes increasingly questionable.
Manent’s argument, therefore, suggests that globalization is not inevitable, and that
politics—indeed, all political projects—are about human choices. The seventh chapter
continues our discussion of Manent’s project by delving into the theologico-political
problem, which is important for understanding the nation as well. Manent’s method adds
an interesting historical dimension to the problem, further demonstrating the importance
of his approach. However, in this final chapter, we conclude by critiquing the limitations
of Manent’s history of political forms, due to his failure to understand the uniqueness of
the American form. Notwithstanding the insights he offers into European political
development, Manent insufficiently distinguishes America from Europe. To the extent
that he is concerned about the universalizing tendencies of Europeans—indeed, primarily
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Western Europeans—and the European desire to exit the political by unifying first
Europe and subsequently humanity, America very much retains its particular form. This
is the case not only in terms of popular opinion, but due to its very constitutional order,
and on the basis of the founding principles. America is, generally speaking, a liberal
regime (in the philosophical sense), and indeed it is a contributor to certain aspects of
globalization. However, it also serves as an exception to the apparent logic of
globalization that would otherwise culminate in the ultimate unity of humanity. An
example to humanity it may be, but America remains so as a sovereign and particular
state among a broader community of nations rather than a harbinger of the community of
humanity yet to come.
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2. MONTESQUIEU:
AMBIVALENCE OF THE HEART:
ON GENERAL AND PARTICULAR PASSIONS
“The less we can satisfy our particular passions, the more we deliver ourselves to general ones.”
—Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, V.2
In the human heart there is a perpetual generation of passions;
so that the ruin of one is almost always the foundation of another.
—La Rochefoucauld, Moral Maxims, no. 10

Our day is replete with commentary regarding change—on change in and of the
world. Whether stressing the speed of change or its immensity—“great and rapid
change,” as is commonly said—we seem rather to have an especial eye for change.
Many of our hearts, moreover, may continually long for change. Observations of and
desire for change are surely related, for change is not something that comes only or
always of its own volition. Political change, for example, involves human will—or the
decisions and actions of certain individuals. Political campaigns propose a change of
rulership, and sometimes a change in the broader rules of the game; sometimes too
outright regime change is sought, through more or less radical means. Contrarily,
resistance to change no less requires volition, vigilance, and in regrettable instances,
violence. Advocates desiring change are ever met by adversaries warning against it.
Generally speaking, the former claim that what is new holds the key to advancement, or
that the possible is likely an improvement. Detractors defend their opposition by arguing
that constancy of what is known—or known to be tried and true, or familiar and
existent—is best. All this to say that change and constancy are themselves experienced
as equally real, even if not always in equal quantity, and irrespective of which among
them is closer to the good at any moment. Thus, the debate over change and constancy
remains a permanent feature of human life.
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Nevertheless, it seems right to say that we moderns are more open and prone to
change. For what is it to be “modern” other than to want not to be “ancient”—that is, to
be different from predecessors, to change from old ways to new ones, and largely reject
the past? The very notion of modernity is inseparable from the idea, or ideal, of novelty,
and a concomitant sense of autonomy, as many have argued.29 While it is incorrect to
deny that anything new emerged under the ancient sun, the dawn of the modern one
seems itself a major change. To heap metaphor upon metaphor, is not this modern sun
the fire created and brought by man himself—is not the difference between the ancient
and the modern so fundamental, as to have brought about a radical change, which is to
say at the very radix of being? We moderns have a sense that the difference between
ourselves and our forefathers, and so between modern ways of life and ancient ones, is
sufficiently vast to the extent that the ancient world is either inaccessible or
comparatively inferior; or, paradoxically, both. Thus it is felt to be increasingly distant
and deficient the more modern we become, the more rapidly we continue to change from
the old, and allegedly improve upon it. And one of the major changes we sense is a
growing unity among the world’s people, or an increasing degree of universalism across
humanity. The modern hope is for change to permanently establish universal justice,
once and for all, here on earth.
No longer will antiquated divisions keep the world’s people apart; no more shall
differences result in conflict or disparity. If politics is grounded in distinctions, the most
radical hope of modernity is for a post-political condition, where all hitherto differences
of significance are depoliticized. Thus, one might wonder whether universal justice is at
29

For a nice summary account of the genealogy of the terms “modern” and “modernity,” as well as of
competing conceptualizations over time, see, Michael Allen Gillespie, The Theological Origins of
Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 1-18.
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odds with the good, which may be particular, divisive or multiple, and sometimes even
unjust. Modern humanity, however, aspires to justice free from separations in assuming
that universal justice is the only good. If there is one commandment for our times it is
that no “self” shall fail to wholly identify with the “other,” and so a sense of similitude
ought to override any awareness of difference.
But if all of this is only sensed, felt, or hoped for, is there any way to really
measure or gauge such change? Can we distinguish between surface and profound
differences and changes; that is, between ones that necessitate altering principles of
thought and action—not least regarding justice—and ones that do not? What criteria help
us to understand whether certain changes are superficial and thereby reflective, after all,
of a deeper constancy; that some distinctions among peoples are insurmountable in
practice; that alleged improvements may come at a price; and that the universal is perhaps
not an adequate criteria for all things human?
Such large-order questions are arguably best approached by first considering
political phenomena directly, and so too by thinking with great political observers who
take in, analyze, and reflect upon the world of human practice before them. Baron de
Montesquieu was a most nuanced and attentive observer of the political world, which was
undergoing both more and less obvious changes, including in terms of justice and
universality. His great work, The Spirit of the Laws, is, among other things, a reflection
of and on the changes of his day and what consequences these emergent differences hold
for political life. Moreover, he was attentive to the distinction between real and apparent
differences, not least of all when comparing cases old and new, or ancient and modern.
As indicated by his profession early in the Preface of his work: “When I turned to
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antiquity, I sought to capture its spirit in order not to consider as similar those cases with
real differences or to overlook differences in those that appear similar.” This statement is
less symmetrical than it appears, and in fact doubly emphasizes the importance of
knowing where and when things are different or are similar.30 In either case, both
differences and similarities may lie on as well as beneath the surface; they may likewise
be obvious or subtle. Discerning real difference and similitude requires effort in thought
and imagination, in attending to the facts and recreating seemingly foreign or lost
experiences for oneself.
For example, when discussing the revolutions in commerce (about which we will
say more below), Montesquieu spends a great deal of time considering the
transformations in navigation, and the technological developments that made such
changes possible. For Montesquieu, the arts responsible for these developments do not
only improve upon themselves, but they likewise correct nature’s shortcomings: art acts
into nature, as it were, bringing about distinct changes. In a chapter entitled, “On the
commerce of the ancients,” his eye for significant changes is fully manifest, as is his
ability to draw the consequences for changes from imaginatively comparing earlier and
later experiences. As he writes: “For if, at a time when sailing has much improved, at a
time when the arts are communicated, at a time when one corrects with art both the defect
of nature and the defects of art itself, one feels these differences, what must it have been
for the sailing of the ancients?” (XX1.6, emphasis added). To this he immediately
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In discussing Montesquieu’s irony, Warner finds this passage to be the “epitome of irony,” insofar as it
overtly alerts us to “the disparity between the esprit of the ancients and the esprit of the moderns,” but, in
“cleverly telling us twice to be aware of the real differences amidst apparent similarities, what Montesquieu
is doing is presenting us with a real similarity amidst apparent differences.” Stuart D. Warner,
“Montesquieu’s Prelude: An Interpretation of Book I of The Spirit of the Laws,” in Enlightening
Revolutions: Essays in Honor of Ralph Lerner, 163.
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adjoins the following: “I cannot leave this subject.” He feels compelled to stick with the
topic, for feeling the differences brought by advances in the arts and sciences (and so too
in philosophy), offers entry into feeling the significance of change—ongoing change,
from the root to its many fruits. That said, as the remark of the Preface makes clear,
Montesquieu had to turn to antiquity—that is, to actively address something that has
passed, or is at least not immediately present to him, but something that he can
nonetheless make accessibly present; perhaps better to say, make spiritually accessible.
Comparison of cases and therefore assessment of change and of difference is indeed
possible, for in the case at hand, the “spirit” of antiquity may be grasped.
While The Spirit of the Laws compares and contrasts the spirits of various laws,
peoples, and human activities, so too does it compare more broadly the spirits of ages and
times. Montesquieu does not, however, speak of the spirit of modernity outright, or at
least not systematically. One wonders whether he is tacitly suggesting that modernity’s
spirit is somehow ungraspable, or at least less readily available to thought. Might it be
sketched but not depicted in full, insofar as it is a spirit still in process? The Spirit of the
Laws as a whole offers a representation of this very spirit in its unfolding, along with its
contradictions, hopes, uncertainties, and concerns. Insofar as it is not presented directly,
it might be suggested that in contrast, the spirit of antiquity is not only visible because it
is in the past, but that at the heart of the latter is the fact of limitations and delineations.
Ancient peoples were explicit, in speech and deed, about differences, and the distinctions
between peoples—political, spiritual, cultural, legal, etc.—were taken for granted.
According to the ancient spirit, difference and variety leapt to the eye and mind:
limitations and dividing lines were to be seen all around. The spirit of antiquity, one is
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tempted to say, consisted of separation. Contrarily, the modern spirit seeks to overcome
and overturn limitations; it bears contempt for arresting divisions, and carries on with an
absorbing change, or change that absorbs all things, seeking to synthesize what appears
otherwise separated: it consists of unification. And yet, the very spirit of modernity may
in fact be less graspable, not only because it is our spirit (and we are presently immersed
in it, or absorbed by it), but precisely because of its unlimitedness—that is, it is an
undifferentiated unity and, to the extent that it hangs together, it lacks reflective
coherence. Insofar as it delineates itself at all, it does so largely by negating antiquity and
its inherent limitations and distinctions, while perpetuating the logic of changeability and
incessant innovation.
With the preceding remarks in mind, it is herein argued that even as
Montesquieu’s political science encourages much of the modern spirit, it offers an
important reminder that is akin to something of the ancient spirit, as one of its core
teachings is the recognition of relevant distinctions, and the ineluctable fact of political
plurality. He helps readers to cultivate the ability to distinguish between real and
apparent differences and similarities, and thus to neither overemphasize or
underemphasize them. Montesquieu offers guidance in developing a balanced
tolerance—a spirit of tolerance, to be sure, but a tolerance of spirits that does not collapse
or synthesize all differences. For Montesquieu understands that as much as politics and
its forms may change, there remains a degree of constancy to man’s political condition,
not least of all regarding its concomitant difficulties, due to the inescapable weaknesses
and corruptibility of man’s nature. Ultimately, it is not his objective to get men to move
beyond politics, but to cultivate a healthy love in and for one’s political community,
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properly speaking. As he writes in his Preface: “If I could make it so that everyone had
new reasons for loving his duties, his prince, his homeland and his laws and that each
could better feel his happiness in his own country, government, and position, I would
consider myself the happiest of mortals” (emphasis added). Montesquieu’s universal aim
is to cultivate a new but nevertheless particular love within the hearts of readers—to love
one’s own with reason.31
Thus, while Montesquieu shares in the spirit of modernity, and is even an
advocate of it, he resists many of its extremes, on the one hand, and presses back upon
abstractions and empty appeals to universalism, on the other. By attending so carefully to
the parts and wholes, or to the particulars and universals, of human and political life,
Montesquieu restores a sense of limits to modern politics as well as to modern political
philosophy. His work exemplifies the fact that healthy political existence requires
balancing and moderating any drive towards radical particularism or radical universalism;
each being an over- or under-emphasis of political limitations, respectively. This chapter
offers an introduction to the emergence of the tension between the particular and
universal and its consequences for politics, largely in discussion of a few ancient
characters present in Montesquieu’s work. Through them, the feeling of differences (and
lack thereof) becomes palpable. The present discussion sets up an elaboration in the next
chapter on the effects of growing universalization Montesquieu sees in the world before
him, so as to asses the implications as he understands them.
31

As Cohler nicely summarizes: “Montesquieu says he hopes to offer his readers, as inhabitants of a
particular country, true, not prejudiced, understandings of their duties. But to be unprejudiced is not to be
universal; rather, it is to understand oneself and the basis of one’s own government. What interests
Montesquieu, as he points out in the Foreword, is the quality, the modification of the soul, or the virtue that
makes a particular government work. Montesquieu does not ask us to abandon that virtue but to see it as
singular and to look for the adjustments proper to it. Enlightenment here is neither abandonment nor
universalization of the principles of government…” Ann M. Cohler, Montesquieu’s Comparative Politics
and the Spirit of American Constitutionalism (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988), 5.
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The Heart and the Particularity of Passions
Novelty and change, and an increasing endorsement of modernity, emerge in
greater degrees as one moves beyond the first part of Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws.
Various commentators have claimed that Montesquieu initially celebrates the ancients in
order to later put them aside, or that he praises them only to eventually make readers
aware of their faults and shortcomings.32 However, his admiration of certain ancient
features and figures is such that he keeps readers wondering about where he really stands,
which awakens us anew to the lively quarelle between the ancients and moderns.33 We
too must assess the degree and goodness of certain changes as we consider the
differences, as well as the similarities, between the ancients and moderns Montesquieu
stresses in more and less obvious ways, and to various ends. After all, Montesquieu does
not outright impose his judgments on us. At a high point immediately after discussing
the novel English constitution, he makes explicit that “one must not always so exhaust a
subject that one leaves nothing for the reader to do. It is not a question of making him
read but of making him think” (XI.20). One important difference to think about that
emerges early in the first part of the work is that related to education.
In a general discussion of the laws of education, Montesquieu makes clear that
these are “the first we receive” and are the very laws that “prepare us to be citizens”
(IV.4). He then speaks of society as a “great family” that includes all particular families,
32

Thomas Pangle, Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1989);
Harvey Mansfield, Taming the Prince (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 217-18.
33
Manent writes that the “extraordinary subtlety of The Spirit of the Laws” is due in part to “the difficulty
of the enterprise,” namely Montesquieu’s attempt to “hold the old and new together in thought,” not least of
all “when the innovation in question is real, profound, and essential.” Manent, “The French Revolution and
French and English Liberalism,” in The Legacy of the French Revolution, eds., Ralph C. Hancock and L.
Gary Lambert (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996), 44. In a different, but not
unrelated sense, Mansfield writes that Montesquieu “clear[s] out of his inquiry the rival extremes
represented by the ancients and moderns, so that his own moderation can emerge.” Mansfield, Taming the
Prince, 220.
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and that each of the latter should be “governed according to the plan” of the greater
family. The particular parts should conform to the general whole by way of education:
“If there is a principle for the people taken generally, then the parts which compose it,
that is, the families, will have one also.” Thus private education operates according to the
same principle of the government, and the laws of education accordingly differ
depending upon the kind of government. If the laws of education are the first we receive,
they are nonetheless not confined by familial rule—or the idiosyncrasies of individual
families—but are directed outwards towards the political community. The particularity
of each family is generalized through education in a manner consistent with the
particularities of the government. There is apparently no one general education for
mankind, according to Montesquieu’s understanding of ancient practice; however, there
is consistency and continuity within individual communities and so among its families.
One cannot conceive of a universal education for fostering citizenship, given the complex
differences among peoples and their governments. And so it seems that politics—the
concrete government and its constitution—is a primary determinant of human education,
which is in turn supported by proper education of peoples. Such an understanding is
hardly Montesquieu’s alone, as, for example, it echoes Aristotle’s understanding of
education in its political orientation, as well as in its variegation based on different
regime types; that is, of an “education relative to the regime” (Politics, Bk. VIII).
However, after discussing education in monarchies and in despotic governments,
Montesquieu pauses to consider the following contrast, as indicated by the chapter title:
“The difference in the effect of education among the ancients and among ourselves”
(IV.4). He informs us that “[m]ost of the ancient peoples lived in governments that had
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virtue for their principle,” which is to say that virtue was the motivating passion, or the
driving force of the government. And, he writes, when “virtue was in full force [dans sa
force],” remarkable things happened: “things were done in those governments that we no
longer see and that astonish our small souls [nos petites âmes].” The force of virtue in
ancient republics, and the astonishing things carried out therein, followed from ancient
education.
The ancients were not somehow different from us in nature, insofar as small souls
may conceivably be enlarged, provided proper guidance; souls may expand or contract
depending, at least to some extent, upon circumstances.34 Our souls have shriveled due
to the change in circumstances, which in large part consist of the government and the
kind of education we receive. We no longer live in the ancient republican governments
where “the full power of education is needed” (IV.5) so as to bring on the full force of
virtue. Insofar as virtue was in full force in these ancient republics it is important to
recall what Montesquieu emphasizes in his Author’s Foreword: “In order to understand
the first four books of this work, one must note that what I call virtue in a republic is love
of the homeland, that is, love of equality.” He then underlines that it is “not a moral
virtue or a Christian virtue; it is political virtue, and this is the principle that makes
republican government move.” Political virtue is rooted in a very particular kind of love,
or a form of love directed at a very particular object, namely one’s own republic. The
full power of education was necessary to cull the strings of men’s hearts and deflect their
34

To truly see what “was extraordinary in the Greek institutions,” Montesquieu suggests comparing it with
“the dregs and corruption of modern times,” however, immediately afterward he offers a modern example
that parallels the ancients: “A legislator, an honnête homme, has formed a people in whom integrity seems
as natural as bravery was among the Spartans. Mr. Penn is a true Lycurgus; and, though he has had peace
for his object as Lycurgus had war, they are alike in the unique path on which they have set their people, in
their ascendancy over free men, in the prejudices they have vanquished, and in the passions they have
subdued” (IV.5, emphasis to English added).

32

love away from the self, engaging in “a renunciation of oneself, which is always a very
painful thing” (IV.5). Self-love is transformed through education into “love of the laws
and the homeland.”
This is no easy task, to be sure, for while man is “[m]ade for living in society,”
there is the ever present possibility that he “could forget his fellows,” insofar as “it is in
[men’s] nature to act by themselves” (I.1). Thus, ancient (republican) education must
instill “a continuous preference of the public interest over one’s own,” and when
successful, Montesquieu says it “produces all the individual virtues,” for all the
individual virtues, in fact, “are only that preference” (IV.5, emphasis added). For
Montesquieu, the crown of the virtues (to adopt Aristotle’s phrase), therefore, consists in
the “continuous preference of the public interest.” And even as the particular form of
government most conducive to this kind of love is democracy (since each citizen is
entrusted with the government), Montesquieu then proclaims that government, being
“like all things in the world,” is no different in that “in order to preserve it, one must love
it.” All governments—all things—require love in order to persist: love is at the heart of
preservation and a certain kind, as well as certain amount of it, must be in the hearts of
men to preserve their government. Different governments, however, require varying
degrees and forms of love. Or at any rate, each kind of government has its springs in one
or more of the human passions, as Montesquieu makes repeatedly clear when speaking
about the principles of governments (IIIff.). In that the success of governments
ultimately rests on ordination or direction of the passions, considering the following
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poignant insight is key: “The less we can satisfy our particular passions, the more we
deliver ourselves to general ones” (V.2).35
Individuals—“we”—must direct our passions somewhere, for we cannot not be
passionate: human beings are lovers, and man’s love may be more or less general or
particular. The pressing question is whether or not—and if so, how—we can love
generally and particularly at the same time, or what the consequences may be of loving in
such contrary, even contradictory, ways—that is, the consequences for the lover as well
as for the object of love. Thus, Montesquieu raises his modern readers’ astonishment at
the manner in which the ancients loved politically. He makes distinctly clear the unique
way in which the ancient city could draw passions out from individual souls towards it,
while binding and circumscribing this love so as to not run beyond it. If the logic of love,
or of the passions, is to seek its satisfaction in more general objects when dissatisfied
with particular ones, from the perspective of small souls it is an astonishing thing indeed
that the republic, or the political body more generally, could so successfully establish
itself as the culmination of passionate satisfaction. We indicted ones, however, with
“our” allegedly small souls, cannot help but wonder whether this contraction is because
our passions are far more particular, or far more general, or somehow both? Is the
contraction a result of an extreme or of a contradiction? Moreover, is Montesquieu
correct or faithful in his depiction of ancient satisfaction on the one hand, and modern
pusillanimity on the other?
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Education and the Particularity of Community
Montesquieu continues the comparison of ancient education with the moderns by
attributing what he sees as a most important advantage to the former: “it was never
contradicted [jamais démentie].” The lives of the ancients—due to their education, or the
manner in which their souls were formed—were constituted by remarkable consistency.
Such lack of contradiction suggests a recurrence of things over the course of time and an
ability to make sense of present things based on previous experience. One gets the
further impression that there was coherence to whole things, so that the various parts—of
the city, of the world, of one’s soul—all had their place, and across the lives of peoples
there was an experiential consistency. Montesquieu makes the ancient world seem
suddenly very simple. By extension, regarding the spirit of antiquity referred to in his
Preface, one may extrapolate that it too had coherence, which is why he can speak so
directly about its spirit, as a spirit. For this sweeping generalization of education, if not
of antiquity as a whole, Montesquieu provides a strikingly singular measure, namely one
man, Epaminondas: “In the last year of his life, Epaminondas said, heard, saw, and did
the same things [les mêmes choses] as at the time that he was first instructed.” The laws
of education Epaminondas received were not only the first, but in many ways the very
last he was exposed to as well.
Of course, this is not to say that Epaminondas had no surprises in his life, or was
sheltered from all change. After all, he was a general responsible for great feats and was
therefore witness to vicissitudes in the order and power of Greek cities. In fact he was
much praised by many for his valor in maintaining and restoring order amidst such

35

conflagration.36 While by all accounts an exemplary figure, Montesquieu claims he
exemplifies the perfection of ancient education, for the changes he may have observed
were superficial, or insufficiently significant to unsettle his well-formed soul.37
Epaminondas thereby serves to represent something like the complete satisfaction of
ancient (republican) love through continued passion for the public interest.
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Cicero, for one, in speaking about what defines a general offers exemplary men who best illustrate the
definition, saying, “I would bring the examples of the Africani and Maximi; and instance Hannibal,
Epaminondas, and such other heroes.” Cicero, De Oratore: Or, His Three Diaglogues Upon the Character
and Qualifications of an Orator, trans. William Guthrie (London: R. P. & C. Williams, 1872), I.XLVIII [p.
85]. Later, when discussing the panegyric, he discusses this particularly Greek form of praise and
celebration of persons, listing Epaminondas among Themistocles, Aristides, Agesilaus, Philippus,
Alexander, and “others.” Ibid., II.LXXXIV [p. 217].
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In what is extant from Plutarch there is no “life” altogether devoted to Epaminondas. Instead, he appears
in two other lives, that of Agesilaus and of Pelopidas. (For what it’s worth, in the life of Agesilaus he
refers to a particular detail that he says he has “mentioned in the life of Epaminondas.” Apparently the
assumedly lost life was in parallel to one of the Scipios. For details, see, G. Shrimpton, “Plutarch’s Life of
Epaminondas,” Pacific Coast Philology, Vol. 6 [Apr., 1971]: 55-9). While Montesquieu does not explicitly
refer to either of these two lives (as he provides no notes at all for IV.4), he cites 16 other lives and two
comparisons in The Spirit of the Laws, so it is no stretch that Plutarch is at least one of his sources for
Epaminondas, among others. Not least, two chapters later he refers outright to the Life of Lycurgus (IV.6).
It is therefore worth recounting in brief what Plutarch says about Epaminondas. In the biography of
Agesilaus, during a peace among the warring Greeks with various ambassadors descending on Sparta,
Plutarch refers to Epaminondas, one of those sent as a “Theban, famous at that time for his philosophy and
learning,” although not yet distinguished as a general. However, among all the delegates, he “alone
maintained the dignity of an ambassador,” whereas the lot of others “crouch[ed] to Agesilaus.” His
defiance in speech and deed, and defense of liberty for all cities from Spartan domination, caused the rage
of Agesilaus who “struck the name of the Thebans out of the league [of peace], and declared war against
them,” while making peace with the rest of Greece. Plutarch’s Lives, ed., Arthur H. Clough (New York:
Modern Library Classics, 2001), Vol. 2, 59-60. In discussing Pelopidas—a friend of Epaminondas and a
man similarly descended from an “honourable family in Thebes”— Plutarch’s remarks demonstrate that
Epaminondas was anything but typical. For example, he “made his familiar and hereditary poverty more
light and easy by his philosophy and single life,” and never could Pelopidas persuade him to share in his
wealth. These two friends, moreover, involved in public life together, are presented as mutually
benevolent, kind, and reverent, while lacking the envy, confusion, and mutual jealousy that plagued other
such pairs as Aristides and Themistocles, Cimon and Pericles, and Nicias and Alcibiades: “The true cause
of this was their virtue; whence it came that they did not make their actions aim at wealth and glory…but
both from the beginning being inflamed with a divine desire of seeing their country glorious by their
exertions, they used to that end one another’s excellences as their own.” Somewhat striking is that at one
point in Epaminondas’ life, after the Spartans came to dominate Thebes, and others fled after the conquest
(including Pelopidas), Plutarch reports “Epaminondas stayed at home, being not much looked after, as one
whom philosophy had made inactive and poverty incapable.” Does this fact indicate inconsistency in his
life, or should one interpret it as demonstrating his consistent devotion to his city?—despite the changes
around him, he remained. Plutarch’s Lives Vol. 1, 386-8.
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One may be inclined to protest against this rather exaggerated claim, or this
manner of generalization.38 Is such consistency conceivable in the speeches and deeds,
or the words and actions, of one man as well as of those around him? Alternatively, just
what are these “things” that so remained the same, according to Montesquieu? Even if
Epaminondas can stand in for statesmen and generals, or certain good citizens, upon
consideration of a different type of man, present in and before his day, namely the
philosopher, it is far from obvious that every such Greek “said, heard, saw, and did the
same things.” A cursory reading alone of various Platonic dialogues illustrates the extent
to which philosophizing reveals different things to the interlocutors, as well as many
contradictions, not least since quite a number of the dialogical exchanges end in aporia.
Moreover, philosophical education was precisely concerned with dramatically changing
men’s lives, or turning their souls around, in the sense of periagoge in Plato’s Republic.
In the book on education Montesquieu in fact refers to Plato on a number of occasions—
to his Laws and Republic as well as to his “laws”—and while he draws out other elements
of the works, he never discusses the philosopher-king or the education of philosophers
(IV.6 et passim); least of all does he stress the higher intentions of philosophy and the
Republic.39 To the extent that philosophical education focused on political virtue and
consisted of a certain civic orientation, it more importantly sought to lead men to moral
and intellectual virtue. In so doing, it at least transcended the particular city, even as it
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was dependent upon it. Montesquieu’s exclusive use of Epaminondas is arguably
directed at underlining the ineffectiveness of classical philosophical education, and the
implication is that this was so much the better for ancient political life, insofar as such a
contradicting education would have a destabilizing effect on the life of the republic.40
The “advantage” of ancient education was that it was genuinely political, in that is was
consistently or even simply political.
Epaminondas’s life was so intimately bound up with his particular city of Thebes
that one finds no real private or personal space, as it were. One could hardly imagine
Epaminondas—or the spirit of Epaminondas—apart from considering Thebes and his
Theban citizenship.41 By extension, Montesquieu intimates, one could hardly imagine
the spirit of the ancients without considering ancient education. Even as Epaminondas
could look beyond the walls of his city, and defend them as well as travel outside of them
to do so at times,42 everything he observed and experienced was understood in light of
these walls—geographically and psychologically, physically and morally—which is to
say through the regime in which he was reared. His life is defined by his education as his
education has delineated his life. The “same things” his education led him to see—both
with his eyes and soul—included above all his city and his fellow citizens; everything
was rooted in a sense of the public business, and in Epaminondas’ case it led to heroic
feats on its behalf. Montesquieu depicts a remarkable bond—a seamless connection—
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Consider how he says, “the speculative sciences…render [men] savage [sauvage]” (IV.8). As the editors
note, sauvage in the French implies both the idea of savage brutality and the shy and wild, which is to say it
is something altogether asocial. Rousseau will develop this thought further, when he criticizes the
philosopher’s inability to act and effect change due to his contemplativeness.
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Consider, in contrast, Montesquieu’s depiction of Alcibiades—a man who in many ways seems to have
been something of the antithesis of Epaminondas, and yet he is described as being “the wonder
[l’admiration] of the universe” (V.4).
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In fact, Epaminondas died outside of his city, during the battle of Mantinea, while fighting the Spartans.
Plutarch’s Lives, Vol. 2, 66.
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between speech and deed, together bound by the city as a public tutelary association. As
he later notes, the ancient republics were admirable for their ability to keep at bay all that
conduced “a spirit of distance from public business” (XXIII.21). Epaminondas is
exemplary for having been altogether void of this “spirit of distance” from the erstwhile
“same things” he first experienced through the laws of education.
Montesquieu thereby emboldens his claim of ancient consistency by playing up
ancient practice (and specifically republican practice) or the “effects” of education, while
downplaying ancient theorizing, or the “speculation” of classical philosophy (not least the
speculation on education itself, as well as the moral and intellectual effects of a
philosophical education). The core of his criticism could be interpreted as directed at the
abstractions and generalizations of the philosophers’ speculations—concerned, as they
were, with the universally best, or with “the idea of perfection,” rather than the
particularly existent thing of which one was already a part.43 Such speculations were
insufficiently political, or socially ineffective, because they sundered the satisfaction of
the city, and thereby diminished the effectiveness of the ancient laws of education,
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As he later writes in the context of Rome: “Sects of philosophy had already introduced into the [Roman]
empire a spirit of distance from public business which could not have reached this point at the time of the
republic, when everyone was busy with the arts of war and peace [Montesquieu adds a note: see in Cicero,
De Offices, his ideas about the spirit of speculation]. From it came an idea of perfection attached to all that
leads to a speculative life; from it came distance from the cares and encumbrances of a family. The
Christian religion, succeeding philosophy, fixed, so to speak, ideas for which the former had only cleared
the way” (XXIII.21). One book later he emphasizes the basic orientation of men, as especially conducive
to proper political life: “Men, being made to preserve, feed and clothe themselves, and to do all the things
done in society, religion should not give them an overly contemplative life” (XXIV.11). And since he
considers the sects of philosophy among the ancients to be akin to kinds of religion (XXIV.10), then
philosophy too, on Montesquieu’s assessment, ought not to dwell on contemplation, but address matters
political. The laws, however, may be called upon to correct the disorientating effects of religion and
philosophy: “As religion and the civil laws should aim principally to make good citizens of men, one see
that when either of these departs from this end, the other should aim more toward it” (XXIV.14).
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releasing or unbinding the passions of men.44 The problem introduced by philosophy is a
problem exacerbated “among ourselves” not least since we no longer live in small states
and are no longer educated by “singular institutions.” The effects of philosophy on the
political world are, in our day, even greater according to Montesquieu, as will be seen. It
can therefore no longer be assumed “that all citizens pay a singular attention to each
other. This cannot be promised in the confusion, oversights, and extensive business of a
numerous people” (IV.7; cf. VIII.16). Amidst this “confusion,” and the extension of
business well beyond the public thing, the “singular attention” of citizens is fractured. As
the size of political bodies has changed, so too therefore has the extent and expanse of
men’s love; the object of the passions has become less directed. But more than just
enlargement is in effect here, for a major difference in education is likewise present. The
effect of the education “we receive” is that it enlarges the distance—it instills a “spirit of
distance”—from the particular community in which we are born and instructed. The
distance is, very concretely, both physical and spiritual. Montesquieu goes on to explain
why this is the case.

Modern Education and the Division of the Heart
“Today,” Montesquieu writes, “we receive three different or opposing educations:
that of our fathers, that of our schoolmasters [maîtres], and that of the world. What we
are told by the last upsets [renverse] all the ideas of the first two. This comes partly from
the opposition there is for us between the ties [engagements] of religion and those of the
world, a thing unknown among the ancients.” What our fathers and schoolmasters teach
44

Montesquieu is not only very attentive to the direction and receptacles of love, but is likewise concerned
with the proliferation and differentiation of desire: “Those to whom nothing is given desire nothing; those
to whom a little is given soon desire a little more and then a great deal” (V.17).
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us is different from what those of the ancients taught them, and furthermore, these
teachings are at odds with the world. What we learn in the world sends us in a different
direction from what we learn in the family and schoolhouse. The difference is not finally
in the details of the education per se, but more importantly in their ultimate orientations.
The effect of modern education is to divide the individual, and draw him in ambivalent
directions. If towards the community, then also away from it; when towards what is
one’s own, likely even more so to what is beyond; and this due to an opposing set of ties:
the inheritance of religious tradition contradicts the reality of the world.
Altogether “unknown among the ancients” on Montesquieu’s telling is the
“opposition” between the two sets of bonds of religion and of the world. There was but
one set of ties for Epaminondas and the ancients, for their religions were, as Rousseau
will famously call them, “civil religions.”45 Religion itself contributed to the cultivation
of citizenship.46 Religion, education, and the world had no deep, or significant,
separations from the public business in ancient republics, on Montesquieu’s account: all
drove men towards civic virtue, inspiring them to manifest it “in full force.” For “us,”
however, religion—our religion—divides men between the realities of the political world
and the teachings of those who exhort concern with what is beyond the world, which is to
say with the demands of Heaven.
One is reminded of Machiavelli’s castigation of the Christian religion and his
judgment that it was to blame for the decline of ancient republics insofar as it taught men
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Rousseau, Social Contract, IV.8.
This is not to say he denies that ancient religion had certain pernicious political effects and abuses in
practice, as for example, he notes that in Athens “the excessive number of festivals was a great problem.
Frequently, business could not be conducted among this dominating people to whom all the Greek towns
brought their differences” (XXIV.23).
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to attend more to their salvation than their patria.47 However, Montesquieu’s claim here
is perhaps less direct than Machiavelli’s and his critique of the Christian religion’s effects
on political life is somewhat ambiguous48—an ambiguity no less directed at the universal
expanse of the Christian religion.49 In speaking of “ties” or engagements, Montesquieu’s
account does not so much emphasize the personal element of salvation at this point as the
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Machiavelli, Discourses, I.11-12, II.2
Elsewhere he addresses the effects of “the idea of a place of reward” and its necessary connection to “the
idea of a region of penalties.” He is particularly concerned with the situation where there is hope for the
former idea with fear for the latter one. The consequence, he writes, would be the loss of force of the civil
laws. When men are certain in their belief “of rewards in the next life” they “escape the legislator; they
will have too much scorn for death.” Thus: “How can one constrain by the laws a man who believes
himself sure that the greatest penalty the magistrates can inflict on him will end in a moment only to begin
his happiness?” (XXIV.14). The question is undoubtedly pertinent in age of renewed religious terrorism.
See, Barry Cooper, New Political Religions or An Analysis of Modern Terrorism (Columbia: University of
Missouri Press, 2005).
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He is not without praise for the positive effects of Christianity on political life: “Remarkably, the
Christian religion, which seems to have no other object than the felicity of the other life, is also our
happiness in this one!” (XXIV.3). He criticizes Bayle for misunderstanding “the spirit” of Christianity and
in this passage, one is tempted to say, even exaggerates the positive effects of Christianity upon citizenship,
writing that Christians, “would be citizens infinitely enlightened about their duties and having a very great
zeal to perform them [of course, he does not specify here which duties]; they would sense the rights of
natural defense; the more they believed they owed to the religion, the more they would think they owed to
the homeland.” Montesquieu finds it “astounding” that Bayle failed to “distinguish the orders for the
establishment of Christianity from Christianity itself, and the precepts of the gospels from their counsels.”
His point seems to be that the very spirit of Christianity is a certain political flexibility, which is to say that
it can and will be adjusted according to the particulars of place and culture, insofar as the counsels are not
like hard and fast laws, and the real precepts are few: “When the legislator, instead of giving laws, has
given counsels, it is because he has seen that his counsels, if they were ordained like laws, would be
contrary to the spirit of the laws” (XXIV.6). The difference between precepts and counsels in matters
political and religious is elaborated in the following chapter: “Human laws made to speak to the spirit
should give precepts and no counsels at all; religion, made to speak to the heart, should give many counsel
and few precepts” (XXIV.7). Thus, even as the Church introduces into the world, through universal
spiritualism, an unprecedented spirit of universalism, its spirit is one that is conducive to balance with
particulars, according to Montesquieu. For discussion of Montesquieu “as an opponent of Christianity who
is at the same times its heir,” and one who did not so much aim at the disappearance of religion than at “a
transformation of Christianity” to make it “safe for liberalism and constitutionalism,” see, Clifford Orwin,
“‘For Which Human Nature Can Never Be Too Grateful’: Montesquieu as the Heir of Christianity,” in
Recovering Reason: Essays in Honor of Thomas L. Pangle, ed., Timothy Burns (Lanham: Lexington
Books, 2010), 269-84; cf. Robert C. Bartlett, The Idea of Enlightenment: A Post-Mortem Study (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2001), 13-44, who argues that Montesquieu and Bayle “are at one on the
fundamental questions,” notwithstanding their real and apparent differences, insofar as both seek to demote
religion’s negative effects on politics by restricting politics to the pursuit of goods rooted in the natural
passions, such as the desire for security.
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conflict between two different communities.50 The ties of religion under the Christian
dispensation are universal: all Christians everywhere are engaged by the City of God and
its commands, and are thus beholden to duties that transcend any given particular
political community. The Church, as representative of the City of God, has the task of
properly forming individuals so as to aspire and live up to the demands of the Heavenly
City, and no doubt it understands itself as being a real and effective city in the world,
even as it claims not to be of the world. However, these ties are, so to speak, invisible, in
contrast to the very visible ties of the world, manifest in the form of one’s own concrete
community, in its laws, customs, and ways, and in contrast to the many other existent but
different ones outside. The religious ties may often be at odds with the worldly, political
ties—one may feel engaged by two alternate cities—causing a certain imbalance, or
inconsistency in the lives of men. This division within the spirit of individuals and
communities may otherwise be understood as a division and opposition between what is
particular and what is universal. What follows is the emergence of ambivalence in the
direction the passions and love may take.
The great task of political philosophy in the wake of Christianity’s emergence has
been to strike a balance or compromise in this regard, between the universal Church and
the particular polities. So much has been called the “theologico-political problem” of the
West, which has served as the catalyst of European political development.51 This is not
the place to recall this long and complex history and the various ways the problem has
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Montesquieu repeatedly reminds readers that when speaking of religion, he speaks “not [as] a theologian
but one who writes about politics,” and thus he examines “the various religions of the world only in relation
to the good to be drawn from them in the civil state” (XXIV.1 [emphasis added]; cf. XXIV.3, 4, 14ff.).
51
See, Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995),
ch. 1. This problem, in these terms, will be addressed herein at greater length in the seventh chapter of this
work.
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been addressed; suffice it to say that it is an inheritance within which Montesquieu
himself is working. And even as the power and presence of the Universal Church has
waned, the Western sense of universality has taken on new forms, both as an extension
of, as well as in opposition to, Christian universalism. Of course, if the Western sense of
universalism emerged first by way of philosophy and then most effectively in and
through the Church, the latter at least was preceded by various political projects that
sought universality. While Rome is the obvious example—and Montesquieu was nothing
if not a keen student of Rome—one earlier empire of particular interest to Montesquieu is
that of Alexander, which he finds to be unique in antiquity.
Alexander and “the whole earth”
Montesquieu first introduces Alexander after discussing the right of war and its
extension, the right of conquest. It is his contention that the “purpose of conquest is
preservation” and any servitude that may ensue is only “accidental” (X.3). He is by no
means unaware of the abuses that both theorists and practitioners have made of this right.
Nevertheless, he states that a conqueror “can change the course of everything,” to which
he adds “muffled tyranny is the first thing which is liable to violence” (X.4). The course
of political history, no doubt, is unthinkable without the role that expansion and imperial
politics has played. If many are liable to emphasize the negative consequences, such as
the destruction of life and property, and the eradication of whole peoples, Montesquieu is
surprisingly quick to counter that its destructive power can be positive as well: “A
conquest can destroy harmful prejudices, and, if I dare speak this way, can put a nation
under a better presiding genius.” Conquest can liberate as well as enlighten.
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Montesquieu offers an argument of humanitarianism, avant la lettre.52 He does
not, however, offer a systematic account as to what conditions and course of action must
prevail for this to hold true. Instead, he provides a negative example in the form of the
disastrous approach of the Spanish in Mexico. Rather than free and enlighten the
Mexicans, the Spaniards, he says, “brought them a raging superstition” and “they made
freemen slaves.” The weighty emphasis he puts on this example makes it clear how
sensitive Montesquieu is to the way in which conquering peoples can go awry. And even
in the best cases, he acknowledges that there is a heavy price to pay, for each conqueror
must “make amends for part of the evils he has done.” In offering a concluding
definition of the right of conquest, he says it is “a necessary, legitimate, and unfortunate
right, which always leaves an immense debt to be discharged if human nature is to be
repaid.” Political action, no matter the nobility of intentions, always risks an element of
evil, or at least requires a means of amending transgressions. There are limits to the good
of conquest, as there are inherent limitations to the good all human action may initiate.53
After what amounts to a rather ambiguous discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of conquests, of wavering goods and evils in expansive activity,
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In his Commentary and Review of Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws, trans. Thomas Jefferson (Orig.
published, Philadelphia: William Duane, 1811 [Reprinted, New York: Burt Franklin, 1969]), 91-2, Destutt
de Tracy approves of this passage. In agreeing that “a people often gain a great deal by being conquered,”
he adds that it is “particularly true, of those whose fortune it is to be conquered by a representative
government, for they thereby gain both liberty and economy,” whether they are incorporated into the body
of the conquering state are refounded into a new state. For de Tracy, this kind of conquest “is in truth more
like a rescue from bondage…and this is what renders the representative form of government formidable to
all others.”
53
If, as Montesquieu writes in his Preface, “[i]t is not a matter of indifference that the people be
enlightened,” there are nonetheless reasons for caution: “In a time of ignorance, one has no doubts even
while doing the greatest evils; in an enlightened age, one trembles even while doing the greatest goods.
One feels the old abuses and sees their correction, but one also sees the abuses of the correction itself. One
lets an ill remain if one fears something worse; one lets a good remain if one is in doubt about a better.”
Enlightenment is not without its ambiguities and ambivalences; the political good is rarely self-evident and
not without trade-offs. Thus, Mansfield nicely summarizes Montesquieu’s “essential task”: “To see the
abuses of enlightenment without renouncing enlightenment.” Mansfield, Taming the Prince, 218.
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Montesquieu gives two ancient examples that triumphed over superstition; two cases
against the one failed modern Spanish example. Under the title, “Gelon, King of
Syracuse,” Montesquieu provides a short discussion of what he believes to be the “finest
peace treaty mentioned in history” (X.5). Gelon made peace with the Carthaginians, and
in the subsequent treaty he sought the abolition of the Carthaginian custom of sacrificing
their children. “Remarkable thing! After defeating three hundred thousand
Carthaginians, he exacted a condition useful only to them, or rather, he stipulated one for
mankind.” It is at this point Montesquieu closes the eponymous chapter with a single
sentence from the life of an altogether different man: “The Bactrians had their elders
eaten by large dogs; Alexander forbade them to do this, and this was a triumph he gained
over superstition.” This triumph introduces Alexander who nine chapters hence is given
his own chapter that is full of great praise for “his enterprise” (X.14).
Prior to addressing Alexander directly, however, Montesquieu discusses a modern
example of comparative failure in the likes of Charles XII (X.13). Contrary to common
opinion, Montesquieu does not singularly attribute Charles’ downfall to the famous battle
of Poltava—often considered the end of the Swedish Empire and the founding of the
Russian Empire—rather he says, “if he had not been destroyed at that place, he would
have been destroyed at another.” It is possible, on Montesquieu’s telling, to rectify the
accidents of fortune, but “one cannot avert events that continuously arise from the nature
of things.” And Charles’ error was precisely that he was “not ruled by the actual
arrangement of things, but rather by a certain model he had chosen; even this he followed
badly.” Charles’ “model”—namely, Alexander—was adopted rashly, and became
something of an imposition, or an abstraction, as it was at odds with the realities of
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politics and his own abilities. It was, Montesquieu underlines, contrary to “the nature of
things.” Montesquieu therefore determines that Charles “was not Alexander but he
would have been Alexander’s best soldier.” Charles’s ambition could have served
Alexander’s own ambition well; however, one may question whether Charles would have
been so satisfied as a subordinate. In fact, it is conceivable that Charles might have been
Alexander’s most dangerous soldier; perhaps brave in battle, but otherwise potentially
unruly if his desires were akin to Alexander’s. The difficulty one is faced with is that
large-scale ambitions, or plans for universal rule, require the mobilization and aid of
those with no less strong but lower-lever passions; the lesser executioners of a vision
must be engaged but aspire to a baser form of satisfaction than that of the visionary or
leader. One must be able to enflame passions, but also tame them, accordingly. The
problem is one of a species that Plato raises in his Republic, when dealing with the
spiritedness of the guardians. It is no less a problem in modernity than it was in
antiquity.
Why, one wonders, does Montesquieu introduce the ancient, Alexander, by way
of the modern, Charles, and furthermore raise the status of the ancient over the modern?
To be sure, the obvious ancient comparison is the parallel Plutarch himself draws
between Alexander and Caesar, which Montesquieu only draws together with remarkable
brevity in closing (as well as an initial passing remark between the types of battles both
first fought). One reason why Montesquieu likely discusses Charles is to attack many of
his contemporaries who held the Swedish king in high esteem.54 Montesquieu thus subtly
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Not least among these is, of course, Voltaire. It is not inconceivable that this was an attack on two fronts:
regarding the praise of Charles, and so too against those who failed to take the ancients seriously. In the
case of Voltaire, based on his works, Nouvelles Considérations sur l’histoire and Discours sur l’Histoire de
Charles XII, it has been said that “Voltaire dealt exclusively with modern history for he believed that
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takes on both modern theory and practice, and subsequently establishes himself—a
different kind of modern—as the true theorist of ancient practice, making Alexander of
antiquity more relevant to the present times than Charles the modern. The modern
political world may have changed, but some of the most important lessons can
nevertheless be learned from a proper understanding of ancient political actors.
Readers are informed that “Alexander’s project succeeded only because it was
sensible [sensé],” and a few lines later that the project was not only “wise [sage], but it
was wisely executed [sagement exécuté]” (X.13). Even when acting rapidly and “in the
heat of his passions,” Montesquieu dares to say that he “was led by a vein of reason [une
saillie de raison qui le conduisait].” Others, Montesquieu charges, have “wanted to make
a romance of his story,” but such men are of a spirit more “spoiled” than that of
Alexander himself. Montesquieu writes at once tauntingly and invitingly that their
romantic decadence is “unable to hide” this “vein of reason…from us.” Montesquieu is
not so much discovering the ‘cunning of reason’ unbeknownst to the actor, but
considering both Alexander’s intentions—his wisdom and strategy—as well as the
broader consequence of his project. Alexander’s project is fully intelligible on its own
terms, even as its intelligibility may offer insights beyond itself. While Montesquieu
seems full of praise for him, he is not, however, without reservations as well. His
ancient history could only satisfy our curiosity whereas modern history could be a definite source of moral
instruction.” Patrick Henry, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Jan. – Mar., 1977): 146. This
is a notion against which Montesquieu obviously stands athwart, and on the basis of which Montesquieu
might charge Voltaire for having failed to genuinely turn to antiquity to capture its spirit (for reasons
beyond idle curiosity). In his Pensées, Montesquieu refers to Voltaire’s History of Charles XII, and
mentions an “admirable fragment,” while commenting on the “vivid” writing of the work, but adds that
“[s]ometimes the author lacks sense.” Mes Pensées, no. 641 (p. 201). In a later note he is more candid, and
the analogy he draws could hardly be more biting to Voltaire: “Voltaire will never write good history. He
is like the monks, who write not for the subject they are treating but for the glory of their order; Voltaire
writes for his monastery” (no. 1446, p. 416). The rivalry between Montesquieu and Voltaire is not
unknown, for as Peter Gay has noted, “Voltaire sniped at [Esprit des lois] for a quarter century.” Gay, The
Party of Humanity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), 59, 90, 208ff; cf. Paul Rahe, The Logic of Liberty
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 10-26.
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ambiguous tribute forces one to wonder about the extent to which Montesquieu endorses
some kind of universal rule, and insofar as he allows it, of what he thinks it ought to
consist.
Montesquieu makes clear that Alexander did not set out on conquest before
securing Macedonia against the encircling barbarians, and doing this included
“completely suppressing the Greeks.” The servitude of the Greeks, however, was merely
instrumental. It was not driven by enmity, rather it was a necessary step for the project’s
sake: “he used this oppression only for the execution of his enterprise.” Alexander’s
oppression of the Greeks reached the success it did because he hid their servitude from
them. Montesquieu’s interpretation of this concealment is based on his claim that
Alexander managed to “dazzle” the Greeks by destroying their “eternal enemies,” the
Persians, and led them to expect the conquest of Asia at large (X.13). Thus, Montesquieu
suggests that the love of Greek liberty at this time was less than Greek enmity—the
resentment of the Greeks could be used against them, insofar as they no longer had the
virtue and will to actually act upon their anger to vanquish their enemies. Happy instead
were they to give themselves up to an oppressor if they could witness their enemies’
destruction. It should be noted that the Greeks of this period were no longer of the stature
of Epaminondas; their erstwhile ordinate civic love and virtue had become corrupt.55
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Montesquieu had previously invoked the authority of Justin (his work, Epitoma historiarum
Philippicarum) on Greek decline, who suggests it was coterminous with Epaminondas’ death (VIII.5, n. 2):
“Justin attributes the extinction of virtue in Athens to the death of Epaminondas…” at which point the
Athenians ceased to be positively competitive, spending their income instead on “festivals,” going to the
theater instead of being “at camp,” whereupon the Macedonians “came out of obscurity.” Six chapters later
Epaminondas is again mentioned, or rather his time is compared with that of Plutarch’s time, such that in
the latter, “the parks, where one fought naked, and the wrestling matches, made the young people cowardly,
inclined them to an infamous love and made only dancers of them,” whereas “Epaminondas’ time,
wrestling had brought victory to the Thebans at the battle of Leucra.” The very same physical activity—
wrestling—can have different spiritual outcomes given the nature of the period.
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What Montesquieu’s description of this example and others makes clear is that
Alexander was successful at finding his opponents’ weakness—strategic, psychological,
geographical, etc.—and exploiting it, often taking an opposing approach from those he
encountered. While he certainly had some luck along the way, in the beginning,
Montesquieu stresses, he “left little to chance.” Eventually, through temerity, wisdom,
industry, and some fortune, his victory at the battle of Arbela “gave him the whole earth.”
Additionally key to Alexander’s achievements, according to Montesquieu, was the speed
with which he executed each stage of his plan and every battle strategy implemented.
“Alexander’s marches are so rapid that you believe that empire of the universe is the
prize for running, as in the Greek games, rather than the prize for victory.” To
summarize his strategy of conquest, one may describe it as wisely used speed and
speedily applied wisdom.
So far as preservation goes, Montesquieu makes explicit that Alexander defied the
counsel of those (including Aristotle, mentioned in a note) who sought to make the
Greeks masters over the enslaved Persians. Instead, it was Alexander who united the
“two nations” and thereby wiped out “the distinctions between the conquerors and the
vanquished: after the conquest, he abandoned all the prejudices that had served him in
making it; he assumed the mores of the Persians in order not to distress the Persians by
making them assume the mores of the Greeks.” He took away the particular liberty of the
Greeks in order to establish a kind of equality among Greeks and non-Greeks. Alexander
mixed peoples through marriages, relocated peoples to new and old towns in foreign parts
of the empire, and intermingled customs.56 By no means unaware of the differences
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The risk involved in such a mixture is far from small, and elsewhere Montesquieu explicitly advises
against it, for forcing one people (or at least one’s army) to adopt the customs of the vanquished, or vice
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between peoples, Alexander was nonetheless indifferent to certain prejudices attached to
these differences, so long as he could manipulate and mix them for the purpose of his
project: “In order not to drain Greece and Macedonia, he sent a colony of the Jews to
Alexandria; it was unimportant to him what mores these peoples had, provided they were
faithful to him.” Montesquieu admires Alexander’s project as something of a protomulticulturalist one.57 His ability to mix and match disparate peoples led to a patchwork
empire in a time of remarkable political differences and hostility, based to some degree

versa may result in hostility towards the leader. This is made abundantly clear in Montesquieu’s source,
Arrian, cited no less than eight times in this chapter alone. For example, on one of a handful of occasions,
Arrian writes that Alexander had “hurt their [his soldiers’] feelings” with “his adoption of Persian dress, the
issue of Macedonian equipment to the Oriental ‘Epigoni,’ and the inclusion of foreign troops in units of the
Companions.” The result of this was disrespect and disobedience on the part of all sides, and thus mutiny
at Opis, raising of Alexander’s ire and order for executions; however, the eloquent speech that follows,
mixing his own humility and pride, attests to his “genius,” to be sure. See, Arrian, The Campaigns of
Alexander, trans. Aubrey de Sélincourt (New York: Dorset Press, 1971), 361ff [VII.8-9]. Plutarch says that
Alexander took “a middle way between the Persian mode and the Macedonian, so contriv[ing] his habit that
it was not so flaunting as the one, and yet more pompous and magnificent than the other.” Plutarch’s
Lives, Vol. II, 174ff; an example of competing jealousies among peoples can be found at Ibid., 194-5.
Montesquieu himself addresses this problem of mixing customs more explicitly in the chapter following the
one on Alexander, entitled, “A new means for preserving conquest” (X.15), where he discusses “an
admirable practice” that amounts to “ a new means for preserving the conquest” (X.15). He gives the
example of the Tartar conquest of China. They prevented the vanquished from despairing while
minimizing their own arrogance as conquerors, and so held both peoples to their political duties, consisted
of pitting the jealousy of each nation off that of the other. The Tartars achieves this by constituting each
provincial body of troops with half Chinese and half Tartars and dividing the tribunals in the same fashion.
Montesquieu summarizes the good results in threefold fashion: “1. The two nations constrain one another;
2. Both keep military and civil power, and one is not wiped out by the other; 3. The conquering nation can
spread throughout without weakening and ruining itself; it becomes capable of resisting civil and foreign
wars.” So sensible is this institution, he concludes, that “the absence of a like one has led to the ruin of
almost all the conquerors on earth.” And yet he goes on to say that an “immense conquest presupposes
despotism” (X.16), while the armies spread throughout the provinces are “insufficient.” The prince in this
case requires “a specially trustworthy body” that is ever prepared “to assail the part of the empire that may
waver.” To the extent that Alexander implemented the “admirable practice” of opposing national
jealousies, or mixing peoples, we not only know that Alexander’s empire fell, but Montesquieu does not
hide the fact that “his empire was divided” immediately after his death (VIII.17). The “important men of
Greece and Macedonia,” Montesquieu explains, who once lived freely or ruled freely over conquered
peoples before they were “so scattered across that vast conquest [of Alexander’s]” could not have expected
to have “obeyed others.” While they may have been subordinate to Alexander’s genius, no other man
compared, and upon his death their particular forms of rule—their own passion for rule, out of glory or
liberty or otherwise, could not be kept at bay. So much is the case of the other empires of Charlemagne and
of Attila discussed here comparatively as well.
57
Catherine Volpilhac-Auger, “Montesquieu et l’impérialisme grec: Alexandre ou l’art de la conquête,”
Société Montesquieu Colloquium: Montesquieu and the Spirit of Modernity (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation,
2002), 49-60. Volpilhac-Auger also offers a pertinent discussion of some of Montesquieu’s sources—
ancient and modern—regarding Alexander.
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on faith to his person and rulership. His apparent respect for diverse peoples garnered the
peoples’ respect in turn. “He respected old traditions and everything that recorded the
glory or the vanity of these peoples,” often leaving vanquished peoples their mores and
civil laws, and even in many cases their original rulers. Importantly, Montesquieu’s
silence about any major religious changes signifies his approval of Alexander’s not
disturbing the religious sensibilities of peoples, for as he writes elsewhere, “it is a
misfortune for human nature when religion is given by a conqueror.” As, he says, is
illustrated by “the Mohammedan religion, which speaks only with a sword,” and thereby
“act[s] on men with the destructive spirit that founded it” (XXIV.4).
The success of preservation, Montesquieu argues, and thus the “vein of reason”
running through his project, rests on the fact that Alexander did not conquer and
subsequently seek to preserve his conquests with various tactics, but that his grander
strategy of conquest itself amounted to a form of preservation: “[he] wanted to conquer
all in order to preserve all [pour tout conserver], and in every country he entered, his first
ideas, his first designs, were always to do something to increase its prosperity and power
[la prospérité et la puissance].” This is in direct contrast with the Roman approach, as
they “conquered all in order to destroy all.” Proper preservation, according to
Montesquieu’s analysis, does not mean simply maintaining the status quo; it is not
preservation without change. Rather, even as one delicately respects “old traditions” and
the cultural elements containing and representing a peoples’ pride, conquest aimed at
preservation requires increasing the economic wealth and capacities of a people. The key
to Alexander’s conquest is inseparable from his introduction and extension of commerce.
Again, in contrast to the Romans whose conquest was to the exclusion of commerce,
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Alexander amounts, for Montesquieu, to what has called been “the pivot of a change in
perspective.” Commerce—in the broadest terms—was not only a means but even in
some sense Alexander’s end. Montesquieu attributes to him “a great revolution in
commerce,” and later adds with assurance that, “one cannot doubt that his design was to
engage in commerce with the Indies through Babylon and the Persian Gulf” (XX.8). In
and through the commercial bridges he built, Alexander became the conqueror who
unified, rather than separated.58 The vein of his reason makes conquest of the whole
earth coterminous with its commercialization.59
We return to discuss the spirit of commerce and its universalizing tendencies in
the next chapter. At present, a few more words about Alexander’s character are
necessary. Montesquieu further unravels this vein of reason by indicating three specific
elements behind it. The first is that it was simply “in the greatness of his genius.”
Alexander’s spirit was so rare and grand that he could hardly have been otherwise given
the circumstances; he even refuted the advice of Aristotle, so great did he understand
himself and his destiny. Second, Montesquieu suggests the fact of Alexander’s “own
frugality and his own economy.” Alexander was not personally greedy or a lover of
luxury and what he did he did for those who stuck with him; he sought no greater
possessions than his fellows. That is, at least in terms of gold and other material goods
that may be acquired through commerce or similar economy, for none but Alexander had
the glory of ruling “the whole earth.” Thus: “His hand was closed for private
expenditures; it opened for public expenditures.” The greatness of his genius consisted in
58

Catherine Larrère, “Montesquieu et l’histoire du commerce,” in Le Temps de Montesquieu, eds. Michel
Porret and Catherine Volpilhac-Auger (Geneva: Droz, 2002), 324-5.
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The absence of religious references in this regard is also telling, since as Pangle argues at length,
Montesquieu felt the best strategy against religious fanaticism was not to counter it with alternative
religious or anti-religious arguments, but to be greet it with silence. Pangle, The Theological Basis, 66ff.
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no small part to his liberality towards others. And the third factor mentioned is
Alexander’s “immense prodigality for great things.” Montesquieu is not suddenly being
contradictory by implying he was greedy or had an extravagance towards “great things,”
for according to Littré’s dictionary of the eighteenth century, “La prodigalité est l'opposé
de l'avarice.”60 His private or personal desires were anything but those of common
avarice, and he desired much more than common things.61 What great “thing” could a
man with his “greatness of…genius” desire on earth more than to rule the whole of it?
And one with his sagesse knew full well that he would have to depend upon the passions
of others to do so. He would need to appeal to and satisfy the desires of various peoples,
finding what is common in the midst of differences, which would require dazzling them;
respecting the particularities of their glory and vanity, he would have to simultaneously
unite them through their common needs. Being without avarice himself, Alexander could
establish himself as the generous bringer of prosperity for all, and even perhaps raise the
desire for prosperity above that for things of glory and vanity. In this way, Alexander
could secure his own glory, but what kind of glory is it; how genuine does Montesquieu
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See the online dictionary, at: http://littre.reverso.net/dictionnaire-francais/definition/prodigalit%C3%A9.
Interestingly, this very passage from Montesquieu is an example of its use.
61
Cf. Plutarch’s Lives, Vol. II, 139-99. The combination of Alexander’s temperance with his sense of
greatness is a recurring theme in Plutarch’s account. On numerous occasions he denied himself the
pleasure of indulging, particularly in conquered women, esteeming it “more kingly to govern himself than
to conquer his enemies,” for as Plutarch explains, Alexander “was wont to say that sleep and the act of
generation chiefly made him sensible that he was mortal; as much as to say, that weariness and pleasure
proceed both from the same frailty and imbecility of human nature.” As the priestess of Apollo confirmed
for him, Alexander considered himself immortal, and it was in his nature to seek immortal glory: “when his
affairs called upon him, he would not be detained, as other generals often were, either by wine, or sleep,
nuptial solemnities, spectacles, or any other diversion whatsoever; a convincing argument of which is, that
in the short time he lived, he accomplished so many and so great actions” (155-7). Though Plutarch
qualifies by later adding that “it is apparent that Alexander in himself was not foolishly affected, or had the
vanity to think himself really a god, but merely used his claims to divinity as a means of maintaining
among other people the sense of his superiority” (162). As a note of comparison, it may be suggested that
that which Plutarch stresses (admittedly in his much longer account) and which Montesquieu suppresses, is
the matter of Alexander’s education as well as the lessons he learns from various philosophers—including
Aristotle, Diogenes, Psammon, Callisthenes, Anaxarchus, and others.
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consider it to be?62 His success, moreover, was rather short-lived. One could do worse
than compare the glory of Alexander to the glory of another ancient much admired by
Montesquieu whom we have already encountered.
In his Pensées, Montesquieu makes only one mention of Epaminondas, but his
importance for Montesquieu is evident enough; even if infrequently mentioned,
Montesquieu clearly reflected repeatedly upon him. Remarkably, the one mention of the
Theban is made with a direct contrast to Alexander. It is worth quoting at length:
Philosophy and, I dare say, even a certain commonsense have gained too much ground in this day and age
for heroism to make much headway in the future. Once vainglory has become a little ridiculous,
conquerors—no longer consulting anything but their own interest—will never go very far.
Each age has its particular character: a spirit of disorderly independence was created in Europe with Gothic
government; the monastic spirit infected the times of Charlemagne’s successors; then reigned that of
chivalry; that of conquest appeared with orderly troops; and it is the spirit of commerce that dominates
today.
This spirit of commerce makes everything a matter of calculation. But glory, when it is all alone, enters
only into the calculations of fools.
I speak here only of vainglory, not that which is founded on the principles of duty, virtue, zeal for the
Prince, love of Country; in a word, I speak of the glory of Alexander, not of Epaminondas. The latter,
being real, is or ought to be for all nations and all times; the former, being chimerical, has the same
vicissitudes as prejudices do.63

Heroism is something of the past, laments Montesquieu64, but the upside is that the now
apparent ridiculousness of vainglory limits the likelihood and successes of conquerors.
So powerful has philosophy and commonsense become that men are primarily oriented in
and to calculation; commerce cultivates calculators and gainsays glory. But one type of
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Montesquieu’s aforementioned critique of Charles XII is similar to that leveled against Louis XIV, and
the broader notion of “universal monarchy.” It is Montesquieu’s belief that the world has significantly
changed so as to preclude any sort of Roman, or even Alexandrian, form of conquest and rule. This
technological and political, if not moral, change is the premise he begins with in his early work, Réflexions
sur la Monarchie Universelle en Europe (Droz: Geneva, 2000). We pick up this discussion in the next
chapter, on war and commerce.
63
Montesquieu, My Thoughts, trans. Henry C. Clark (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2012), 236-7 [no. 810].
64
This theme is repeated in a number of places in his Pensées: “It is probable that what is called heroic
valor is going to be lost in Europe…” “That spirit of glory and valor is being lost little by little among us.
Philosophy has gained ground…” and a list of reasons, moral and technological, are additionally
responsible for the change. Ibid., 225-26 [nos. 760, 761].
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glory is always “real…or ought to be for all nations and all times”—that is to say, even
in the midst of a spirit of commerce, even when the age is dominated by commercial
calculation, and when some distance has separated men, they may still be able to
approximate something like the glory of Epaminondas. The spirit of Epaminondas is as
present as that of Alexander; they stand as two ancient alternatives of glory, the one more
“real” than the other, but each equally relevant today. Epaminondas’s glory, for all its
particularity—for all its localized Greekness, even Thebanness—resting upon a very
specific and focused education, is nonetheless a universally admirable form of glory.
While the glory of universality, so to speak, can be seen as particularly prejudicial. The
universality of genuine glory rests upon particular political devotion: the love that
preserves a government.
To be sure, one should not exaggerate the importance of Montesquieu’s private
and unpublished musings, as he himself tells us in the introduction of his Pensées that its
contents are unfinished reflections. Moreover, the intention here is not to say that
Montesquieu sought a restoration of classical virtue per se, after all, the circumstances
have changed. But Montesquieu’s keen awareness of the need for a modicum of political
passions—or the important place of passion’s role in political preservation—make
especially apparent the tension in politics between the particular and the universal,
especially as the world becomes increasingly universal and open; that is, as individuals
are drawn in directions beyond their own polities and are reared in the absence of ancient
laws of education but under modern ones that otherwise educate in seemingly
contradictory ways.
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While Montesquieu sees many benefits to uniting peoples and commercializing
the earth so as to tame politics—to bring about a cure for Machiavellism (XXI.20)—as
we discuss in the next chapter, he nonetheless forces us to ask about the realness, and one
is tempted to say the naturalness, about different forms of glory; thus, we must reflect on
the consistency of different passions and their political consequences. Is the glory of
republican virtue, in its stark Epaminondasian form, somehow more stable or more
coherent, than an expanding or imperial form of glory?65 After all, if it “is or ought to be
for all nations and all times,” then its reality presumably remains ever present, beyond
Epaminondas’ death and the demise of the ancient poleis. How though might it truly take
shape and form without the requisite powers of ancient education, administered by its
“singular institutions” in the small setting of the city? Alternatively, it might seem that
Alexander’s glory too lives on, as it has certainly been a model to other conquerors,
whether successful or not. However, Montesquieu indicates that it is, despite its
imaginary staying power, “chimerical.”66 One might argue that the glory of Alexander’s
project was lost, on the one hand, through the success of the project in its commercial and
calculative (or anti-glorious) effects, and on the other hand, with the demise of the
political project (that hinged on faith to his person) upon his death (cf. VIII.17). Does
not, however, something akin to his project in an a-personal form (as in an Alexandrian
project sans Alexander) live on today in the form of a globalized or globally
commercialized world? At any rate, in light of this mixed success, or the uncertainties
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True heroism, Montesquieu says much later in his Pensées, ought to be constituted by moderation, which
is in fact “the rarest virtue.” My Thoughts, 608 [no. 1987].
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Although what most distinguishes Alexander for Montesquieu, say, from Caesar and others, is the great
consternation that those he conquered experienced upon his death; he left, for them, something like a
sudden void in the world when he departed from it (X.14). See, Volpilhac-Auger, “Montesquieu et
l’impérialisme grec,” 58.
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about particular and universal glory—then and now—one wonders whether there are
perhaps different principles, or a different ancient lens through which to consider matters
of politics and passions and the difficult balance between things particular and universal.
The Stoics and their “most worthy principles”
Montesquieu offers one notable ancient example that illustrates something like a
suitable balance between the whole earth and one’s particular community, or between
what is most general and what is one’s own. It is his depiction of “the Stoic sect” that
provides a window into this view (XXIV.9). To begin with, the praise he lavishes on the
Stoics is quite remarkable, and carries none of the reservations found in his portrait of
Alexander: “There has never been one [i.e., among the “sects of philosophy,” which he
says “could be considered as kinds of religion”] whose principles were more worthy of
men and more appropriate for forming good men [gens de bien] than that of the Stoics,
and, if I could for a moment cease to think that I am a Christian, I would not be able to
keep myself from numbering the destruction of Zeno’s sect among the misfortunes of
human kind.”67 He goes on to say that the Stoic sect “alone knew how to make citizens;
it alone made great men; it alone made great emperors” (emphasis added).68 According
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Elsewhere Montesquieu has similarly positive things to say about the Stoics: “At that time [i.e., from
Antonius to Probus] the Stoic sect was expanding and gaining favor in the empire. It seemed that human
nature had made an effort to produce this admirable sect out of itself—like those plants the earth brings
forth in places the heavens have never seen. The Romans owed their best emperors to it…” Montesquieu,
Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their Decline, trans. D. Lowenthal
(Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1968), 145ff [Ch. XVI]. In a letter to Fitz-James (Oct. 8, 1750), he writes about his
desire to pen a work imitating Cicero’s de Officiis, which was itself modeled after Panaetius, “who was a
Stoic…since the Stoics were those who best treated this matter of duties.” He adds that he “reader the main
Stoic books, and among others, the moral reflections of Marcus-Antonunus, which seems to me the
masterpiece of antiquity.” Quoted in My Thoughts, 92 [no. 220, editor’s note, 1].
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One notable place where he is critical is when speaking about the Stoics’ view on friendship. They
“carried the reasoning too far,” he writes, when claiming, “the Sage loves no one.” In this context the
question of relations of citizens emerges, and Montesquieu acknowledges the limitations of attachments.
We are unable to “attach ourselves to all our fellow citizens” but instead, he says, we select “a small
number, to whom we limit ourselves.” Subsequently comparing Rome and the present, he says that in the
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to Montesquieu, the Stoics “were occupied only in working for men’s happiness and in
exercising the duties of society [devoirs de la société]; it seemed that they regarded the
sacred spirit which they believed to be within themselves as a kind of favorable
providence watching over mankind [le genre humain].” Likewise, repeating this theme
of social devotion, he concludes: “Born for society, they all believed that their destiny
was to work for it; it was the less burdensome as their rewards were all within
themselves; as, happy in their philosophy alone, it seemed that only the happiness of
others could increase their own.”
Montesquieu’s interpretation of “Zeno’s sect” unmistakably emphasizes the
autonomy of its individual members alongside the instillation of duty towards “society.”
Somehow the apparent disconnect between the individual’s self-sufficiency and his
devotional attachment to “society” can be brought together. The consequence of Stoic
philosophy, in its ability to produce citizens, great men, and great emperors gives one the
impression of being positively political and moral; despite its detachment—among those
who are erstwhile drawn to contemplate and speculate, and therefore think universally—
the result is total political devotion.69 One is therefore eager to know who exemplifies
these characteristics, and just how these apparently contradictory tendencies may be
combined. Consequently, it comes as something of a surprise to find that the only
examples Montesquieu supplies are of emperors. Could it be that the only individuals
able to live according to “themselves,” or the “sacred spirit which they believed to be

former, “[c]itizens were linked to citizens by all sorts of chains,” including friendship, the enfranchised,
slaves, and children; however, “[t]oday, everything is abolished, right down to paternal power; every man
is isolated,” insofar as interests have become “particularize[d].” What otherwise detached men from
themselves and bound him to another “brought forth great deeds,” while absent this, “everything is vulgar,”
and only the basest, even “animal instinct of all men” is present. Ibid., 333 [no. 1253].
69
Cf. Pangle, Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism, 233.
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within themselves” as well as “watching over mankind”—to be altogether for one and
one for all, as it were—are those who are in an absolute position of rule? In recalling
Plato’s lesson regarding the strongly reluctant philosopher-king—the individual who
would much rather devote his soul to the pursuit of wisdom rather than rule over the
many—one cannot help but be struck by the apparent ease with which Montesquieu
seems to solve this problem.70 What is the criterion for the watchmen of “mankind”? At
any rate, he “momentarily lay[s] aside the revealed truths” to say that “seek[ing] in all of
nature… you will find no greater object than the Antonines.” The Antonines most
naturally exemplify the “most worthy principles.” However, in addition to the Antonines
(among whom one may include as few as three or as many as seven, some more or less
well-reputed than others), Montesquieu goes on, somewhat shockingly, to include one
emperor by name: “Julian even, Julian (a vote thus wrenched from me will not make me
an accomplice to his apostasy); no, since him there has been no prince more worthy of
governing men” (emphasis added). The only individual personally singled out, and
otherwise considered the worthiest prince to have governed men from his time to the
present, was the man who sought to restore Roman paganism.71
Whatever else one makes of these remarks, it is clear that Montesquieu does not
hold Christian charity to be the means by which the fellow human beings beyond one’s
political borders ought to be embraced. And yet the ambiguity of the political language
70

See, Lowenthal, “Montesquieu and the Classics.”
Kojève (in his characteristically ironic fashion) has spoken of Julian as “not only an ancient philosopher
but also an authentic emperor, although an ineffective one because he was behind—or ahead of—his time.”
He contends that both “fear of Christian intolerance” but above all raison d’Ètat is the principal reason for
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pagan’ and ‘Neo-Platonic mystic.’” Alexandre Kojève, “The Emperor Julian and His Art of Writing,”
Ancients and Moderns: Essays on the Tradition of Political Philosophy in Honor of Leo Strauss, ed. Joseph
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in this passage is somewhat telling. Rather than speak of governments or states,
Montesquieu twice mentions “society”—a term that is undoubtedly less binding than the
others and seems well paired with the notion of “mankind” itself. By no means does he
presume a return to the ancient world and its political-pedagogical consistency, with its
exclusive emphasis on the particularism of the city, for even if it were possible, it is less
than ideal with respect to freedom and security. Moreover, changes have occurred
precluding such a return; the present power of universalism in the world cannot be
denied.72 The entire passage is reminiscent of Montesquieu’s statement from his Preface:
“By seeking to instruct men one can practice the general virtue that includes love of all.”
Montesquieu models himself in some capacity after the Stoics.73 Like the Stoics, he
seeks to provide the means for “the general virtue that includes love of all” and the
particular virtue allowing each to “better feel his happiness in his own country,
government, and position”; however, unlike the emperors, he does not seek to rule
outright, and indeed denies the possibility for such universal rule by one. The fact that
the world has changed, and is becoming increasingly universal in his day, provides him
with reason to think that such a general love of mankind is all the more likely, even as he
must provide some ballast against its overextension.74 Striking the proper balance—even
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Consider Cohler’s remarks: “The singularity of a particular political life is vulnerable to pressures toward
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Once Christianity—or perhaps its predecessor, Roman universality—became prevalent, Montesquieu
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development of particular spirits…Although the ancient understanding of political life as particular and
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The cosmopolitanism of the Stoics is well known, and has of late become a model for present day ideals
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a new balance, or one based on “new reasons”—the requisite modern balance of love,
between humanity and one’s own polity, so that neither love be at the expense of the
other,75 is an achievement that would make him “the happiest of mortals.” We turn in the
following chapter to examine some of these changes he sees in the world before him, so
as to assess his consequent hopes and means to moderate the extremes.

paraphrases and second or third hand reports, often polemical, penned centuries after their death. But these
original Stoics evidently promulgated the first widely influential cosmopolitan ethical ideal.” What is
interesting is that contrary to many who presume a sort of openness and tolerance to such cosmopolitanism
is that Zeno and his followers “seem to have meant by ‘natural law’ a codification of what they understood
to be the austere and radically unconventional ethic of obedience to rational law…an ethic they presented
in a rather dogmatic, moralistic, and even censorious version.” In short, whatever one makes of it, it is
emphatically an ethic for the few, and so anything but an ideal for all. Pangle, “Roman Cosmopolitanism:
The Stoics and Cicero,” in Cosmopolitanism in the Age of Globalization: Citizens without States, eds., Lee
Trepanier and Khalil M. Habib (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011), 41-2.
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So much is the problem at large examined throughout this essay, which can be summarized by just how
much, and in what way, universal aspirations can be mixed or reconciled with particular ones, and whether
or not or to what extent political life and the community can include as well as moderate transpolitical
aims? The importance of the consideration rests on the fact that it is not self-evident man is capable of
living well on the highest plane of universality or the lowest plane of individualism—or, combined, as
simply an “individual” in the “globe.”
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3. MONTESQUIEU:
OPENING OF THE UNIVERSE:
THE EARTH, COMMERCE, AND THE RIGHT OF NATIONS
“The sea traffic in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea were the only ones known;
that of the Ocean was impractical; the compass had not yet brought the world together.
The trips that a merchant from Constantinople or Smyrna now make in two months provoked the wonder of
the world in that period, and were celebrated by all the poets. Thus, one must not be surprised to see so
many imperfections in the ancient histories, and so many empires and kingdoms in oblivion.
It was not like it is now, when all peoples are so bound together
that the history of one always illuminates that of the others.
—Montesquieu, Pensées, no. 1887

We have seen in the previous chapter how Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws is a
work that uncovers competing passions. It demonstrates that the ambivalence of the
human heart is a problem for political thought to engage with seriousness. This is
perhaps especially true, as the world has become increasingly open—or as we like to say
today, globalized. Arguably now more than ever before can man’s longings and passions
be directed beyond the immediate place and objects around him, in even contradictory
ways. And alongside the extension of such longings and passions has been an increasing
drive towards greater universalization and a certain growing sense of—or desire for—
uniformity across the Western political landscape, if not that of the world as a whole. So
it is worth reflecting with Montesquieu on the following:
There are certain ideas of uniformity that sometimes seize great spirits (for they touched Charlemagne), but
that infallibly strike small ones. They find in it a kind of perfection they recognize because it is impossible
not to discover it: in the police the same weights, in commerce the same measures, in the state the same
laws and the same religion in every part of it. But is this always and without exception appropriate? Is the
ill of changing always less than the ill of suffering? And does not the greatness of genius consist rather in
knowing in which cases there must be uniformity and in which differences?

Such questions are especially relevant today, as so many spirits are struck by ideas of
uniformity, desiring as they do a globalized and harmonized world—one where the
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weights, measures, laws and the like in all areas of human life are the same; or, where
natural differences have little consequence.
It is nevertheless important not to take too narrow a view of globalization—that
is, by discussing it in but its most recent manifestation. The contact and connection
between different and disparate peoples, and a drive towards the uniform, are by no
means strictly contemporary phenomena. The ancient world consisted of expanding
empires and trading peoples, and so too in Montesquieu’s own day commerce was
becoming all the more widespread, as well as studied with greater attention. The
navigation of the globe, through technological developments, and thereby the discovery
of the coasts of Asia and Africa, and of America that was altogether hitherto unknown,
were consequential by Montesquieu’s day. So much to the extent that it is in terms of
movement and transport—in the development of the art of navigation, or the technology
directly related to commerce—that we can greatly feel the difference between the ancient
and modern world: “For if, at a time when sailing has much improved, at a time when the
arts are communicated, at a time when one corrects with art both the defect of nature and
the defects of itself, one feels these differences, what must it have been for the sailing of
the ancients?” (XXI.6). So it is that Montesquieu reflected greatly on the political
implications of how “[t]he compass opened the universe, so to speak” (XXI.21).76 This
chapter examines this opening, the place and likelihood of political uniformity in an open
universe, and its consequences for human mores and virtue. It is argued herein that
Montesquieu’s embrace of universalizing commerce is qualified, and that he is very
aware of the ambiguities such an open universe brings forth, for both human happiness
76

Montesquieu speaks of the discovery of the America as the expansion of the universe: it made possible
for the House of Austria under Charles “a new kind of greatness” when “the universe expanded and a new
world obedient to him appeared” (XXI.21).
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and greatness. His attention to natural distinctions—which is to say bodily, physical,
topographical and climatological differences—and the plethora of details that shape
human communities and communication make up part of his “genius…in knowing in
which cases there must be uniformity and in which differences.” It is a genius from
which we can still profit today.

The Communication of Peoples, in Commerce and War
“The history of commerce,” writes Montesquieu, “is that of communication
among peoples” (XXI.5). And by “communication” Montesquieu means more than just
interaction in speech; rather, it implies various kinds of encounters and exchanges, in
goods, ideas, currencies, services, and the like, both for better and for worse. As more
peoples in different parts of the world—not least in different climates—have come into
contact and communication with one another, commerce expanded, for “peoples of the
same climate have almost the same things,” therefore, “they do not need commerce with
one another as much as do peoples of differing climates” (XX.4). It is inherent to the
logic of commerce that it broadens and expands, for that which is communicated from
afar is what is least likely to be available at home. Moreover, this communication in its
expansive form is not unrelated to certain dramatic kinds of activity, such as war and
attempts to maintain peace: “[Commerce’s] greatest events are formed by their [i.e.,
peoples’] various destructions and certain ebbs and flows of population and
devastations.”
The long process of universalizing commerce, and so of globalization, has by no
means been a painless or steady one. Even as it may be true that “[t]he natural effect of
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commerce is to lead to peace,” insofar as “[t]wo nations that trade with each other
become reciprocally dependent”—for “all unions are founded on mutual needs”
(XX.2)—commerce nevertheless exacts its own additional price. It may have effects that
are other than peaceful, while perfectly reciprocal dependence cannot always be
guaranteed. Moreover, the logic of interconnected interest is not the only one operating
in the political world; nor for that matter in the hearts of men. This chapter discusses
Montesquieu’s views on commerce, war, and the physical setting of these activities to
illustrate that while he sees commerce’s universalization as a likely positive force,
particularly in countering the devastation of war, he is not unaware of the less than ideal
effects such changes can have on human communities, as well as that the earth’s
physicality plays a significant and inescapable role in these spheres of activity. Thus, his
work indicates certain limits to universality in politics—the opening of the universe is not
a singularly positive event, and therefore a critical political gaze is necessary to engage
the phenomenon.
While the political universe may be opening up in new ways—fostering new
kinds and objects of human passions, as well as at more general levels—Montesquieu
does not hold out for any ultimate, or universal solution to the political problem.
Alternatively, he is not one to deny the reality of tangible, and perhaps even intractable,
distinctions between peoples. The Spirit of the Laws serves to constantly remind its
readers of the inescapability of contingency in human affairs, and the irreconcilability of
certain particularities. On the whole, and unlike many of his near successors,
Montesquieu offers no systematic or universal philosophy of history, never mind one that
proposes a consummate end. The fact that Montesquieu’s work teaches history
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continues, even along multiple trajectories and with a degree of unpredictability—that we
may speak of both the history of humanity and the histories of peoples, or of universal
history and particular histories—is itself indication of a balanced approach to the
universal and particular.77 This lesson is particularly evident from his discussion of war
and peace as well as of commerce.
Various scholars have engaged with Montesquieu’s views on these and related
themes. The relationship between war and commerce in The Spirit of the Laws is by no
means incidental, and indeed, the general argument that each has a similar logic, or spirit,
at its core, so that a world of commerce may one day eliminate war, is a claim dear to
much of liberal thought.78 It is a hope generated by reflection on the state of nature and
the desire to flee it on every level, once and for all. Even as Montesquieu’s initial
discussion of war and defense is followed by a later elaboration of commerce, with
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Kant’s discussion in his work, “Perpetual Peace,” in Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), where he writes that, “[the] spirit of commerce…cannot exist side by side with war, and that
sooner or later [it] masters every nation” (114). Cf. Thomas Pangle and Peter Ahrensdorf, Justice Among
Nations (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1997), 185-217, who discuss just how long Kant thought
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implications of commerce’s effect on softening martial tendencies, we will see he is not
confident this is inevitable. Various qualifications lessen the oversimplified view that
commerce and war fit neatly together so that Montesquieu is less sanguine regarding the
commercialization of the world as being tantamount to its demilitarization.
Thus, while some find that Montesquieu is overwhelmingly insistent that national
character is particularly difficult to change, and is stable in the long run,79 others perceive
a “dramatic presentation of a continuously expanding republican federation as the only
adequate solution to the problem of politics.”80 It is not self-evident that his arguments
regarding commerce can be decontextualized in so straightforward a manner, and applied
to the world at large as a single, or singular process—that is, with one adequate solution
to the political problem. Not unlike the distinctions he makes between different forms of
government throughout the work, so too does he characterize commerce in multiple
ways. It should not surprise us that he differentiates commerce, given his erstwhile
differentiating gaze upon the world. One ought, therefore, to be hesitant in regarding
Montesquieu as professing the ultimate triumph of commerce, or of the logic of
economics more broadly, over the political (and thereby over war), given the intersection
between them—even the ambivalent and complex intermixing of various factors in this
regard. This is not to deny that Montesquieu analyzes the important influence of trade
and commerce upon peoples and the concomitant relations among states, for this is at the
heart of his understanding.81 However, there is no singular or inevitable effect and logic
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that applies to each people, or to the world as a whole. Montesquieu offers no guarantee
of pure progress, least of all on a universal scale.
So it is that Howse rightly hesitates initially when concluding, with the following:
“Perhaps we should not project onto [Montesquieu’s] sober spirit the actual project of
world government or a universal liberal society.” Nevertheless, he goes on to suggest
that, “without some such conception, [Montesquieu’s] contentions about the relationship
of commerce, war and peace collapse into a set of contradictions, paradoxes and
tautologies.”82 This reading is one of many examples that feel the need to engage in a
systematization or reduction of what Montesquieu otherwise understands to be the
complexity of the world of human practice and politics. He himself avoids drawing all
particulars into a universal, if not homogeneous, gaze, collapsing the tension between the
two, even as his interpreters seek to do so. If paradoxes or ambiguities remain a part of
his political presentation, perhaps we ought to consider the fact that the political
condition is not itself soluble, and that Montesquieu had no illusions about grand
theorizing to otherwise solve the political problem at large. It is less a matter of
incoherence than it is sensitivity to limitations, in thought and action.
Similar to Howse, but with less heavy-handedness, Long emphasizes
Montesquieu’s cosmopolitanism, seeing him as having “laid the foundations on which
Kant built his plans for Perpetual Peace.”83 While there is undoubtedly a cosmopolitan
element to Montesquieu (as discussed in the previous chapter), this is, to reiterate, a
viewpoint that is qualified by a certain appreciation of the difficulties and rarity of
maintaining such a lofty perspective—that is, by the general fact of ambiguity in the
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human heart. It is conceivable that Montesquieu felt a few, gifted and noble spirits,
might be able to live in a manner that transcends particular polities, but he was far from
thinking they could transform the world in their image. One need only recall that
enlightenment for Montesquieu does not mean a simple universalism or rejection of
particularism, but instead includes “new reasons for loving [one’s] duties, his prince, his
homeland and his laws and that each could better feel his happiness in his own country,
government, and position” (Preface; emphasis added). Whatever cosmopolitan
perspective he offers (and to whomever it is truly intended), it is qualified by a sense of
the importance of loving one’s own, founded as it may be on “new reasons.” A pure
cosmopolitanism is not the core of Montesquieu’s teaching.
Rosow, for one, offers more attention to the inherent difficulties to which
Montesquieu awakens us insofar as he explicitly addresses Montesquieu’s theory of
international relations in light of its combining “a theory of a capitalist structure of
international trade with a historical appreciation of the impossibility of projects of
universal monarchy in Europe.”84 While the logic of commerce is “cosmopolitan,” the
universalization of the typically European monarchical form of rule amounts to the
expansion of nationalism. Thus, Rosow presents Montesquieu as working in and through
a position between the logics of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, and to whatever extent
he advocates an expansion of the development of European commerce and international
law, he did “not draw the optimistic conclusions” that many of his contemporaries and
successors did. “He was not optimistic about the prospects of the new system. There
was no determinism in Montesquieu’s view, no eschatological vision…Montesquieu only
flirted with the internationalist idealism of the proponents of perpetual peace, just as he
84
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accepted a limited truth in Machiavellianism.”85 As Perkins highlights, Montesquieu
offers “no one answer to the problem of the source of national power” and so no ultimate
or universal solution to ensure liberty and security (or the “tranquility of mind” that
individuals so seek), whether monarchical or republican.86 This is not a defect in his own
thinking, but the strength of what can be said to be his antinomial, multi-perspectival
approach, and its sensitivity to the complexities of human and political life.

The Perfection and Ruin of Mores
As indicated, the subjects of war and peace, and commerce—or what we now call
international relations and political economy—are relationally bound in Montesquieu’s
work, for both have to do with “communication” among peoples in the broadest sense of
the term. Both consist in the relations between peoples and political bodies on a range of
levels, including the highest, or most global. Moreover, both touch directly on the
consolidation and disintegration of communities. The activities of war and commerce
have their respective spirits that impact the integrity of peoples and their ways of life, and
so too therefore do such activities influence the hearts of men, as well as the passions
therein. War may expand and strengthen the polity, or fragment and destroy it; it can
elevate patriotism and devotion or enervate and dishearten civic morale. So too can
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commerce contribute to the material wealth and economic vitality of a people, as it may
erode older barriers and frontiers, or weaken traditional bonds and create transnational
ties. Finally, war and commerce induce the establishment of additional laws that seek to
regulate political bodies. After all, early on Montesquieu had underlined that war among
individuals and among societies “bring about the establishment of laws among men”
(I.3), while certain refinements and developments occur through the regulations provided
by the “right of nations, which is the political law of the nations” (X.1). Commerce
likewise brings forth “more laws” and Montesquieu agrees with Plato’s assessment that
“in a town where there is no maritime commerce, half the number of civil laws are
needed” (XX.18).
In the case of both modern right of nations and the expansion of commerce,
Montesquieu provides explicit praise. The former, he notes, changes depending upon the
times and on this front “homage must be paid to our modern times, to contemporary
reasoning, to the religion of the present day, to our philosophy, and to our mores” (X.3).
Insofar as “our modern times” deserve recognition for an improved understanding of the
right of nations, as compared to the Romans, one can also applaud commerce for curing
“destructive prejudices,” for “it is an almost general rule that everywhere there are gentle
mores, there is commerce and that everywhere there is commerce, there are gentle
mores” (XX.1). Mores become less fierce than in previous times, and commerce spreads
“knowledge of the mores of all nations everywhere.” The knowledge that is spread is
knowledge of diversity, of different mores, and once “they have been compared to each
other,” “good things have resulted from this.” But not good things alone, and indeed, one
should not fail to note the qualification that it is almost a general rule that commerce
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softens mores. Cautious not to make too many generalizations, Montesquieu tacitly
leaves open the possibility for exceptions, since knowledge of differences could
conceivably exacerbate tensions or prejudices. Such caution is based on Montesquieu’s
own deep understanding of the human heart and the richness that a science of mores must
consider. Not only that, but he is well aware that, on the one hand, “one retracts one’s
errors as slowly as one can” (XXI.9) for men are reluctant to admit their mistakes, while
on the other, “the drawbacks that one foresees…are often less dangerous than those one
cannot foresee” (XXI.23). Holding to these insights, it is no wonder Montesquieu
proceeds with the restraint and moderation he does.
Thus, he writes that “[o]ne can say that the laws of commerce perfect mores for
the same reason that these same laws ruin mores” (XX.1). Montesquieu elaborates on
this statement of near perfect ambivalence by adding the following: “Commerce corrupts
pure mores, and this was the subject of Plato’s complaints; it polishes and softens
barbarous mores, as we see everyday.” Every day one may observe that the barbarous is
improved while purity is diminished: commerce limits the possibility for moral greatness
but lessens moral depravity. This fact, Montesquieu indicates, is evident to those who
take the time to observe. And it is not something that deserves outright, or
unquestionable celebration. For while it may be true that “the spirit of commerce unites
nations,” Montesquieu underlines the importance of how “it does not unite individuals in
the same way” (XX.2). In countries where men are “affected only by the spirit of
commerce,” such as in Holland, he says one can see that “there is traffic in all human
activities and all moral virtues,” to which he adds: “the smallest things, those required by
humanity, are done or given for money.” The very requirements of and for humanity
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become transactional, and reducible to the logic of trade and exchange. Selfish interest
drives the softened and polished, he suggests. Thus, Montesquieu hereby hints at a
curious result: insofar as the universe opens up, such that more members of the human
race communicate with one another, the virtues of humanity become questionable. While
joined at a national level to a greater extent—states further joined through common
interests—individuals lose a sense of their humanity towards others. Stated otherwise, it
is an open question as to how and what kind of virtue is possible in such an opened
world. Moreover, it is worth adding that war is sometimes waged on the basis of
weakness, or decadence, and a “second barbarism” or a “barbarism of reflection” is not
inconceivable, as his older Italian contemporary, Giambattista Vico, once argued.
In the aforementioned passage, Montesquieu notes that the positive effect of the
spirit of commerce is that it “produces in men a certain feeling for exact justice,” which
opposes them to banditry and to a set of moral virtues that at least limits always and only
considering one’s own interests, so as at least to consider the interests of others. This
exact justice ensures that interests—one’s own and those of others—are accounted for,
and no doubt banditry violates both sets of interests. Obvious to all though, is the fact
that interest does not exhaust the human person; it is not the only logic at work in the
human heart. In contrast, where there is no commerce at all, Montesquieu makes
mention of Aristotle’s inclusion of banditry as a means of acquisition. What is important
here, is that this a-commercial spirit, even anti-commercial spirit, amidst banditry,
produces a virtue altogether absent among commercial peoples, namely “hospitality.”
Bandit peoples, such as the Germans of Tacitus and others, both offer and receive
strangers “with the same humanity.” Montesquieu hereby highlights how a rare form of
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humanity is lost, how certain virtues are possible only where commerce has not yet
emerged—even where barbarism persists—and that there are therefore different
manifestation of humanity, or of humanity’s virtues. That purity is precluded but
barbarism is softened, suggests simultaneous progress and regress. One detects here that
if commerce opens the universe, it somehow closes the souls of men, or at least closes off
one of its magnanimous parts. While the peoples of the world may have a higher degree
of communication, there is likely to be less hospitality among them, as well as more
traffic in vice and trade in things hitherto requiring a modicum of virtue but now
conducted on the basis of interest alone.
This narrowing of interest is perhaps most poignantly demonstrated through
Montesquieu’s discussion of religion, where he highlights the impact of commerce on
religion. He writes: “Religion has such great threats, it has such great promises, that
when they are present to our spirits, no matter what the magistrate does to constrain us to
abandon it, it seems that we are left with nothing when religion is taken away, and that
nothing is taken from us when religion is left to us” (XXV.12). His chief insight that
follows is that a ruler does not minimize religion by punishing or banning it outright.
One does not turn the souls of men directed towards God by penalization, least of all
through punishing the body or even inflicting death, for this often only affirms the
believer’s faith. Rather, “a more certain way to attack religion is by favor, by the
comforts of life, by the hope of fortune, not by what reminds one of it, but by what makes
one forget it.” The “comforts of life,” which commerce indubitably delivers, changes the
direction of men’s passions. Addressing religion, lawgivers must not make its
practitioners “indignant,” but instead lead them to “indifference,” for “other passions act
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on our souls…when those that religion inspires are silent.” Given that Montesquieu finds
“the prejudices of superstition [to be] superior to all the other prejudices” (XVIII.18), he
welcomes some transformation of religion among men, insofar as it tames destructive
religious prejudices. Montesquieu is not without praise for many elements of
Christianity, particularly, as he underlines, that we owe to Christianity “both a certain
political right in government and a certain right of nations in war, for which human
nature can never be sufficiently grateful” (XXIV.3). On the one hand, the political
consequences of commerce may in part mirror those of religion, as at least in the case of
Christianity, Montesquieu speaks of the “softness” of the Gospel message. On the other
hand, in replacing the longing for Christianity’s promises with the “comforts of life”
offered up by commerce, Montesquieu appears a qualified advocate. While the violent
and destructive passions and prejudices of religion may be minimized, Montesquieu is
more than aware of religion’s political utility, and its role in cultivating human virtues. It
may be he aspires toward a “modernizing reinterpretation of Christianity,” as Pangle
suggests.87 What is certain, however, is that his discussion of commerce and religion,
notwithstanding their differences in spirit, illustrates the importance of a science of
politics attending to the place and importance of the body in political life.

The Body and “a thousand passions”
Despite the changes across time, one thing remains constant, not least as
evidenced by its recurrence as a theme in Montesquieu’s work, namely the fact of both
human and political embodiment. This should hardly come as a surprise. Given that
Montesquieu speaks of the “spirit” of a nation and of its laws, one would expect
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something of an associated body. Moreover, he takes seriously his own claim that man
follows certain physical laws given his own corporeality (I.1).88 Being no pure idealist or
metaphysician, but instead one who looks at the world politically, as he repeatedly
reminds his reader,89 each spirit, whether individual or collective, has a real, concrete
manifestation, or framework, as well. A nation, or a people, is not an abstract entity, and
while it is not wholly fixed or static in space but is subject to history and its vicissitudes,
it is nevertheless a real actor. Each and every nation or people has a greater or lesser
ability to act, based in some part no doubt on the nature and principle of its government,
and the various other aspects that form its spirit, but no less on its shape and size as an
embodied entity. Thus, the various political bodies—the necessarily different peoples of
the world—are individuated and cannot easily be compounded; hence, for example, the
great difficulty of conquest, insofar as it implies a mixing of bodies, sometimes those of
vastly different natures and spirits (X.3ff; cf. IX.2).
The array of distinctions across the political universe suggests certain
insurmountable divisions and thereby the real possibility for conflict. The judgments and
decisions on the part of actors play a large role in this matter, to be sure, with respect to
strategy, prudence, diplomacy, and the like. However, from the inescapable logic of
political embodiment follows the fact that these bodies can and will collide at times. As
there is a spiritual element to politics, which may be considered the realm of freedom, so
too is there the physical aspect of politics, which carries the force of determination. Not
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all things are always possible, as circumstance of time and place narrow the range of
available options. Moreover, man is “a limited being” who “loses even the imperfect
knowledge he has, and “[a]s a feeling creature, he falls subject to a thousand passions”
(I.1). It is no wonder then Montesquieu spends the amount of time that he does on trying
to understand conflict and its resolutions through what we today call international
relations.
The title of book nine, “On the laws in their relation with defensive force” opens
with a chapter engaging the question of “how republics provide for their security.” The
opening line is a startling example of what appears to be itself an ineluctable law of
political ontology: “If a republic is small, it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it is large, it
is destroyed by an internal vice.” Adding to the impression of fixity in such things, he
speaks of a “dual drawback” that “taints democracies and aristocracies equally, whether
they are good or whether they are bad. The ill is in the thing itself; there is no form that
can remedy it.” Given the inescapable fate of republics, at first glance, we are told “it is
very likely that ultimately men would have been obliged to live forever under the
government of one alone.” Despotism or monarchy would appear the only alternative
governments given the constraints of this fact. After all, “despite men’s love of liberty,
despite their hatred of violence, most peoples are subjected to [despotism],” considering
the difficulty of establishing a moderate government. The latter requires “a masterpiece
of legislation that chance rarely produces and prudence is rarely allowed to produce,”
while in contrast, “a despotic government leaps to view” (V.14). This is a powerful
indictment against republicanism and its inherent instability, if ever there was one.
However, he goes on to say that in the face of such facts, men “devised a kind of
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constitution that has all the internal advantages of republican government and the external
force of monarchy,” which Montesquieu refers to as “the federal republic.” No doubt, we
have a further qualification to the two kinds of republics adumbrated in part one, and this
is by no means a conceptualization Montesquieu draws out of the air.
This “society of societies,” where “many political bodies consent to become
citizens of the larger state that they want to form,” boasts examples in the “associations”
that allowed Greece to “flourish for so long.” Key to the longevity of the Greek
republics—of ancient republics in general—was their ability to associate for the purposes
of external defense. Alliance formation could be seen as the best offense and defense.
The erstwhile truth regarding the destruction of republics is met through the human
power and freedom to associate and consent. By mixing the small and the large in the
form of an association, and thus creating something like an intermediate form, republics
have a better chance at security, or so it might seem.90 The reader is inclined to ask,
however, just how serious Montesquieu is being here? One must be cautious given this
quick swing from a definitive statement on an impasse, and a subsequent announcement
of resolution. Moreover, just seventeen chapters prior to this, in the preceding book,
Montesquieu underlined that “a republic must dread something.” What maintained the
laws among the Greeks was fear of the Persians, and so too were Carthage and Rome
“mutually strengthened” because they “intimidated one another” (VIII.5). Montesquieu’s
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eloquent conclusion here is as follows: “The more secure these states are, the more, as
with tranquil waters, they are subject to corruption.” Such being the case, a successful
society of societies might itself foster internal corruption; the logic of security, while
aiming to secure, nonetheless rests upon a palpable insecurity, namely dread of an enemy.
After indicating that this held for the Greeks, he says that it likewise applies in the
case of the Romans; however, the catch is that this society of societies worked both for
and against them. By way of these associations, “the Romans attacked the universe, and
with their use alone, the universe defended itself from the Romans.” Thus, “when Rome
had reached its greatest height, the barbarians were able to resist it” through various
“associations made from fright.” The success of federal republics is such that both
attackers and defenders can garner strength from consenting to form a “larger state.”91
The paradox persists, given that federal republics give both aggressors and defenders
greater confidence; or better yet this confidence can turn defenders into aggressors and
force one-time aggressors to be on the defensive. Those “associations made from fright”
can become frightful associations, which begs the question as to whether such larger
states do not likewise become “destroyed by an internal vice” of some kind. How can
security and confidence through largess avoid the temptation to further expand, even if
without force at first? What prevents or inhibits the confident and large from ever
desiring to grow, even if only to further ensure security? The problem of security is
never solved once and for all, and if republics large and small can mitigate the ills of the
“dual drawback” temporarily, there is no permanent remedy.
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That said, Montesquieu goes on to write that because of the federal republic,
“Holland, Germany, and the Swiss leagues are regarded in Europe as eternal republics.”
But surely he is being ironic here no less, or speaking only as an observer of opinions—
of what is “regarded in Europe” by some, or even by many—for he himself has elsewhere
expressed how all governments pass out of existence: “Since all human things have an
end, the state of which we are speaking [i.e., England] will lose its liberty; it will perish.
Rome, Lacedaemonia, and Carthage have surely perished.” (XI.6).92 Is his point, perhaps,
to signify the exaggerated sense of security of some, and to point out that whatever
success the federal republic may offer, it is hubris to regard any political order as eternal
in the way certain Europeans may regard particular existent republics? It is conceivable
that Montesquieu is indicating the presence of a kind of European decadence in political
opinions. Who would be so bold as proclaim the eternity of any republic—who, in all
seriousness, would pronounce the possibility of a perpetual republic? This seems a tacit
attempt to moderate certain opinions that may lead, on the one hand, to complacency
regarding the need for vigilance regarding the preservation of a republic, or on the other,
to extravagance and the idea that conquest and expansion are the sure way to selfpreservation.
Whatever the case, this is not to deny that Montesquieu finds a balancing
principle at work in the operation of such associations, even if the sought balance is less
than indefinite. In consenting, or allying, along the lines of a society of societies, the one
“who might want to usurp could scarcely have equal credit in all the confederated states.
92

As Perkins writes in a discussion of Montesquieu’s ability to make predictions: “the fate of dying nations
has influenced his thought and overshadowed any naïve belief that legislative intervention may
conclusively prolong the lives of nations or for long give them a linear course. His negative, retrospective
determinism causes him to stress the mortal nature of all nations rather than their life.” Perkins,
Montesquieu on National Power and International Rivalry, 61.

81

If he became too strong in one state, he would alarm all the others.” Even if he
succeeded in subjugating a part, the other independent forces could still resist him before
he dominated the whole. The complexity and multiplicity of this association is such that
the “state can perish in one place without perishing in another; the confederation can be
dissolved and the confederates remain sovereign.” These are not parallel claims,
however. For one part to perish and the whole to remain extant is different than the case
where the whole dissolves and the parts remain separate, or sovereign, wholes unto
themselves. Montesquieu’s point is that the dissolution of federations is not the end of
society, per se, and thereby not an inevitable return to the state of nature. The principle
of a federal republic provides something of an additional layer of security that can serve
the mutual interest of all associates. Thus, each republic may enjoy “the goodness of the
internal government of each one; and, with regard to the exterior, it has, by the force of
the association, all the advantages of large monarchies.”
In the event that one seeks to bring together states of a different nature, however,
Montesquieu underlines that the only way for them to “continue to exist together in one
federal republic is by force” (IX.2). There is instability when it comes to mixing or
binding different natures, or governments of different kinds. The alternative, it would
seem, would be to transform all states to the same nature, but such a position presumes
that the particulars of a people, its territory, mores, and all the aspects contained in its
spirit can be overridden with ease, or be disregarded. For this reason, Montesquieu
proceeds to discuss how both despotic (IX.4) and monarchic (IX.5) states provide for
their security. Only after following his original typology in this regard does he turn to
discuss “the defensive force of states in general” (IX.6), although under this heading he
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addresses three particular states: France, Spain, and Persia. The examples are not
incidental, for in the following chapter, entitled simply, “Reflections,” he offers an
argument against the “project of universal monarchy”—something all three of the
aforementioned governments were drawn to.
It may be something of a surprise that Montesquieu will offer discussion of how
different states may defend themselves “in general,” for would not the question of
security and the strategy to preserve it be just as particular to its nature as its laws? On
the crucial point of maintaining existence, how could the means of defense not flow from
specific principles and circumstances? If the title heading suggests generalizations, the
content of the chapter speaks in terms of proportions and relations that are anything but a
singular model; instead, being relational or relative, it is consistent with what he will later
spell out: “All size, all force, all power is relative” (IX.9). Thus, Montesquieu illustrates
how there is a relation between size and speed, or “the speed with which one can execute
an undertaking against it and its promptness in rendering this effective” (IX.6). Insofar as
this is a general concern, it must be placed within the concrete context of space and
territory, which are factors inevitably linked to a state’s capacity for action: action
requires a space, and the circumscription of territory must be such that one can move with
sufficient speed within it so as to respond—to act according to the concrete reality of a
peoples’ embodied statehood—before one’s borders are breached and the space is
conquered by another. If we have begun to think today that geography and space are of
less relevance, given advances in communications technology and the increased role of
air power for purposes of defense (and what is known as the revolution in military
affairs), such that the obstacles on and of the earth, and even the earth itself, are no
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hindrance to speed and movement, Montesquieu’s work offers repeated reminders of the
inescapability of frontiers, terrain, and the space within which we live and fight.93

The Earth and its “natural divisions”
The earth is neither “flat,” nor is it a “smooth” sphere, void of discrepancies,
barriers, and natural divisions. Modern readers may find Montesquieu’s lengthy
discussion about climate’s impact upon laws and nations—and the broader examination
of “physical causes”—to be irrelevant, passé, or even strange, but this too is integral to
his attention to the range of details of political life, as well as his insight into the
corporality of human beings and their communities.94 Broadly contrasting the continents
of Europe and Asia, he describes the ease with which empires are maintained in the latter,
due to its vaster landscapes and fewer natural barriers, whereas Europe’s geographical
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concentration and topographical unevenness has had different consequences. Asia is
much more conducive to despotism and servitude because of the physical nature of its
territory: insofar as despotism is rule without mediation and intermediate divisions, the
more homogeneous the continent, the less supportive it is of the divisions requisite for
free and moderate government. In contrast, the many “natural divisions” in Europe
“form many medium-sized states in which the government of laws is not incompatible
with the maintenance of the state; on the other hand, they are so favorable to this that
without laws this state falls into decadence and becomes inferior to all the others”
(XVII.6). Europe’s “genius for liberty” is in part attributable to its concentration of
continental, or topographical, and thereby political and national differences. And the
very competition between states, has been conducive to internal legal ordering.95
To be sure, on this macro level of continental comparisons, the different degrees
of liberty within Europe are underplayed, but so much is inevitable from such heights.
Yet as we know, Montesquieu has multiple perches at various levels from which he
gazes. Significant here is that his counsel regarding size and shape, and the earth’s
complex surface, recalls the fact of territoriality, and how the physical elements—or, the
details of political physiognomy—are intimately related to the judgments and decisions
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regarding action and a people’s political history more broadly.96 In sum, the body and
spirit of a polity are inseparable, and the world’s polities vary in their bodily and spiritual
manifestations and combinations. Given the natural differences and divisions—the
discrepancies and variance in the physical geographical landscape—there is unlikely to
be a single and identical political spirit the world over, and with the emphasis
Montesquieu places upon the bodily, it is clear he does not err in imagining a purely
spiritual forms of politics, or a politics that extends directly and solely from the will.
In the case of France and Spain he says that they meet “the requisite size,” as “the
state must be of a medium extent so as to be proportionate to the degree of speed nature
has given men to move from one place to another.”97 These states, with their facility to
direct forces within a reasonable amount of time, and their ability to gather knowledge
regarding the whole of the country so as to minimize exposure are contrasted with the
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vastness of Persia.98 Its size means its mobilization and deployment are slow, its forces
are separated from one another, and communication is greatly hindered. Montesquieu
thus speaks of the “true power of a prince,” arguing it is based not on his ease in
conquering but “in the difficulty there is in attacking him”; or, in a bolder sense, he adds,
“in the immutability of his condition.” The truly powerful are the ones who can resist or
stave off external change, and expansion only invites change, or instability, for states that
expand expose “new sides from which they can be taken.” If it is “wise” for a monarch
to increase his power, it is “no less prudent” for him to limit it. There are therefore
drawbacks to being both large and small, and the size of a polity’s body is no incidental
matter—the problem of size is by no means restricted to republics. On this note
Montesquieu turns to offer some “reflections,” which he gives as the title to IX.7.
Montesquieu argues, as he had in his earlier work at some length (and it is curious
he does not cite it, as he does with his work on the Romans)99, that the project of
universal monarchy “would have been…fatal to Europe,” as well as to the subjects, the
king, and his family, should King Louis XIV have succeeded as he had hoped in fulfilling
it. For Montesquieu, “Heaven” actually “better served” Louis “by defeats,” for
notwithstanding his lack of success in becoming the only king in Europe, he became most
powerful of all. To have great power in the presence of other rulers is one thing; to be the
only ruler is another. A plurality of powers or states, or rulers, in the international realm
is better for all—is in accordance with Providence even—instead of unifying power
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under a single rule. The project of seeking such universal rule of one “cannot fail in one
country without failing in all others, or fail for a moment without failing forever” (IX.7).
These sentiments were previously formulated by Montesquieu at greater length in his
work, Réflexions sur la monarchie universelle en Europe, and the very lines from Spirit
of the Laws IX.7 are nearly taken verbatim from chapter XVII of Réflexions.100
Moreover, the claim with which Montesquieu opens the latter work is that universal
monarchy eventually failed with the Romans, and having done so it has now failed
“forever.” Thus, he argues that such a project is not only dangerous for the sake of
balanced power and peace, but that it is despotic to the core. A centralized world
government is at odds with Montesquieu’s view of liberty and its foundations.
What is interesting, however, is that he finds that the present state of Europe, and
so the course of European political development at large, has made such a prospect
ultimately impossible—circumstances preclude it. Any attempt to draw the many nations
under the rule of a single command is foregone, or so he argues. Of course, if this is so
decidedly the case, why does Montesquieu feel the need to make such an argument to
persuade readers? Perhaps it is an intellectual exercise to merely detail the circumstances
that have changed from, say, the time of the Romans who ruled universally with a
monarchy, to the time of the present Europeans. But that Montesquieu felt compelled to
write it, and argue persuasively, suggests he maintained that despite certain
circumstantial changes, men’s ambitions remain the same across time and must
continually be addressed. Insofar as he understands men to be preoccupied by their
interests, he likewise contends they are ever at risk of being overcome with spiritedness.
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The need to tame men’s pride and desire for large conquest and glory is a permanent
problem, no less so even if the stakes of such aspirations may vary. Whether or not the
European situation is such as to make universal monarchy “morally impossible,” given
technological developments that have equalized forces, and a “right of nations [droit des
gens]” that makes such hegemonic wars ruinous for those waging them, the fact is that
men may still pursue such ambitions, as Louis XIV was arguably perceived as doing.101
In speaking of moral impossibilities, Montesquieu offers ethical and practical
counsel rather than describing what is in fact precluded. His humanité leads him to
exaggerate, in hopes that men will not take such grave risks for glory, and his advice is
buttressed by pragmatic details. What is curious, and what illustrates this moral suasion
rather than an ontological truth, is that despite his emphasis on the changed nature of
things—again, between the time of the Romans who successfully carried out universal
monarchy, and that of present Europe—the fact is that in emphasizing and underlining
these changes, his argument retains an ambiguous core: to argue on the basis of change,
Montesquieu cannot avoid the truth of change, per se. That is to say, present
circumstances are no less open to change. Neither prosperity nor power is fixed, and
there is continual variation of both, particularly within Europe: it is “the nature of these
things is to vary continually.”102 It is on the basis of this constant variation that there are
“a thousand hazards,” which should prevent anyone from trying to engage in such an
endeavor. Montesquieu’s reflections on the dangers of universal monarchy hint at the
problem of universal regimes at large: global empire, or a world-state, is more likely to
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exacerbate the political problem rather than solve it. Thus, one thing most of all is
certain: human beings frame their lives in political communities, on various scales,
notwithstanding the various changes across time that may alter the shapes and forms of
such associations.
If no single community is permanent, the act of putting things in common among
some people and against others is an indelible fact. And so, “considered as inhabitants of
a planet so large,” it follows that “different peoples are necessary” (I.3). Even with the
opening up of the universe, and an increasingly universalistic world, certain differences
persist, due to the broad range of “physical” and “moral” causes that shape peoples. Well
known for taking into account the immensity of details and variety in the human world,
Montesquieu’s political science is a masterful undertaking for its combined examination
of these causes—what may be called political physics and political psychology—thereby
considering human activities “from all these points of view” (I.3, I.1). Recalling
attention to political physicality is a particularly important reminder for our democratic
and technological age as we are wont to overlook such details. Recalling attention to the
place of the body and the bodily place of politics seems apt in politically disembodying
times, when we imagine few to no obstacles to our wills, and the spirit of unity and
universalism.103
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“The First of All Empires”
Part 3 of The Spirit of the Laws, which consists of 6 books (the third of which is
literally the central book of the entire work), begins with a book discussing “laws in their
relation to the nature of climate” (III.14) and ends with a book on “the laws in their
relation with the principles forming the general spirit, the mores, and the manners of a
nation” (III.19). The entire trajectory of this third of six parts then is from political
physics to political psychology—that is, on the relation of body and spirit to laws. A
dialectical movement of this sort arguably runs through the whole of The Spirit of the
Laws. To the extent that one can read the text as a linear dialectic, as is sometimes
suggested,104 one may also read the work somewhat concentrically, considering the
central parts in relation to peripheral parts—that is, outward from the corporeal core. The
books of this third part consist of the baseline reality from which, or upon which, human
political possibilities radiate, and in which they ever remain rooted to some extent. The
first five books deal both with nonhuman nature and human nature, considering
throughout rudimentary needs and desires, and the kinds and degree of environmental
factors that satisfy or frustrate them, inflame them or dampen them. It is little surprise
then to find that the topic of slavery is central as well, which repeatedly raises the issue of
bodily mastery. Montesquieu is a great opponent to slavery—writing that “[i]t is not
good by its nature” (XV.1ff.) and “is against nature” (XV.7)—and yet his extended study
of it makes it intelligible, suggesting how certain “natural reasons” have led to it. He
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does not simply explain to excuse, for as he writes when discussing the circumstances of
polygamy: “In all this I do not justify usages, but I give the reasons for them” (XVI.4).
Rather, he suggests that human reason, by way of prudent legislation, aided in part by
technological and mechanical developments (XV.8), may counter natural reasons if
indeed they are more conducive to human liberty. However, he underlines that there is
no universal or formulaic manner by which slaves may be freed, writing explicitly “it
depends too much on circumstances” (XV.18). The concrete context must be considered
in the matter of lifting the constraints of physical servitude and thus introducing the
possibility of greater freedom.
As has been pointed out, this third part “begins and ends with the most detailed
discussions of human nature in the whole of The Spirit of the Laws. The discussions
constitute an elaboration of the theoretical principles stated in Book I. It is perfectly
fitting then that the books comprising Part Three are literally the central books and that
their titles all refer to ‘nature.’”105 There is no escaping the fact that the natural
environment affects men’s bodies and that different settings have different effects. As
Montesquieu argues, the differences in this regard “should make very different
characters” (XIV.2). Likewise, the facts of the physical setting bring constraints and
demands that shape the community: “The differing needs of differing climates have
formed different ways of living, and these differing ways of living have formed the
various sorts of laws” (XIV.10). “The empire of climate,” he writes in the first book of
this third part, “is the first of all empires” (XIX.14); however, by the time one reaches the
concluding book of part three, he underlines the fact that “[m]any things govern men:
climate, religion, laws, the maxims of the government, examples of past things, mores,
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and manners.” Climate remains the first in this list of what are multiple things that not
only govern men, but in conjunction with one another form what he famously calls “a
general spirit” (XIX.4). The particular things of both nonhuman and human nature,
constitute a people’s spirit, which itself requires embodiment to appear. Even as things
related to nonhuman nature may be minimized in their weight of governance, through the
activity of the legislator—that is, by way of his spirit—the former remains a factor
nonetheless. While the balance of these governing things certainly varies, all continue to
play some role in shaping the character of peoples. It would be an error in both theory
and practice to reduce a people to pure body or pure spirit, or to the governance of one
“thing” alone, just as it would be wrong to assume all peoples to be governed by the same
thing, or even an identically proportionate relation of things.
The general spirit of a people is not therefore merely an artificial construct or a
haphazard assortment of things, let alone something that may be uniformly imposed, but
results from a broad natural process of development. Laws, Montesquieu underlines,
“should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely
that the laws of one nation can suit another” (I.3). And in the extreme, Montesquieu
notes: “There are climates in which the physical aspect has such strength that morality
can do practically nothing” (XVI.8). While there is an element of organic unfolding in
the lives of peoples,106 to reiterate, men may nevertheless garner greater control over their
natural environment, over this first of all empires, and thus human nature can come to
tame nonhuman nature to some extent. But even as the strength of the latter diminishes,
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its presence is never eliminated.107 The strength and shape of every peoples’ spirit is to
some extent related to the earth’s variegated surface—to the physical content of its
particular space—and this variation is considerable when one reflects upon the details.
It can influence things including courage and ability in war; the power of
imagination and the passions, as well as the kind and degree of taste and sensitivity; the
form and strength of love (XIV.2, XIV.14; XVI.11); the ready acceptance of certain
metaphysical ideas (XIV.5, XIV.7); the devotion to labor (XIV.6) and general level of
industriousness (XIV.9); the relationship of a people to alcohol (XIV.10); the types of
diseases and the facility of their transmission and proliferation (XIV.11); and the
psychological state of a people not least regarding their propensity for suicide (XIV.12).
If the list appears somewhat random, it does not take a great deal of effort for
commonsense to provide some examples to corroborate such claims. That is not to say
they form irreversible laws, or instances without exception; however, Montesquieu is
likewise suggesting these influences can be addressed, so long as they are indeed
considered. The less temperate a climate is though, the more “a good education” is
necessary, which is to say that “a wise legislator” is all the more important in extreme
conditions, so as to better regulate the bodily rather than have the body weigh down the
spirit. As one chapter title has it, “bad legislators are those who have favored the vices of
the climate and good ones are those who have opposed them” (XIV.5). Thus,
Montesquieu does not deny the possibility for improvement, or relegate those of the
warmest climates to slavery and despotism indefinitely, nor however does he avoid the
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difficulties: “a certain laziness of the spirit, naturally bound with that of the body” is the
greatest challenge for the legislator to overcome—for the consequence is a “spirit
incapable of any action, any effort, and application.” In a word, such laziness is
conducive to slavery of various kinds (XV.7): when laws are badly made, lazy men
appear, and out of laziness men are enslaved. Only the basest of human possibilities
emerge when the spirit is not active in engaging the body. Liberty rests upon energy and
action, effort and application; it does not follow simply from a perfect constitution or set
of institutions.
To be clear, the aim here is not to corroborate all Montesquieu’s empirical
claims, for his work is not without its errors on the level of natural science; after all,
modern natural science has made significant advances beyond the time of the eighteenth
century. However, the general attention to nonhuman nature’s place in politics, and its
role in cultivating distinctions, is a worthwhile lesson. If some of Montesquieu’s
conclusions are less than convincing in this regard, his method, so to speak, is one we
need to be convinced of anew. It is a curious fact that we today still trade in some of
these ideas on the level of common sense, while social science is loath to consider such
opinions as worthy of scientific consideration, only registering them in opinion polls
instead. Public opinion at least still recognizes generalizations about different peoples,
and so differences regarding the general spirit of a people, at least in part on the basis of
their place in the world—thus, as related to the climate and geography of their lives. For
example, everyone knows that the climate of war matters greatly, and so too does the
climate from which soldiers come or in which they train, as any man on the street can
recount the difficulty regarding Americans in the tropics and jungles of Vietnam (this, of
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course, in addition to the more complex problem of ill-formed strategy regarding
“irregular” or “insurgency” warfare); or how common opinion still holds that northerners
are more industrious than southerners, as one can presently read in the newspapers about
the European divide between “Germans” and “Greeks”; that colder nations are well
known for being heavier drinkers, as indicated by consumption levels in Russia and the
Baltic countries; and while the location of disease hardly requires mention, the manner in
which diseases have spread across like and unlike climates is of significant importance in
the history of peoples, as has been notably popularized by writers like Jared Diamond.108
At any rate, having mentioned that climate has a role in the liberty of a people—
that it makes them more or less energetic, prone to activity, attentive and industrious—it
is not by accident that the only two nations mentioned in the chapter titles of this first
book of part three are China and England. On the one hand, China and England represent
two polar opposite political possibilities: despotism and liberty. On the other hand, they
represent opposing geographical realities: a large continental space and a small island
place. However, by juxtaposing presumed opposites, Montesquieu overrides these
presumptions by indicating the success of legislators in dealing with nonhuman nature—
in properly opposing the “vices of the climate”—and that this is true for countries
irrespective of their degree of liberty, or kind of government. Elements of contingency
cannot be overlooked. The legislators of China were sensible when they did not take “the
peaceful state” of men for granted but instead oriented men towards “the action proper to
making them fulfill the duties of life,” and they did this by making their religion,
philosophy and laws “all practical” (XIV.5). If the Chinese climate otherwise inclines
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men to rest, these legislators introduced “moral causes” to divert them from being
languid. Moreover “a good custom in China” (XIV.8) has been to rouse the peoples to
their plowing by offering honors from the emperor to those who best cultivate the fields.
Appeals to the pride of men, and even inflaming it, is no less possible in the most
difficult of climates: the industriousness of men may be encouraged with the right form
of legislation. Success is achieved not by ignoring the climatological factors, but
precisely by attending to them.
So far as England goes, Montesquieu offers a curious discussion of suicide: “the
English resolve to kill themselves when one can imagine no reason for their decisions;
they kill themselves in the very midst of happiness” (XIV.12). This English “illness”
“comes from the physical state of the machine and is independent of any other cause.” It
is due to the English climate, Montesquieu argues, and yet this otherwise drab condition
is an important source of England’s ability to keep tyranny at bay. The English mind has
a certain “impatience” that makes the most suitable government for such a people “one in
which they could not be allowed to blame any one person for causing their sorrows, and
in which, as laws rather than men would govern, the laws themselves must be overthrown
in order to change the state” (XIV.13). Thus: “In a free nation, this characteristic [of
impatience, nearing on obstinacy] would be one apt to frustrate the projects of tyranny,
which is always slow and weak in its beginnings, just as it is prompt and lively at its end,
which shows at first only a hand extended in aid, and later oppresses with an infinity of
arms.” Restful people, those completely satisfied and without any kind of stubbornness
or sorrows, are more prone to servitude, but “a people who rest in no situation, who
constantly pinch themselves to find the painful sots, could scarcely fall asleep.”
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In sum, the immediate environment in which a people find themselves influences
their physical dispositions, and lawgivers err in disregarding such facts. They must not
exaggerate physicality, but need recognize and recall its influence all the same. Thus, if
we find ourselves smiling at some of the evidence Montesquieu provides for his claims
about the differences among effects of cold and hot climates through—for example, his
enthusiasm about experimentation on a cow’s tongue and the results of its fibers
expanding or contracting based on its contact with heat of cold air—it is not unlikely that
he would find our general disregard of physicality equally risible, and rightly so.
Montesquieu is no pure determinist, for he himself argues that “[t]he doctrine of a rigid
destiny ruling all makes the magistrate a tranquil spectator,” for such a man will think
“that god [or nature] has already done everything and that he himself has nothing to do”
(XIV.11). But, to reiterate, Montesquieu is also anything but a pure spiritualist, for he
makes it abundantly clear that lawgivers must deeply consider the material with which
they are working. This is a fact that continues to be recognized today by those who think
in terms of geography and the long-lasting features of the earth’s surface, otherwise
detailed on maps. Even when speaking about commerce and its revolutions—a
potentially liberating and universal activity—Montesquieu does not fail to remind readers
of the particularities of nonhuman nature’s impact.

Commerce and its “great changes”
Let us now return to where we left off above regarding commerce.
Montesquieu’s book addressing the “revolutions” commerce has had “in the world” and
its consequences for laws, begins by underlining that despite such revolutionary activity,
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“it can happen that certain physical causes such as the quality of the terrain or of the
climate fix its nature forever” (XXI.1). This striking statement opens a discussion
consisting of a mixture of ancient and modern examples and comparisons. After all,
“[f]rom time to time the world meets with situations that change commerce” (XXI.4),
such as the direction and partners in trade; so too, of course, has commerce changed the
world. “Commerce, sometimes destroyed by conquerors, sometimes hampered by
monarchs, wanders across the earth, flees from where it is oppressed, and remains where
it is left to breath: it reigns today where one used to see only deserted places, seas, and
rocks; there where it used to reign are now only deserted places” (XXI.5). Commerce,
like every other human activity, is subject to certain limitations and constraints—not least
to the contingencies of place and the vicissitudes of time. Thus, Montesquieu’s hopeful
eye is ever moderated by the inescapable facts and particularities of reality to which he
attends with care. Even when discussing “revolutions” he remains restrained, and by no
means lets himself get carried away by revolutionary tendencies.109
When discussing the commerce of the ancients, he summarizes the logic as
follows: “The effect of commerce is wealth; the consequence of wealth, luxury; that of
luxury, the perfection of the arts” (XXI.6). One can therefore conclude that where the
arts are carried out to a certain point, there was likely “a great commerce” established.
He derives as much about the Persians, the Medes, and the Assyrians. However, their
luxurious reign through commerce was brought to an end by the Tartars, who not only
ended the broad-based communications of peoples and destroyed patterns of trade, but
even diverted rivers that facilitated exchange. In contrast to the commerce of luxury,
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Montesquieu speaks of “an economic commerce”—a distinction made in the previous
book as well, upon relating commerce to the constitution: in government by one alone
luxury is typically the foundation, whereas in government by many it is “founded on
economy” (XX.4). The practice of the latter consists of “gaining little and even of
gaining less than any other nation” the compensation for which is that of “gaining
continually.” This form of commerce cannot “be done by a people among whom luxury
is established who spend much and who see only great objects.” Montesquieu then
quotes Cicero approvingly, who writes in his De Republica [4.7]: “I do not like a people
to be both the rulers and the clerks of the universe.” At least in ancient commerce, the
two activities of ruling and clerking are “contradictory,” for together they may fill the
same individual’s head “full of both great projects and small ones.” That said,
Montesquieu acknowledges that “the greatest enterprises are also undertaken in those
states which subsist by economic commerce, and they show a daring not to be found in
monarchies.” The reason, he suggests, is because the logic of commerce is to lead from
one to another—from “the small to the middling, the middling to the great, and he who
earlier desired to gain little arrives at a position where he has no less of a desire than to
gain a great deal.” Commerce cannot likely remain contained; it begets more of itself,
irrespective of its original size or amount. And so too, the ancient desire for a separation
of politics and economics was more ideal than real, for “the great enterprises of the
traders are always necessarily mixed with the public business.”
This is particularly true for governments ruled by many, and therein, Montesquieu
ultimately claims that the greater one’s sense of prosperity, the more risk one will take. If
one believes that “what one has acquired is secure, one dares to expose it in order to
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acquire more; only the means for acquisition are at risk; now, men expect much of their
fortune” (XX.4). Properly mixing the spirit of commerce with the general spirit of a
people is a high aim for the legislator, and the English are “the people in the world who
have best known how to take advantage of each of these three great things at the same
time: religion, commerce, and liberty” (XX.7). While other peoples let political interests
trump commercial ones, “England has always made its political interests give way to the
interests of its commerce.” Rather than following Cicero’s maxim, the English seem to
have benefited politically no less by acting as clerks of the universe only to likewise rule
it. But these twin roles have required a constant preparedness for war and a strategy of
colonization. The English role in opening the universe was active, for the latter has not
opened of its own volition. Yet this modern example has a sort of parallel and
particularly instructive ancient one. As discussed in the previous chapter, here too
Alexander serves Montesquieu well in providing material for reflection on both change
and permanence in politics, and on the complex relationship between commerce and war.

Conquering to Trade, or Trading to Conquer?
At the heart of his discussion of Alexander and commerce is the following
question: “It is true that Alexander conquered the Indies, but must one conquer a country
in order to trade with it?” (XXI.8). Montesquieu tells us that Alexander initiated “a great
revolution in commerce” on the basis of four events that occurred under his rule. These
consisted not only in the conquest of the Indies but also of Tyre and Egypt, and of the
discovery of the seas to the south of Egypt, i.e., the Red and Indian Seas. Alexander’s
success, not unlike previously discussed, was based on knowledge and force; he had a
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“project” or a “design” and the means to implement it. But this project seems to have
changed along the way on Montesquieu’s telling, for while he may have initially
followed the course of others, he charted his own path, too, and adapted his design
according to new knowledge. If he took the same voyage as Darius towards the Indian
Sea, the latter did so with “the fancy of a prince who wants to show his power rather than
the orderly project of a monarch who wants to use it” (XXI.8), which had no
consequences for commerce or navigation. Moreover, the Persians did not engage in
trade, nor did the Egyptians for the most part, and when the former conquered the latter,
“they brought with them the same spirit they had at home,” which included an “extreme”
“indifference to sailing” (XXI.9). They were therefore ignorant of ocean voyages and
oceans themselves, to the extent that “the Red Sea had to be discovered a second time,
and the ocean a second time, too, and this discovery awaited the curiosity of the Greek
kings.” Alexander brought a different spirit, or at least allowed his spirit to be affected
by new “information.” His curiosity and broad spirit meant he was not, in conquering,
blinded by conquest in itself; nonetheless, the knowledge he acquired and the changes in
his spirit would have been impossible without the force of the conqueror. Throughout
this discussion Montesquieu displays his deep knowledge of geographical details, trade
routes and developments in navigation—not only due to his own curiosity of such facts,
but because of their centrality to the history of the communication of peoples.
When Alexander reached and discovered the Red Sea, a revolution followed. He
secured Egypt for himself but in doing so “open[ed] it in the very place where the kings,
his predecessors, had locked it” (XXI.8). Moreover, Alexander “did not dream of
commerce” previously, for it was a thought that “could come to him only with the
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discovery of the Indian Sea.” Thus it became his “project” to establish commerce
between the Indies and his western empire, and as a result “Egypt had become the center
of the universe” (XXI.9). Nevertheless, he still lacked sufficient knowledge of certain
parts of the earth, even as he initiated a Western desire to press outward and open further
the universe of men and the mixing of different peoples. The commerce of the Greeks
and Romans in the Indies “was far less extensive than ours” given the greater number of
countries we know about, of which they remained ignorant, so that “we engage in
commerce with all the Indian nations and even do their commerce and navigation for
them.” However, the ancients “engaged in commerce with greater ease than we do.”
What is the reason for this? Montesquieu hints obliquely that it has to do with a different
level or degree of satisfaction. For example, we today—of Montesquieu’s time and
ours—could not rest satisfied with but the commodities received from the inhabitants of
the Southern Islands. And so, the trade routes to Egypt would alone be insufficient;
rather, we longed for and executed passage to the Cape of Good Hope, and beyond as
well. With an attention turned away from virtue to interest—from one kind of humanity
to another—the world opens up, but it is far from self-evident that men find greater
happiness. At any rate, commerce “wanders across the earth” (XXI.5) and the “history of
luxury” is inseparable from the history of commerce (XXI.6).
If commerce came easier for the ancients when it existed, because it was more
limited, it was also easier to put a stark end to it, as evidenced by the many examples
Montesquieu gives of acting against the communications among peoples. Among those
mentioned, the “calamities of the Carthaginians” (XXI.11) brought about by Roman
conquest is a particularly important one. On one level it shows how the two logics of
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Cicero stand at odds with one another—that of being clerk versus ruler over the
universe—at least in the ancient world. However, he also brings to light that “the great
wars between Carthage and Marseilles over fishing grounds” were followed by peace,
which led to a mutual engagement in economic commerce. Both being commercial
peoples, notwithstanding the interruptions through war, they managed to maintain their
commercial ambitions. Their wars were due to a certain amount of mutual jealousy, and
yet the most destructive war, at least for the Carthaginians, were the Punic wars, when in
fact the Romans were not at all “jealous of its commerce” (XXI.11). They sought only to
conquer “the whole earth” and yet engaged a practice of acting “as destroyers in order not
to appear as conquerors.” The Romans destroyed to conquer and without concern for
commerce—“their genius, their glory, their military education, and the form of their
government drew them away from commerce” (XXI.14)—while Alexander conquered to
pave the way for commerce. In short, the Roman conquerors and Alexander each saw the
“whole earth,” however, they saw it differently: one for domination the other for opening
it up to communication. Alexander’s success at inaugurating a revolution in commerce
had long-lasting effects, whereas in a chapter entitled, “On the state of the universe after
the destruction of the Romans,” Montesquieu judges that “one would have said that they
[the Romans] conquered the world only to weaken it and to deliver it defenseless to the
barbarians” (XXIII.23). In any case, ancient history illustrates that commerce may be
both a cause of war and of peace; just as peace- and war-making may both be conducive
to commerce. To the extent that Montesquieu does speak admiringly of the Romans, his
greater praise is reserved for Alexander, suggesting that in practice, a certain mixture of
clerking and ruling is to be preferred.
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Indeed, in a chapter entitled, “How commerce in Europe penetrated barbarism”
(XXI.20), Montesquieu gives an account of changing views of usury, the role and
persecution of the Jews in their commercial activities, not least their invention of the
“letters of exchange,” and the overall result that “Commerce was able to avoid violence
and maintain itself everywhere, for the richest trader had only invisible goods, which
could be sent everywhere and leave no trace anywhere.” Princes have since been forced
to act more “wisely,” with less cruelty and recklessness, unless they were to pay a heavy
economic price: “for it turned out that great acts of authority were so clumsy that
experience itself has made known that only goodness of government brings prosperity.”
Montesquieu refers to these consequences as an ongoing cure of “Machiavellianism,”
insofar as councils need be more moderate, and the one-time violence of political
revolutions and coups will become but “imprudences.” His insights here can be
summarized by the following: “And, happily, men are in a situation such that, though
their passions inspire in them the thought of being wicked, they nevertheless have an
interest in not being so.” We must again take note that while men are in this “situation,”
there is no guarantee that they will submit strictly to their interest.110 And as we shall see
when discussing Tocqueville, the common good requires that men seek more than their
own, mere individual interest.
At any rate, the pursuit of national economic interest has had the political effect of
increasing power, for as Montesquieu saw, the discovery of America commercially
linked Europe to Asia and Africa with the result that “Europe has reached such a high
degree of power that nothing in history is comparable to it.” He makes this assessment
110

For discussion of Montesquieu’s “science of interests,” and its place in modern political philosophy that
attends so much more to the passions and interests than does classical political philosophy, see, Harvey
Mansfield, “Self-Interest Rightly Understood,” Political Theory, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Feb., 1995): 48-66.
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on the basis of considering “the immensity of expenditures, the size of military
engagements, the number of troops, and their continuous upkeep, even when they are the
most useless and are only for ostentation” (XXI.21). The great wealth generated by
commerce has created well-armed states, capable of fighting wars on an unprecedented
scale. To have become wealthy, however, does not guarantee its maintenance, for “by
the use of the exchange, wealth somehow does not belong to any state in particular and
since it is so easily transferred from one country to another” (XXII.15), certain defensive
and martial courses of action may follow to preserve it. Not only that, but necessity may
dictate at times certain less than peaceful approaches to ensure the continuance of
commerce, for if commerce has been born of conquest and war in the past, nothing
guarantees against the recurrence of such means. “The business of society must always
go forward,” (XXII.19), and to reaffirm this claim he reiterates it: “Business must go
forward, and a state is lost if everything falls into inaction” (XXII.22).
If the “natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace,” commerce may
nonetheless have its own unnatural effects, which are largely downplayed by
Montesquieu but not absent upon further consideration. The limits to what commerce
can achieve in shaping human behavior and action rest in part on the fact that the opening
of the universe does not beget a political singular or uniform solution to the problem of
human rule and order. In fact, an open universe may exacerbate the political problem.
Just as Montesquieu advises that “[o]ne must not judge Europe as if it were a single state”
(XXIII.25), it follows that one cannot examine or judge the whole world to be one, or
presume its eventual unification. Notwithstanding greater universalization in an open
universe, so much variety and a multitude of particulars persist, with consequences for
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relations—pacific and martial, commercial, or otherwise—between the necessarily
different peoples of the world in and among their respective societies. In the next section
we turn to Tocqueville, who elaborates on Montesquieu’s understanding of the human
heart, with greater attention to the effect the democratic revolution is having upon it, and
what this means for politics and human flourishing.
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4. TOCQUEVILLE:
THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION’S REACH:
EQUALIZING CONDITIONS
“Between those centuries of disorders and miseries one encounters others when societies rest and when the
human race seems to catch its breath. That is still, to tell the truth, only an appearance; time no more
suspends its course for peoples than for men; both advance daily toward a future of which they are
unaware; and when we believe them stationary, it is because their movements escape us. These are people
who walk; they appear immobile to those who are running.”
—Tocqueville, DA, I.2.2
“In centuries of equality the human spirit takes another turn. It readily fancies that nothing stays put. The
idea of instability possesses it…for in democratic centuries, what is most in motion amid the motion of all
things is the heart of man.”
—Tocqueville DA, II.3.6

The previous chapters on Montesquieu have drawn out two phenomena of
ambivalence. First, the human heart and its general and particular—and thus, often
opposing—passions; and second, of a world becoming simultaneously more open and yet
possibly less coherent, or at least less cohesive. Put otherwise, reading Montesquieu
introduces one to the conflict latent in the modern liberal world between patriotism and
cosmopolitanism on the one hand, and that between globalization and individualism on
the other.111 Tocqueville’s work, as many have noted, picks up on Montesquieu’s in a
variety of ways, not least regarding our concerns here.112 Equally attentive to the
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This ambivalence of liberalism is well noted by others, as, for example, Lawler remarks: “Political
liberalism seems to point in two directions, both toward the proud existence of self-government or rule and
toward self-forgetfulness in political devotion.” Peter Lawler, The Restless Mind (Lanham: Roman &
Littlefield, 1993), 3. In other words, liberalism points—paradoxically and simultaneously—towards
individualism and collectivism. One might also suggest that liberalism points towards the truth of one’s
individuality as well as the truth of human commonness, or unity. More directly still, it is the case that
today, men are individuals, citizens, and members of humanity, and these three truths are not altogether
reconcilable. As Lamberti writes, “Better than anyone else, Tocqueville posed the central problem to
modern political philosophy: how to respect the individual while preserving the citizen.” Jean-Claude
Lamberti, Tocqueville and the Two Democracies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 188.
112
Some examples of interpretations suggesting that Tocqueville closely follows Montesquieu, include,
Melvin Richter, “The Uses of Theory: Tocqueville’s Adaptation of Montesquieu,” in Essays in Theory and
History, ed. Melvin Richter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 74-102; Raymond Aron,
“Tocqueville,” in Main Curents in Sociological Thought: Volume One (New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers, 2008), 237-302. Ceaser argues that “traditional political science, which lasted for some twentythree centuries, has a long and distinguished list of practitioners,” and, he argues, “is best represented in the
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movements of the human heart, his discussion situates its ambivalent dynamism within a
world of growing equality, arguably well beyond what Montesquieu might even have
imagined. And so far as an open, commercial world of equal individuals goes,
Tocqueville is especially impressive when it comes to the paradox of how a growing
sense of similarity among men can result in an increased degree of isolation from society,
or from the public good, simultaneously inducing greater dependence upon the state and
thereby increasing the possibility of despotism. His observations in and of America
provided him with a sense of what to “hope or fear” with the onset of the “social
revolution” that was increasingly equalizing conditions, and out of which he sought to
understand “the direction that democracy” may or may not take across the political world
(Intro., 13).113 His work offers a window on both how to think about our political

works of Aristotle, Montesquieu, and Tocqueville,” for they all “focus the study of politics on a direct,
common-sense encounter with what they hold to be politically most important: the form of government or
regime under which one lives.” James Ceaser, Liberal Democracy and Political Science (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1990), 41. For a similar view, see Raymond Aron, who likewise discusses
Tocqueville in comparison to Montesquieu and Aristotle, writing, “In the history of sociology, Tocqueville
remains the closest to classical philosophy, as interpreted by Prof. Leo Strauss.” Thus, Tocqueville does
not refrain from making judgments while describing, but just as with the aforementioned predecessors, he
demonstrates that “a description cannot be faithful unless it includes those judgments intrinsically related to
the description”—all this particularly in the context of political regimes. Aron, Main Currents, 262ff. In
contrast, Hennis argues, “Montesquieu does not supply the key to an understanding of Tocqueville, and that
to view him within this tradition leads to a failure to understand his modernity. Tocqueville’s actual
teacher,” he writes, “if one is to be ascribed to him, is Rousseau.” However, he comes closer to agreeing
with Ceaser, for example, in a broad sense, when he later writes: “As with everyone before him, the
knowledge [Tocqueville] seeks in this field [of science politique] is sought not for its own sake but for the
sake of correct action,” adding in a footnote: “The purpose of political knowledge is not changed in
Machiavelli or Hobbes, either. They only radicalize it.” Ultimately, “Montesquieu may have been
Tocqueville’s mentor as far as the form or the analytic ordering of the subjects is concerned,” however,
given the changed political situation from Montesquieu’s day to that of Tocqueville, “Rousseau is
Tocqueville’s real teacher when it comes to substance; indeed, the substance which is at issue: human
freedom.” Wilhelm Hennis, “In Search of the ‘New Science of Politics,’ in Interpreting Tocqueville’s
Democracy in America, ed. Ken Masugi (Savage: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), 27-62. All this without
speaking of the third influence of import, namely, Pascal. On this, see, Peter Augustine Lawler, The
Restless Mind; and, Paul Rahe, Soft Despotism, Democracy’s Drift (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2009), 169-70 et passim.
113
All references to Democracy in America will be to volume, part, chapter, and page number (in the
Mansfield and Withrop edition) as follows: I.1.1, 1, with the exception of references to the Introduction that
will be simply by page number.
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situation and what might be done to help men live satisfying and free lives under present
conditions.
As democracy has gone global, and insofar as globalization and democracy are
intimately related phenomena, one commentator is correct in suggesting the following:
“The central questions raised by Tocqueville in his studies of America, France, and other
European countries are just as crucial for understanding the course of the Global
Democratic Revolution taking place in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle
East.”114 Indeed, Tocqueville famously describes the “development of equality of
conditions” in striking terms. He says it is something like “a providential fact,” and in
this sense, he speaks of it having one of the “principal characteristics” of just such a fact,
namely, it is “universal.” No isolated or incidental phenomenon, it is furthermore,
according to Tocqueville, “enduring,” insofar as it is beyond the power of human beings
to counter it outright; it may be directed, but not stopped. Thus, it is a fact that is both in
and of history, as well something that transcends history—it is a fact that could not be
more general, for it applies at least in principle to all men in all places. And so, “all
events, like all men, serve its development” (Intro., 6). It is, however, something that
likewise has its source in the human heart, as Tocqueville describes the passion for
equality that exists in at least two opposing forms. The first is “a manly and legitimate
114

Sheldon Gellar, “Tocquevillian Analytics and the Global Democratic Revolution,” in Conversations
with Tocqueville: The Global Democratic Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, eds. Aurelian Craiutu
and Sheldon Gellar (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009), 33-54. McWilliams notes that while Tocqueville’s
writing “seems to rely on the existence of borders between states” he otherwise “draws attention to the
impermanence and even impotence of political borders in the modern world.” Democracy in America, she
argues, serves as witness to the “the spectacle of a world where long-standing political borders, especially
at the international level, are being crossed and compromised at a furious rate.” And it is the phenomenon
of democratization that is the “the greatest political development of the modern age,” largely because it
itself transcends such borders. McWilliams suggests that Tocqueville’s political science can be seen as
directed at “the challenge of preserving political liberty in a world of increasingly evident global scale.”
Susan McWilliams, “Tocqueville and the Unsettled Global Village,” in Tocqueville and the Frontiers of
Democracy, ed. Ewa Atanassow & Richard Boyd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 153-77.
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passion for equality that incites men to want all to be strong and esteemed.” The second
he labels “a depraved taste for equality in the human heart that brings the weak to want to
draw the strong to their level and reduces men to preferring equality in servitude to
inequality in freedom” (I.1.3, 52). People in the age of democracy do not naturally or
inevitably scorn freedom. Tocqueville says they have a taste for this too; however,
“freedom is not the principal and continuous object of their desire; what they love with an
eternal love is equality…nothing can satisfy them without equality, and they would
sooner consent to perish than to lose it.” Amidst the flux and movement of the human
heart today, its apparently sole continuous and even natural desire is for equality. Of
course, with such equality—drawn from a manly or from a depraved taste for that
matter—come certain difficulties and problems. Tocqueville examines the logic of
equality as it is unfolding historically and as it continues to operate in the human heart.
Beginning as he does from this universal fact, Tocqueville engages the particular
manifestations and possibilities of social and political equality, in their positive and
negative variations, in an attempt to show how men can cultivate a healthy political
existence in light of this enduring and universal phenomenon. For equality of conditions
is what he refers to as “the generative fact,” from which he says in America “each
particular fact seemed to issue” (Intro., 3). To which he adds much later that “in the
midst of the apparent diversity of human things, it is not impossible to find a few
generative facts from which all the others flow” (I.2.10, 315). Just how few is unclear,
but not unlike Montesquieu, Tocqueville finds that the diversity of human things can be
made intelligible, and this is especially true by consciously balancing general and
particular facts, epistemologically and otherwise.
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In the penultimate chapter of the first volume, Tocqueville states explicitly that
any reader thinking his aim was “to propose Anglo-American laws and mores for
imitation by all peoples who have a democratic social state would have committed a great
error,” for the general situation of democracy requires different and particular laws and
mores. Stated more philosophically, such an error would have meant becoming “attached
to the form, [and] abandoning the very substance” of Tocqueville’s thought (I.2.9, 302).
Just as the general and particular require balance, so too must form and substance each be
properly attended to without undue attachment to one over the other. Whatever else his
reservations about his own work, Tocqueville is “sure of sincerely having the desire” to
succeed in making known what he saw, which is to say that he never “knowingly
succumbed to the need to adapt facts to ideas instead of submitting ideas to facts” (Intro.,
13-14).115 For as he states elsewhere, “[t]here is nothing more unproductive for the
human mind than an abstract idea. I therefore hurry to run toward the facts” (II.3.18,
590). And so Tocqueville’s mind remains largely above the “blind instincts” and
“invincible habits” at either end of the “opposing penchants of the [democratic and
aristocratic] intellects[s]” that otherwise lead men astray to “direct actions despite
particular facts” (II.4.2, 641). In this and the following chapter we discuss Tocqueville’s
insights—some of the ordered and sincere combination of facts and ideas—on these
fronts, so as to illustrate his continued relevance as a guide for our own political world
today, with its aspirant universalism.
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Relatedly, Tocqueville provides one definition of “genius” as being able “to fit actions to facts.”
Tocqueville, Recollections, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J.P. Mayer & A.P. Kerr (New York: Doubleday &
Co., 1970), 43.
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Tocqueville’s Art and Science
Just as Tocqueville himself limned in his “Speech Given to the Annual Public
Meeting of the Academy of Moral and Political Science” on April 3, 1952, there are “two
parts of politics that must not be confused, one fixed and the other in motion.” The first
is what he refers to as “the general and permanent condition of humanity” and can be
properly examined by science, founded as it is “on the very nature of man, on his
interests, on his faculties, on his needs as revealed by philosophy and history, on his
instincts, which change their objects according to the times without changing their nature,
and which are as immortal as his race.” Tocqueville appropriately calls the second “the
art of government,” which consists of “a practical and militant politics that struggles
against the difficulties of each day, adapting to the variety of incidents, providing for the
passing needs of the moment, and calling to its aid the ephemeral passions of
contemporaries.”116 There is an existent, if not always apparent, relation between these
two aspects of politics—science and art, or theory and practice—and it is something of an
open question regarding the extent that this relationship itself can, or is subject to,
change.117
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Tocqueville’s Speech is available in, Alexis de Tocqueville and the Art of Democratic Statesmanship,
eds. Brian Danoff and L. Joseph Hebert, Jr. (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011), 17-30.
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For discussion of Tocqueville’s appreciation of the tensions between theory and practice, or
intellectualism and statesmanship, see, Richard Boyd and Conor Williams, “Intellectuals and
Statesmanship? Tocqueville, Oakshott, and the Distinction between Theoretical and Practical Knowledge,”
in Alexis de Tocqueville and the Art of Democratic Statesmanship, 117-36. Boyd and Williams
demonstrate that for Tocqueville, “it is a dangerous fallacy to think that theory can ever take the place of
practice,” and yet that “an epistemological skepticism about the limits of theoretical knowledge need not
culminate in an anti-democratic political disposition. Cf. James W. Ceaser, “Political Science, Political
Culture, and the Role of the Intellectual,” in Interpreting Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, ed. Ken
Masugi (Savage: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1991), 287-325. Ceaser convincingly shows how
Tocqueville’s work calls for “a science of politics to combat the potential hazards of the easy ideas
produced by literary writers about politics.” In connecting political culture and political thought as he does,
illustrating the mutual influence of each, Tocqueville’s new science “points to the need to transcend the
artificial modern division between political theory and empirical political science.” Ceaser argues that
following Tocqueville leads one to the view that political culture should be understood with reference to
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Notable in Tocqueville’s own distinction is the common fact of human “needs”
and the connection between “instincts” and “passions,” insofar as these are, curiously,
both permanent and changing—that some are temporary and some eternal (some of the
latter beyond the obvious ones, say, of basic sustenance and the like, but being more
political, as it were). The significance of what Tocqueville calls the “great democratic
revolution” and thus the emergent “age of democracy” is central to all his thinking, not
least because it is something of a cause, or carrier of change, in the instincts, passions,
and the needs of men; something of a revolution in the hearts and minds of men has taken
place. However, this revolution is true to its own etymological ambivalence: it consists
of a revolving as well as of a renovating, so to speak. It brings with it both continuity and
change. It is less that new passions or needs are born, than that some are heightened
while others are dampened, both for better and for worse. Therefore, one must read
Tocqueville’s statement in Democracy in America calling for a “new political
science…for a world altogether new” [“Il faut une science politique nouvelle à un monde
tout nouveau”] with some qualification—his altogether here is an exaggeration, or
something of a rhetorical cue applied to ask readers to consider precisely the problem of
novelty and permanence, as well as of motion and fixity, in human and political affairs.118

the philosophic ideas that form the broader perspectives governing peoples’ views and opinions.
Ultimately, the maintenance of liberty requires knowing and cultivating the requisite ideas and perspectives
that generate in people both the means and will toward a life of freedom.
118
Hennis reads this statement, placed as it is “at a dramatic point in this highly dramatic introduction,” to
be “scarcely…understood as anything but an indication of the ambition of its highly ambitious author,”
thereby suggesting that we ought to read Tocqueville’s book and oeuvre as a whole as a possible “answer
to this need.” He concludes by writing that Tocqueville’s “actual theme, his only theme” is: “How can we
prevent the degradation of souls in an age of equality which has been willed by destiny?” Most important
for this political science is that “man’s sense for the higher things be preserved and that his sensitivity to
greatness be prevented from falling asleep.” Hennis, “In Search of the ‘New Science of Politics.’” If this is
the case, the world may have changed, but hardly altogether, insofar as these aims are not unlike those of
classical political philosophy, circumstantial differences aside. Mansfield and Winthrop likewise offer a
focused discussion of this striking statement calling for a new political science, arguing there is “good
reason” to think it can be found in his book and writings on the whole, but that “he left it implicit and
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The proclaimed need for a new science should be considered in light of the fact that he
“undertook to see, not differently, but further than the parties,” and at least two such
parties hereby referred to are those with two opposing views on the democratic revolution
itself: “A great democratic revolution is taking place among us: all see it, but all do not
judge it in the same manner. Some consider it a new thing, and taking it for an accident,
they still hope to be able to stop it; whereas others judge it irresistible because to them it
seems the most continuous, the oldest, and the most permanent fact known in history”
(Intro., 3).119 Tocqueville finds some amount of truth in both views, insofar as he traces

scattered rather than explain it systematically, also for good reason.” Ultimately, they claim that modern
political science, preoccupied as it has been—since Hobbes—with solving the problem of legitimacy so as
to bring an end to heated conflict has failed, and in the meantime as it has avoided discussing the state or
health of human souls, souls have been degraded. Thus, “The modern theorists believed they could have
legitimacy without concern for souls; Tocqueville disagrees.” Harvey C. Mansfield Jr. and Delba
Winthrop, “Tocqueville’s New Political Science,” in The Cambridge Companion to Tocqueville, ed.,
Cheryl Welch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 81-107. With the discussion in note 112,
supra in mind, Kraynak argues that Tocqueville’s “adaption of classical regime analysis to fit the
phenomena of democratic sovereignty and the limited constitution is the centerpiece of the new science.”
Robert P. Kraynak, “Tocqueville’s constitutionalism,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 81,
No.4 (Dec., 1987): 1175-95. Goldhammer situates Tocqueville in a Pascalian milieu where the heart and
mind are divided, and while Tocqueville has “nothing but the highest respect for reason” (or science), he
has “doubts about the guidance that reason can offer man,” so that instinct (or art) is a necessary
supplement. Ideas and insight may not only fail to guide men, but may lead him down dangerous
pathways. Therefore, Goldhammer argues that the new political science “was intended to direct the new
political art, whose purpose was to shape man’s instincts, for when the light of reason fails and
circumstances are unprecedented, instinct is all man possesses to set himself on the right course.” The
extent to which instincts are malleable, and what degree of continuity they bear across time, is a complex
problem in Tocqueville. “As often as not, instinct occupies a middle position: it is like love, at once
circumstantial and durable.” Thus, “the word instinct conjures up for Tocqueville the Pascalian ambiguity,
uncertainty, and doubleness of man’s situation. Reason by itself is too feeble and instrument to guide him
in life’s storms. He must use reason whenever he can, but, knowing in advance that it may fail him in
crucial moments, he must live his life and constitute his society in such a way as to cultivate those instincts
most likely to save him when reason fails.” Arthur Goldhammer, “Translating Tocqueville: Constraints of
Classicism,” The Cambridge Companion to Tocqueville, 153-55, 158-59. On the matter of continuity and
change in Tocqueville, see, Pierre Manent, “Tocqueville, Political Philosopher,” Ibid., 108-20, who writes:
“In the constant change of all things human, one thing does not change: democracy as ‘democratic
revolution,’ as equalization of conditions, which is ‘the oldest, most continuous, most permanent fact
known to history.’ The unchanging fact is change of a certain type. What is permanent is the way in which
things change and the direction in which they move.”
119
His references to two parties in Europe, or to “a struggle between two contrary principles” in Europe, is
a recurring feature. Cf. I.1.5, 187ff. Likewise, he speaks of two opinions “as old as the world, and one
finds them over and over in different forms and reclothed with diverse names in all free societies. One
opinion wanted to restrict popular power, the other to extend it indefinitely.” I.2.2, 167. Finally, consider
the following powerful statement: “In this century, when the destinies of the Christian world appear to be
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the revolution’s roots well back beyond his own day, noting certain consistencies of
human character over the ages; just as he draws sometimes startling distinctions between
democratic and aristocratic ages, peoples, and souls. He has sought the moderate ground
that is attached to neither extreme, as he indicates in the “Notice” to the second volume:
“Placed in the midst of the contradictory opinions that divide us, I have tried for the
moment to destroy the favorable sympathies or contradictory instincts that each of these
opinions inspires in my heart” (400). Thus he avoids flattering either of the “great
parties” or any of the “little factions” that hold ideologically to radical or reactionary
views, seeking to further the democratic revolution or restore the old aristocracy.
Ultimately, he hints at an at least hidden bond between things democratic and aristocratic,
insofar as they can even be compared, while he suggests that certain aspects of the latter
are necessary to ennoble and properly sustain the former.120 After all, “however new and
unexpected contemporaries may find the particular events of any age, including our own,
they are always part of the age-old history of humanity.”121 One can indeed learn from
the old world, just as one might learn from and apply some of the old science and art, as
well. In fact, in his other major work, The Old Regime and the Revolution, Tocqueville
stresses just how much the revolutionaries failed “to put an abyss between what they had
been and what they wished to become” in their great effort “to disassociate themselves
unresolved, some hasten to attach democracy as an enemy power while it is till getting larger; others
already adore it as a new god that issue from nothingness; but both know the object of their hatred or their
desire only imperfectly; they do combat in the shadows and strike only haphazardly.” I.2.6, 234. In
contrast, Tocqueville seeks to approximate perfect knowledge of democracy, without overwhelmingly
hating or desiring it; hence what might be called his objectivity.
120
While famously saying at the end of Democracy that democracy and aristocracy are fundamentally
incommensurable, Zetterbaum is correct in arguing that Tocqueville “does in fact subject them to common
standards, standards that are trans-historical, that transcend the limitations of any particular social or
political condition.” Marvin Zetterbaum, Tocqueville and the Problem of Democracy (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1967), 23, 34-5.
121
Recollections, 71. Interestingly, the editors here add in a footnote that the following words were marked
for omission in the manuscript: “For what we call new facts are most often only forgotten ones.” The
alleged omission was due to his further marginalia: “Has not this been said by others?”
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from their past.” If the Democracy goes to great lengths to highlight novelty, the Old
Regime highlights how much of the past remains, and how “[u]nintentionally” the
revolutionaries used the debris of the old regime to construct the framework of their new
society.”122
At any rate, as we will see, for Tocqueville, the democratic comes to represent the
general while the aristocratic the particular, in terms of passions, ideas, and the human
spirit at large. On one level, it is likewise possible to relate the aristocratic with art and
the democratic with science, albeit not exclusively, but insofar as the former heightens
art, or the poetry of existence, while the latter emphasizes the rational or science of life.
The democratic spirit tends to extend reason in the extreme, to the highest level of
generality, so that the process of rationalization becomes increasingly emptied of content;
it skirts over particular differences, divisions, and distinctions, holding the imagination’s
attraction to (and exaggeration of) curious details at bay. What is science, on a most
basic level, other than the search for universal and unchanging laws, even to the contempt
of exceptions? The aristocratic spirit, in it its heightened manifestations, places an
overemphasis on imagination, with an acute attention to particularities, sometimes at the
expense of broader general truths or patterns that may weave a rational thread through the
many details. Nevertheless, both the general and the particular, just as both art and
science, participate, as it were, in humanity. That is to say, both are means of expressing
and representing humanity. Not to mention, one speaks of humanity in general as well as
of its particular manifestations, and both artistic and scientific inclinations are
fundamentally human. Thus, for all their differences, and in consideration of all that
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Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution, trans. Alan S. Kahan (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1998), 83.
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separates them, the aristocratic and democratic spirits have a common bond as well,
rooted, so to speak, in the very nature of man.
Interested as he is in man simply, Tocqueville nevertheless demonstrates that man
is always politically situated in some way: man’s heart and mind take on a particular
form, given the regime under which he lives, and so under particular conditions man is
more or less democratic or aristocratic.123 Stated differently, for all that the world has
changed—entering as it has the democratic age—some things remain unchanged. The
human condition has been and is a political condition, despite the fact that the range of
possible regimes may have changed, and that the human expressions of the heart and
mind vary over time.124 While his political science may require different means to
achieve its objectives, it remains chiefly concerned with raising and representing what is
best in humanity. In his own words: “Only the goal toward which the human race should
always be tending is unmoving; the means of getting it there vary constantly” (II.2.15,
518).125 That said, he likewise makes clear that “there is nothing in the world but
patriotism or religion that can make the universality of citizens advance for long toward
the same goal” (I.1.5, 89). The political or the theological alone have the power to hold
man’s collective attention for sufficient time to direct him towards action, but just as God
or the gods must take on some form or be mediated by man in some particular way, so
too must the political take a specific body in aspiring towards any given goal. Such
123

That is not to say that man is simply reducible to a political type, for as has been convincingly argued,
“Tocqueville is no partisan of the futile effort to reduce modern or extremely restless individuals to
citizens, an effort which also opposes man’s true greatness. Because the American cannot and should not
be simply citizens, they must also be religious. They have longing which they know, at least sometimes,
elude political and technological satisfaction. Their apolitical greatness lies in those longings, which point
beyond the limitations of this world to a greatness, as Pascal says, beyond human experience.” Lawler, The
Restless Mind, 9.
124
Manent, “Tocqueville, Political Philosopher,” The Cambridge Companion to Tocqueville, 114ff.
125
Cf. “For it is true that, although humanity is always the same, people’s outlooks and the incidents that
make history vary constantly.” Recollections, 37.
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embodiment, and the variety of mediating forms, inevitably results in separations—that
is, among the world’s peoples; hence the multiplicity of collectivities. The broad task of
political science and art within such collectivities, according to Tocqueville, is
establishing and maintaining a combination of liberty and dignity—the conditions and
qualities to which humanity ought to aspire, and seeks to achieve in a variety of ways.126
As this was Tocqueville’s goal in light of the democratic revolution, so it need be ours in
an apparently globalizing world. The preservation of liberty and dignity requires
applying the art and science of politics in a way that moderates certain universalizing
tendencies, consisting as it must in “holding men together…as a body.”127 Doing so rests
upon being able to properly see both the surface and depth of things human and political.

From “External Configurations” to “Internal State of Soul”
Chapter One of Part 1 of the First Volume of Democracy in America opens with
discussion of North America’s “external configuration,” which, Tocqueville writes,
“presents general features that are easy to discern at first glance” (1.1.1, 19). This
statement serves not only as entry into his book, but as itself a first glance at his manner
of analysis—that is, his methodos.128 Starting from the outside, with the general, and
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In Recollections he states emphatically that in politics he “had no cause to defend except freedom and
human dignity” (105). In Democracy, Tocqueville says that the end of politics consists of “independence
and dignity” (II.4.7, 666), and “freedom and human greatness” (II.4.7, 670). For discussion of these aims,
and by way of contrast with Aristotle, see, Mansfield and Winthrop, “Tocqueville’s New Political
Science,” esp. 104 (note 7). If Aristotle aims at virtue, Tocqueville aims for greatness, and the latter is not,
for Tocqueville, necessarily identical with virtue. Both seek to raise man upward, or encourage what is
higher, and the question to ask is whether and to what extent in fact the differences in their respective
political sciences rest upon differences in the world—that is, just how new is the world; if not altogether,
still sufficiently to necessitate a change in the very substance of political science, rather than simply its
form?
127
Recollections, 82.
128
Kaledin, interestingly, reads this opening discussion of America’s geography and terrain as an objective
as well as a subjective landscape upon which Tocqueville’s “own inner drama was played out and where
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what appears as obvious, he moves inward, to what is more difficult to discern at first
glance—to what he initially refers to as the “internal state of soul” (I.1.1, 24). Doing so
requires an additional glance, or multiple glances, which then in turn complicate what
was originally easily discernible. It is a matter of examining parts, or the internal aspects
of what otherwise appears whole. Additionally, as Tocqueville elsewhere writes: “All
men placed at the same point of view do not envision the same objects in the same
manner. This is so with greater reason when the point of view is different” (I.2.10, 362).
This is true for democracy itself, which, despite being “founded on an idea so simple and
natural, nevertheless always supposes the existence of a very civilized and very learned
society.” A distant and first glance reveals something different from a second and closer
one: “At first one would believe [democracy] to be contemporaneous with the first ages
of the world; looking at it closely, one easily discovers that it could only have come last”
(I.2.5, 199). Thus, Tocqueville sorts through the opinions of others, as well deeply
considering what he himself has seen. Consequently, he says he encounters in America
“something more than an immense and complete democracy,” and therefore “the peoples
who inhabit the New World can be envisaged from more than one point of view” (I.2.10,
302). In short, all general features are complicated by the particular details, and this

his social and political imagination found fullest scope.” The “dark forests of America” that Tocqueville
writes of became a recurring metaphor for his own “personal struggle against skepticism and doubt” and
the increasing isolation he felt from his own people and age. The tension between doubt and belief,
Kaledin highlights, is at the heart of the concluding chapter of Democracy, just as it is central to the
opening one: “The unresolved struggle between mind and value, intellect and faith at the heart of
Democracy in America is Tocqueville himself.” Arthur Kaledin, Tocqueville and His Democracy (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 7, 63-82, 172-3, et passim. While there is some merit to Kaledin’s
reading, he is often prone to over-psychologizing Tocqueville’s work when looking for the “journey within
the journey” to America, and so the “other book within Democracy in America” that he reads as “a
subliminal epic of self-exploration in which Tocqueville ranges through his own feelings and experiences
in quest of his true self, to finally locate himself in history.”
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complication—this tension—is inescapable.129 Moreover, Tocqueville is very conscious
of it, trying as he ever does, to balance between over-generalization and particularization.130 By the end of the first volume, after having taken so many objects or
parts into consideration, from various perspectives, he then “gather[s] all of them under a
single point of view,” which provides a concluding discussing that is “less detailed, but
surer,” so that he may “perceive each object less distinctly” but “embrace the general
facts with more certainty” (I.2.10, 391). Tocqueville’s regard ever strives to grasp “the
form” of objects so as to “conceive a clear idea of the whole,” while not neglecting the
parts that constitute the sum, or the many details that constitute human existence. So
much may be considered part of his moderation—one of his chief intellectual virtues.
His endeavor to tread a moderate line in this regard is less surprising given that,
first, he often thinks in terms of dichotomies (which are “easy to discern at first glance,”
but again, are later complicated), and second, that one of his most important conceptual
dichotomies—the democratic and aristocratic—contain, or represent, things general and
129

Later, when speaking about American executive power, he makes a comparison between the American
president and the king of a constitutional monarchy in Europe, prefacing this discussion by saying, “In this
comparison I shall not be much attached to external signs of power; they deceive the eye of the observer
more than guide it.” He is aware of when the surface, or external, distracts or obfuscates, and must
therefore be circumvented or passed through quickly, rather than when it must slowly be pierced and waded
through towards the depths, or the internal. As he writes a few lines later, “One must therefore leave the
surface and penetrate further.” DA I.1.8, 117-18. He is nothing if not careful in his attention to such
matters, and the language is anything but incidental. After all, “The human mind invents things more
easily than words: hence comes the use of so many improper terms and incomplete expressions.” DA I.1.8,
148. And finally, one finds a further analogy when he speaks—not without playfulness—about the
freedom of the press and its relation to expression versus thought: “Expression is the exterior form and, if I
can express myself so, the body of thought, but it is not thought itself.” DA I.2.3, 173. His expression
about expression makes one question the true spirit of the body of his thought; or, again, leads one to
consider the exterior in light of the interior, and vice versa.
130
Commentators repeatedly speak of how self-conscious a writer he is. See, for example, Schleifer, who
speaks of his “intense self-awareness as a writer.” James T. Schleifer, “Tocqueville’s Democracy in
America Reconsidered,” The Cambridge Companion to Tocqueville, 128; Zetterbaum says “Tocqueville
writes with full consciousness of the requirements of political practice; his first consideration is always the
effect his thought will have on society,” and so he is “a statesman writing for statesmen.” On this basis
Zetterbaum convincingly unfolds the “salutary myths” that Tocqueville introduces, and resolves certain
paradoxes between his public and private writings. Zetterbaum, Tocqueville and the Problem of
Democracy, 19-20ff.
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particular. Just as Tocqueville’s thought can only be properly understood through his
manner of comparison, and thereby thinking in and through both terms of any pair, so too
must we follow his manner of juxtaposing both general and particular categorizations.131
In so doing, we shall additionally come to understand how he advises mixing or
balancing the general and particular—ideationally or theoretically, as well as politically,
and practically.132 It is his contention that democracy, as the rule of the majority, can
become tyrannically homogeneous, insofar as “democratic republics in our day have
rendered [violence] just as intellectual as the human will that it wants to constrain” (I.2.7,
244). Left to itself, the majority can become despotic, setting itself and its ideas and
interests as the general—or sole—standard, so that any particular opposition finds no
place, or is otherwise absorbed.
Whereas in the past, an absolute and despotic government “struck the body
crudely, so as to reach the soul; and the soul, escaping from those blows, rose gloriously
above it,” in democratic republics, the tyranny proceeds otherwise: “it leaves the body
and goes straight for the soul. The master no longer says to it: You shall think as I do or
131

Consider his oft-quoted statement: “the mind becomes clear only by comparison”; Cf. Aron, who
considers him a comparative sociologist of the highest degree… (184-85). As Schleifer—who has spent a
great deal of time perusing Tocqueville’s notes, drafts, and the like, while translating his work, and thereby
reflecting continually on matters of style, method, and language—writes: “Tocqueville also commonly
wrote in parallel structures, in matched phrases, sentences, or paragraphs. This feature reflects another
important intellectual trait. He tended to think in pairs, and especially in contrasting pairs, or pairs in
tension. This attention to contrasting pairs is, of course, related to one of Tocqueville’s favorite techniques:
comparison and contrast.” Schleifer, “Tocqueville’s Democracy in America Reconsidered,” 122-23.
132
Schleifer argues that his belief in “harmony meant pairs in equilibrium”—that is, he sought and
advocated a certain balance in thought and advocated the same in deed, in terms of the various comparative
categories and objects he juxtaposed. Ibid., 123. Manent concludes that Tocqueville is precisely a
philosopher for the very reason that he institutes “the confrontation between ‘aristocracy’ and ‘democracy’”
and so declares “that the debate between these two forms of humanity—between justice and grandeur—
cannot be resolved,” thereby reopening “the question that our dogmatic passion declared to have been
settled in advance.” Manent, “Tocqueville, Political Philosopher,” 120. Tocqueville’s philosophical depth
rests in his ability to see that there are timeless tensions, and that one state of soul (or even one kind of
state, or regime, that fosters certain types of soul) can only be considered in full in the light of other such
states and souls—no single manifestation of human or political life exhausts the range of possibilities, even
while the range is well less than unlimited.
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you shall die; he says: You are free not to think as I do; your life, your goods, everything
remains to you; but from this day on, you are a stranger to us…You shall remain among
men, but shall lose your rights of humanity…Go in peace, I leave you your life, but I
leave it to you worse than death.” Today’s experience of political correctness—the
alleged correcting and abolition of certain differences and distinctions—or the aspirant
correction of politics by altogether transcending the political, would be unsurprising from
Tocqueville’s perspective. The intellectual equalization and leveling to which democracy
is prone—that is, its tendency to “extreme equality,” and to universal similitude, in areas
not only of the body, but of the soul—is dangerous to liberty. In the extreme, the
majority that comes to be a shapeless mass or a generalized group void of particular and
contrary voices culminates in the “perpetual adoration of itself” (I.2.7, 245). Such selfadoration is the only act of will, the only idea that remains, in souls that have submitted
to the notion of the most generalized right.
An important part of his new political science is the task of countering such
tendencies, albeit without being reactionary in the opposite regard; without seeking to
revert to something other than will of the majority, or placing the “social power”
elsewhere than in the people. Key to keeping the general interest of the majority from
becoming omnipotent is the cultivation and maintenance of opposing and particular
interests and ideas. Thus, in the age of democracy, Tocqueville seeks to “keep open
aristocratic possibilities,” not out of any partisanship to class, or the past, but to liberty
and dignity.133 After all, as he writes in his Recollections: “in matters of social
constitution the field of possibilities is much wider than people living within each society
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Lawler, Restless Mind, 21 et passim.
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imagine.”134 It may be difficult for men in the age of equality to see beyond the steady
equalization of conditions, or to view alternate results and forms of equality, but not
impossible if properly considered. Some have therefore spoken of Tocqueville’s
“aristocratic liberalism,” and of his defense of “the aristocratic sources of liberty.”135 Not
without profundity and insight, Tocqueville’s liberalism has been referred to as
“liberalism with soul.”136
While his concern includes the soul, Tocqueville’s initial attention to “external
configurations” follows the Montesquieuean approach that likewise recognizes the
importance of things bodily, and the concrete details and objects in and of human life.
Just as Montesquieu makes apparent that any and every spirit requires manifestation
through some kind of body or form, so too does Tocqueville emphasize this fact.137 The
“spirit of liberty,” for example, only exists in a delineated space, through the actions of
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Recollections, 76.
Arther Kaledin devotes a chapter to Tocqueville’s “Aristocratic Liberalism,” in Aristocratic Liberalism:
The Social and Political Thought of Jacob Burckhardt, John Stuart Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), see esp. 137-47.
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Mansfield and Winthrop, “Tocqueville’s New Political Science,” 84, in the context of how
Tocqueville’s new political science is concerned with the soul, and is therefore an immersion in practice
rather than an endeavor at formulating and deriving principles; for this reason he is so devoted to studying,
bolstering, and properly cultivating pride. “He prefers liberalism in practice to liberalism in theory because
liberalism in practice is liberalism with soul.”
137
In one instance Tocqueville speaks of societies as being “like organized bodies,” which “follow certain
fixed rules in their formation from which they cannot deviate. They are composed of certain elements that
one finds everywhere and at all times” (I.2.5, 200). If initially striking in its rigidity, the statement is
clarified—its “elements” come to light—as being a division of people into “three classes,” namely the rich,
those who are not rich but “live amidst ease in all things” (and so something like what we refer to today as
the middle class), and finally those without property who “live particularly by the work that the first two
furnish them.” To this he adds: “you cannot fix it so that these categories do not exist.” The law of
numbers in politics is inescapable. One may read this as a modification of Aristotle’s discussion of the few
and the many and their typical arguments in politics, with the added difference that Tocqueville speaks of
each class having “certain instincts that are their own” when it comes to handling issues of a state’s
finances. Since the proportions vary (as he illustrates regarding America, England, and France), and so do
the consequences of universal suffrage, the fact is that the ruling of the many need not necessarily be the
rule of the poor, for in America, “the great majority of citizens are possessors,” which puts it in a much
more “favorable” situation than the France of his day.
135
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individuals, or even in a particular text.138 And indeed, Tocqueville’s discussion of the
external configurations of America is immediately followed by—and thereby
complicated by—his well-known discussion of “the point of departure” of the Americans
(I.1.2, 27-45). Drawing a parallel between a single human life and the life of nations, he
writes: “The man is so to speak a whole in the swaddling clothes of his cradle,” to which
is added: “Peoples always feel [the effects of] their origins. The circumstances that
accompanied their birth and served to develop them influence the entire course of the rest
of their lives” (I.1.2, 28). There is much to the word “circumstances” here, for what
could be more localized than the birth of a particular person or peoples? No birth occurs
more than once, nor does it happen in more than one place. And yet few things can be
properly understood strictly in light of their birth time and place. So much is suggested
by the genetic fallacy, which is one Tocqueville commits by his use of a single—the—
point of departure, as well as refutes by writing more than a singular history along a
linear trajectory; the general truth of the point of departure is further complicated by
additional particular details. If indeed the chapter on the point of departure is “the key
almost to the whole work” (I.1.2, 29), it is a key that almost opens the door, but
nonetheless requires effort from extraneous sources, and so it may be said to open a door
to further doors and doorways.139 At any rate, the spiritual circumstances Tocqueville
elaborates here fall under the title of Puritanism, which is by no means a simple concept:
as the point of departure it has many parts.
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Tocqueville very succinctly defines what he means by “a spirit” in one passage as a sum of common
habits (I.2.3, 177). Common habits are, needless to say, practiced, and to be so held in common, must have
some form of manifestation (even as the expression, to hold in common suggests).
139
After all, in Recollections he writes that he “hate[s] all those absolute systems that make all the events of
history depend on great first causes linked together by the chain of fate and thus succeed, so to speak, in
banishing me from the history of the human race.” He goes on to stress the importance of “chance” and
“accident” and “the concatenation of secondary causes,” as well as the various facts that are otherwise
“inexplicable” (62).
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Puritanism, Tocqueville writes, “was not only a religious doctrine” but “also
blended at several points with the most absolute democratic and republican theories.”140
Even as the first Americans wanted to make “an idea triumph,” in studying their
documents and sources, “one seems to breathe in an air of antiquity and a sort of biblical
perfume” (I.1.2, 32-3). Such imagery requires pause, for not only is it an open, even
contestable, question as to whether ancient and Biblical ideas are wholly reconcilable
under a single idea, but air, simply speaking, does not have the same weight or quality as
perfume.141 Perhaps Tocqueville only uses “antiquity” here in its more rudimentary
sense of old (rather than “Greek” or “Roman”), for what he himself emphasizes is the
“conviction” animating the writer, which in turn “elevates his language.” The Puritans,
based on a reading of their writings—in this case, the writing of Nathanial Mortan, an
early historian of New England—give one perusing such works the impression that they
did not simply set out as “a small troop of adventurers going to seek fortune beyond the
seas.” Rather, one finds “the seed of a great people that God comes to deposit from his
hands onto a predestined land.” The idea, coming as it does from God, is represented by
a tangible seed, while the erstwhile physical land is imbued with predestination. Mind
and body are mutually representative and intermingled in a most complex fashion:
140

See, Sanford Kessler, “Tocqueville’s Puritans: Christianity and the American Founding,” The Journal of
Politics, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Aug., 1992): 776-92, who points out the virtues and shortcomings of Tocqueville’s
understanding of Puritan “point of departure.” He likewise highlights the ambiguities and changes over
time: “Tocqueville initially claimed that the Puritans made America a sort of Christian commonwealth
where moral and intellectual life was governed by faith. He later shows, however, that the Puritans set in
motion a process which made individual judgment and self-interest the bases of American mores rather
than the Bible and Christian love” (789). Cf. Barbara Allan’s, Tocqueville, Covenant, and the Democratic
Revolution: Harmonizing Earth with Heaven (Lanham: Lexington, 2005), for an elaborate discussion of the
importance of the covenant tradition of Reformed Protestantism in American constitutionalism and
Tocqueville’s understanding and extrapolations from this basis.
141
On the matter of ancient thought and the Bible, see, for example, Charles Norris Cochrane, Christianity
and Classical Culture: A Study of Thought and Action From Augustus to Augustine (Indianapolis: Liberty
Fund, Inc., 2003); and Leora Batnitzky, “Leo Strauss and the ‘Theologico-Political Predicament,’” in The
Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss, ed., Steven B. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009), 41-62.
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external configurations and the internal state of soul are not unrelated. And as
Tocqueville is a writer, or sort of historian, he too knows that his language requires the
elevation of conviction. His conviction is often conveyed through his prominent use of
imagery.142
In one of many remarkable footnotes, and one that explicitly addresses the
connection between things external and internal—between body and spirit, or matter and
mind, as well as presentation and re-presentation—Tocqueville elaborates on the “rock
on which the pilgrims descended,” namely, that in the town of Plymouth (I.1.2, 34). The
emigrants that landed had the goal of founding a colony, and while they failed to do so on
the banks of the Hudson as hoped, they “were finally forced to land on the arid coasts of
New England.” The rock that “is still shown” there, is one, he notes, that has “become an
object of veneration in the United States.” The veneration that takes place in the mind
passes by way of objects in space, which are carriers of meaning. Man can and does
express the elements of his soul—the external can represent the internal—and often
through things that can literally be seen by the eyes.143 Tocqueville here goes on to say
that he has “seen fragments of it carefully preserved in several towns of the Union. Does
142

As Faguet has written: “the task which [Tocqueville] set before himself was to penetrate beneath
accidental history to solid history, or beneath history to the physiology of peoples. Emile Faguet,
Politicians and Moralists of the Nineteenth Century (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 80.
Faguet adds, rather eloquently, the following: “Thus he was a historian of institutions or a demological
historian. This was quite new at the time when he attempted it—that is, in 1833. Between the history
which was too hampered by philosophic considerations and the purely epical history, and again, the history
which was not much more than a pamphlet and a controversial work, there was decidedly room for a
patient, and at the same time impassioned, study of this underworld, of these depths, of the bottom of this
sea upon which pass the currents, the ebb and the flow and the tempestuous agitations of the waves of
living. This was the task to which Tocqueville applied himself. Notice how he was prompted to this study
by his nature; meditative, reserved, as little man of the world as of the platform, he was well made to pay
little attention to the surfaces, to probe the depths and listen to the silences and to hear best of all the things
which make the least noise” (81-2).
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Of course, not all such things may be seen, but even our own language cannot help but reify or objectify
speeches and deeds that may not necessarily be directly heard or seen, as, for example, when we say, “That
was a beautiful thing you said,” or “an awful thing you did.” The thingness of human experience is
inescapable—that is, for beings with embodied souls.
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this not show very clearly that the power and greatness of man is wholly in his soul?
Here is a stone that the feet of some miserable persons touched for an instant, and this
stone becomes celebrated; it attracts the regard of a great people; they venerate its
remnants, they parcel out its dust in the distance. What has become of the thresholds of
so many palaces? Who cares about them?”144
So many images he uses, both in his personal reflections and correspondences, as
well as in his political analysis, apply language of the body and concrete space, which
imbues it with significance beyond its material or physical existence on the one hand, and
implies the fact that there is an inescapable concreteness to things human and political, on
the other, so that ideas never triumph alone, without obstacles and limits, or in vacuo.145
So much is consistent with his critique of the philosophes and the French revolutionaries
who sought to create what Tocqueville called “an imaginary ideal society in which
everything seemed simple and coordinated, uniform, equitable, and in accord with
reason”—as though there were nothing that could not be forced to conform to the mind
and its desires.146 And as for the drive to rationalization and uniformity, he argues in
various places how it conduces to tyranny, not least in terms of laws and mores; here in
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This is to highlight but one of many places where Tocqueville emphasizes the bodily, physical, or
physiognomical, and its relation to greater meaning. Indeed, early on he writes: “I confess that in America I
saw more than America; I sought there an image of democracy itself, of its penchants, its character, its
prejudices, its passions…” (Intro., 13). Images teach powerful lessons; the imagination helps to clarify
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the context of changes in the European political landscape and the diminished “spirit of
resistance” in various nations:
When provinces and towns formed so many different nations in the midst of the common native country,
each of them had a particular spirit that opposed the general spirit of servitude; but today, when all the parts
of the same empire, after having lost their franchises, their usages, their prejudices, and even their
memories and their names, have become habituated to obeying the same laws, it is no more difficult to
oppress them all together than to oppress one of them separately (I.2.9, 300).

The ideas of uniformity and universality that follow so closely to that of equality requires
continued resistance, even as there is philosophical truth and validity to such ideas.
Tocqueville states that he would “regard it as a great misfortune for the human race if
freedom had to be produced with the same features in all places” (I.2.10, 302), assumedly
because such homogeneous freedom limits the possibility of greatness in variety and
varieties of greatness. While Tocqueville is certainly not disinterested in the
“philosophical merit of an idea,” he is above all concerned with “the moral and political
effect that it can produce.”147
The same could be said about laws, which are not without their consequences on
things both physical and spiritual, and are on some level ideas that take legal form in
particular communities. Arguably, nowhere in the first volume is this connection made
more strongly than in the area of estate law, insofar as changes in this law result in rather
stark changes in the matter of the family and in men’s ideas of it. In fact at one point,
Tocqueville writes: “No great change in human institutions will be made without
discovering estate law in the middle of the causes of that change” (I.2.10, 334). In the
case of changes in estate law, Tocqueville illustrates how the consequences can quite
literally be destructive of the physical and mental structure of the family, as well as its
situatedness in, and bond with, a particular piece of territory. He writes that with the case
147
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of the right of primogeniture, and so in aristocratic families, “territorial domains pass
most often from generation to generation without being divided. The result is that family
spirit is in a way materialized in the land”(I.1.3, 48). The family not only has an actual
body, made up of its members, but, “[t]he family represents the land, the land represents
the family; it perpetuates its name, its origin, its glory, its power, its virtues. It is an
imperishable witness to the past and a previous pledge of existence to come.” Time itself
is concretely represented in the family-land connection—memory and hope are
inextricably wound up in this bond. However, “[w]hen estate law establishes equal
partition, it destroys the intimate connection that exists between the spirit of the family
and the preservation of the land; the land ceases to represent the family, for, since it
cannot fail to be partitioned at the end of one or two generations, it is evident that it must
constantly be diminished and in the end disappear entirely” (I.1.3, 49). The result of
equalization—or “equal partition”—is a physical and spiritual transformation; the family
and its territory are no longer the same in their appearance and substance.
The consequences are greater yet, for a change in the spirit of the family is
coterminous with a change in what might be called the spirit of commerce; or, certainly
with men’s relationship to money and their desire for it: “from the moment when you
take away from landed property owners a great interest of sentiment, memories, pride,
and ambition in preserving the land, you can be assured that sooner or later they will sell
it, for they have a great pecuniary interest in selling it, since transferable assets produce
more interest than others and lend themselves much more easily to satisfying passions of
the moment.” Again, the relationship to time—in a very spiritual sense—is altered, for
passions cease to be related to the past or the future. Passions are less guided by the
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familial memories and hopes, but are instead individuated and concerned with the
immediate present. It is worth quoting Tocqueville’s own words further: “What is called
family spirit is often founded on an illusion of individual selfishness. One seeks to
perpetuate and in a way to immortalize oneself in one’s remote posterity. Whenever the
spirit of family ends, individual selfishness reenters into the reality of its penchants. As
the family no longer presents itself to the mind as anything but vague, indeterminate, and
uncertain, each concentrates on the comfort of the present; he dreams of the
establishment of the generation that is going to follow, and nothing more.” Tocqueville
subsequently states that one does not therefore seek to perpetuate one’s family; however,
he immediately qualifies this conclusion by stating, “at least one seeks to perpetuate it by
other means than landed property” (emphasis added). If the effect of the democratic
estate laws is to destroy the older aristocratic family, men can nevertheless find new
means to perpetuate the family; or establish a new form of familial life. Family life can
go on, under the new form—and so, with a new spirit—namely, that of the democratic
family.
This early discussion serves as introduction to two especially important sections
of the second volume, namely where Tocqueville discusses the democratic family and the
already mentioned phenomenon of individualism. For he later elaborates on how
democracy induces in men a forgetfulness of their ancestors and that it also “hides his
descendants from him and separates him from his contemporaries; it constantly leads him
back toward himself alone and threatens finally to confine him wholly in the solitude of
his own heart” (II.2.3, 484). This isolation, and turn of men inside of themselves, away
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from the public sphere and its good, is, to be sure, “despotism’s golden opportunity.”148
However, to reiterate, one can still yet seek to derive from democracy “all the good that it
can do; and knowing its good instincts as well as its evil penchants” one may yet “strive
to restrict the effects of the latter and develop the former” (I.2, 6, 235). As bodies and
souls take on new shapes—individually and collectively—influenced as they are by the
substance of equality—externally and internally—the fact of their inevitable relatedness
remains. What Tocqueville’s new political science attempts to balance is attentiveness to
things bodily or material, and things spiritual or of the soul—that is to say, knowing
when and how to rest on the level of the external, and when or in what fashion to plunge
deeper, or beyond to inwardness. Such balance is of great importance when it comes to
both interpreting and shaping the opinions and ideas of a democratic people.
The “Spirit of the City” and the “Idea of Rights”
As the democratic revolution is no longer confined to either America or to
Europe, 149 Tocqueville was correct in sensing something of an “irresistible advance of
modern societies toward democracy.”150 Contemporary political science is well aware of
the situation, as indicated by the attention paid to comparative studies of democracy,
indexes of democratization, and studies regarding the consolidation of democracy—
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sometimes known as transitology—well beyond the Western world.151 Alongside this
advance toward democracy is of course the spread of the idea of political rights, and what
Tocqueville saw as the broad endeavor “to give the peaceful exercise of certain rights to
all” (I.2.6, 227). After all, he states that he knows of “only two manners of making
equality reign in the political world: rights must be given to each citizen or to no one”
(I.1.3, 52). However, Tocqueville’s understanding of rights—of certain rights—is an
intentionally circumscribed, or limited understanding, directly linked with his notion of
political liberty. In contrast to some unlimited views of rights that one finds today, with a
definition of rights that extend well beyond any association with the political, even
sometimes being either apolitical or anti-political, the rights Tocqueville has in mind and
advocates serve to support and enliven political life.152 In rather evocative language,
Tocqueville refers to what he calls “the spirit of the city [l’esprit de cité],” and he does so
precisely in the context of his discussion of rights, suggesting that the spirit of the city
seems to him to be “inseparable from the exercise of political rights” (I.2.6, 226).
This “spirit of the city” is the polar opposite of force or violence, and is never
reducible to a single man, or mass, for that matter. Furthermore, it is something that
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Tocqueville says is diminished by “administrative centralization” (I.1.5, 83), for it is
instead the conscious endeavor of political participation and the spirit that serves as a
spring to political action in the world. And if this spirit is the antithesis of force,
Tocqueville says that the idea of right likewise follows “immediately” after force, the
latter of which can never be more than a “transient element in success” (I.2.8, 260).153
Thus, the spirit of the city provides individuals with a sense of belonging that may
otherwise be referred to as “national pride,” and he elsewhere states that certain laws are
necessary to “awaken and direct that vague instinct of the native country that never
abandons the heart of man, and in binding it to daily thoughts, passions, and habits, and
to make of it a reflective and lasting sentiment” (I.1.5, 89). The spirit of the city is
further is constituted by the desire and satisfaction of devotion to one’s fellows and a
common cause, in the liberty and strength that allows men to carve out a common destiny
in the world. If the spirit of the city is captured by the free activity of individuals, who
both assent to and abide by laws made in their name, it is likewise the antithesis of a
phenomenon briefly alluded to above and what Tocqueville famously calls
“individualism” (II.2.2, 482). The latter phenomenon is one where a man “turns all his
sentiments toward himself alone,” but is distinct from selfishness, per se. “Selfishness is
born of a blind instinct,” and is common throughout the ages, insofar as certain men have
always had “a passionate and exaggerated love of self,” where everything is related to
oneself, or one’s self is preferred above every other self and thing. However,
individualism arises from “a new idea,” and “proceeds from an erroneous judgment
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In more evocative terms, when writing about the tragic situation of the Indians—left between barbarism
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destroy the Europeans or become their equals” (I.2.10, 312-13)—Tocqueville writes: “one cannot destroy
everything, fury has a limit” (I.2.10, 325).
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rather than a depraved sentiment.” The depravity of selfishness is not due to any
particular time or regime, whereas individualism “is of democratic origin, and it threatens
to develop as conditions become equal.” Individualism “is specifically democratic and
has the tendency to progress as democracy does.”154
Most profoundly, Tocqueville writes, it “has its source in the defects of the mind
as much as in the vices of the heart.” These defects and vices are born from certain
democratic ideas and conditions, and must be countered by rightly advocating the spirit
of the city; it ought to push back against harmful ideas. Individualism is only
exacerbated by a view of rights that is without political boundaries, born as it is of the
individual self only to serve the interests and desires of this same self, otherwise void of
obligation, responsibility, and community. In order to oppose this vague and all
expansive sense of rights, political rights need remain the predominant notion of rights,
and be attached to the spirit of the city. Though this spirit is modified today, in its
manifestation and strength, as compared with previous ages, it can nevertheless be
encouraged and discouraged by present ideas of the mind and movements of the heart.
Central to this task is making this spirit seem useful to men in protecting their rights and
serving their interests: to make it consistent with their individual needs without reducing
their attention to simply meeting such needs.
While it is by no means “an easy thing to teach all men to make use of political
rights,” Tocqueville does believe that when it can be done, “the resulting effects are
great.” To this he adds that, “if there is a century in which such an undertaking ought to
be attempted, that century is ours.” Why now more than ever? The reason is because
“religions are weakening” and “the divine notion of rights is disappearing,” while “mores
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are being altered,” and alongside this “the moral notion of rights is being effaced.”
Traditional religion and morality, and the erstwhile understanding of rights that follows
from them, can no longer be relied upon to serve the public good, or the spirit of the city;
again, the older idea of virtue cannot alone be turned to for support. The spirit of the city
and the idea of rights are not likely to be bound by theology or philosophy. For the onetime stable beliefs have given way “to reasoning” of an individualist and materialist form,
as older and established “sentiments” have given way to “calculations.” Tocqueville
goes so far as to label this fact a “universal disturbance” (I.2.6, 228). Even as the march
of equality is part of God’s plan—a Providential fact—and on one level brings a greater
degree of justice for all, it is corrosive, and has so dramatically disturbed the hearts and
minds of men.155 Thus, at present, there is only a single “immobile point in the human
heart” that can be relied upon, or that must be appealed to, which is the idea of “personal
interest.”
The modern heart that is agitated and in flux nonetheless has a settled core that
can serve as the foundation for bridging the idea of rights and the spirit of the city, and it
is up to the new political science to carry out this task.156 Without appeal to the notion of
personal interest, man’s heart today is unreliable in its simultaneous support for both the
idea of right and the spirit of the city. In fact, Tocqueville goes so far as to suggest that
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“[m]en are no longer bound except by interests, not by ideas” to the extent that “human
opinions form no more than a sort of intellectual dust that is blown around on all sides
and cannot gather and settle” (II.1.1, 406). Nevertheless, even if interest alone binds, it is
possible that one’s idea of interest can change, or become broadened. In what is perhaps
the most dramatic example he gives, namely that of war, Tocqueville argues that
democratic people fear conquest much less than war, where it is the opposite for
aristocratic peoples. Since each democratic citizen likely has a very “small part in
political power and often takes no part in it” yet “all are independent and have goods to
lose,” it follows that, “[i]t will always be very difficult to make a democratic population
determined to take up arms when war is brought to its territory.” The conclusion he
draws is the following: “it is necessary to give rights to these people and a political spirit
that suggests to each citizen some of the interest that make nobles in aristocracies act.”
To this he subsequently adds that, “only the passion and the habit of freedom can
compete with advantage against the habit and the passion of well-being” (II.3.26, 634).
Tocqueville’s examination of the introduction, use, and application of rights into
modern politics is at once cautionary and encouraging. Thus, he admits that “men who
will in the new societies [of equality] will often make use of their individual reason” but
he is far from believing “that they will often abuse it” (II.1.1, 407). The abuse he has in
mind consists of seeing one’s own interest altogether detached from that of others, or
having an idea of interest that is pursued at the expense of others. He qualifies his
previous statement when adding that “without common ideas there is no common action,
and without common action men still exist but a social body does not.” The existence
and prosperity of society requires that “all the minds of the citizens always be brought
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and held together by some principal ideas,” which means drawing opinions from “one
and the same source” (II.1.2, 407). An idea of interest that is common after all is
precisely based on the idea of the common—of interests that are both one’s own and that
of others, of common or mutual interests, which are enshrined in rights. Therefore, in
instructing the people of their “true interests,” so that they best understand how “to profit
from society’s benefits,” they must also learn how to “submit to its [i.e., society’s]
burdens” (Intro., 9). Thus, the granting and receiving of rights does not operate in a
single direction, but comes with a cost, or with responsibilities that are not without
burden, and yet this burden cannot be buttressed by traditional means or promises; be it
of happiness through virtue or in an afterlife. But this apparent burden may itself be
lessened, or masked, through the formulation and application of a very specific
“doctrine”—not only an idea, or set of ideas, but a doctrine properly articulated and
taught by certain “moralists.”
The bridge between the spirit of the city and the idea of rights is founded upon
the “doctrine of self-interest well understood.” This is a doctrine that allows these
contemporary moralists to “bring…to light” “the points where particular interest happens
to meet the general interest and be confounded with it” (II.2.8, 501). And it is something
Tocqueville finds to exist with remarkable strength in America. While the internal
evidence, so to speak, is found in examining men’s ideas and the teachings of American
moralists, the external evidence, as it were, is that America is the country that has “taken
most advantage of association and where they have applied that powerful mode of action
to a greater diversity of objects” (I.2.4, 180). When well understood, self-interest leads
men to meet their own needs, but likewise to “associate for the goals of public security,
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of commerce and industry, of morality and religion.” The result of such a “powerful
mode of action” so applied, is the perpetuation of a belief that there “is nothing the
human will despairs of attaining by the free action of the collective power of individuals”
(I.2.4, 181). One can hardly overstate Tocqueville’s view of the importance of men in
associations and acting together, and the influence this has on the human mind and heart.
To be sure, it is precisely this “collective power of individuals” that constitutes the spirit
of the city. This is not, however, a form of collectivism, or some classical ideal of
homonoia, but filtered as it is through the teachings of contemporary moralists and their
doctrine of self-interest well understood, men do not feel compelled to sacrifice
themselves to others like them “because it is great to do it” or out of some high-minded
notion of virtue and beauty. Rather, they come to understand that at least some sacrifices
“are as necessary to the one who imposes them on himself as to the one who profits from
them.” Such enlightened self-love, and a view of interest backed by necessity, may “not
produce great devotion; but it suggests little sacrifices each day”—sacrifices not
altogether at odds with one’s personal interest that can make a positive contribution to the
broader interest of the community at large.157 In this way, an otherwise individualistic
people are guided to “aid each other and [the doctrine] disposes them willingly to
sacrifice a part of their time and their wealth to the good of the state” (II.2.8, 502),
thereby making real the city’s spirit.
Tocqueville intentionally speaks of the spirit of the city, for what is the city but
the emblem or symbol of political life, par excellence. While by no means a romantic
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To be sure, these sacrifices do not violate the “impious and detestable…maxim that in matters of
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who longs to restore the ancient polis, there are certain facts of the city that any particular
political community has in common.158 This spirit requires locality and a certain amount
of particularity, both within the city, and among (or against) other cities; it is a spirit that
emerges through conscious civic activity and intentional political action among a select
group of people. His implication is that there is no genuine spirit of the world, or of the
globe. One may speak of humanity, but there is no singular political spirit of humanity,
for it manifests itself in particular ways and forms; men act, mankind as a whole is not an
actor. To be sure, this spirit differs today as compared to the classical spirit that relied on
the cultivation of virtue in a stricter sense—not least on the difficult virtue and limited
rule of the few. It is additionally different because it seems “inseparable” today from the
exercise of political rights, and the idea of rights is itself of more recent origin. It is true
that Tocqueville links the idea of rights with that of virtue (a much older idea), for he
says, “[a]fter the general idea of virtue I know of none more beautiful than that of rights,
or that these two idea are intermingled” (I.2.6, 227). The general idea of virtue is,
however, something of an opaque expression, which leaves open the question of whether
he has either moral or political virtues in mind, whether he mixes or separates them; in
fact, Tocqueville herein offers no definition of virtue, and any precise sense of its
meaning is less than aided with his suggestion of the intermingling of the two ideas of
virtue and of right.159
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Tocqueville only complicates matters by writing the following: “The idea of
rights is nothing other than the idea of virtue introduced into the political world.” He
would seem here to reduce virtue to political virtue, and furthermore reduce political
virtue to such things as honorably protecting one’s family and property and expressing
one’s right to vote. However, this is directly at odds with his broader understanding of
the need for moral order, proper education, and the role of religion in society. Moreover,
insofar as rights are nothing other than the introduction of virtue into the political world,
he also speaks about how “the century of blind devotions and instinctive virtues is
already fleeing far from us” (II.2.8, 503). It does not seem a straightforward task by any
means to introduce virtue into the political world, even under the name or cover of
something else, not least if it is “already fleeing far away from us.” Nevertheless,
something must be found, to bring and hold together the spirit of the city and the idea of
rights. And again, it is the doctrine of self-interest well understood that meets this need:
“Self-interest well understood is a doctrine not very lofty, but clear and sure. It does not
seek to attain great objects; but attains all those it aims for without too much effort. As it
is within the reach of all intellects, each seizes it readily and retains it without trouble.
Marvelously accommodating to the weaknesses of men, it obtains a great empire with
ease, and preserves it without difficulty because it turns personal interest against itself,
and to direct the passions, it makes use of the spur that excites them” (II.2.8, 502). The

that Tocqueville often associates with self-assertion on the one hand and mastery of the selfish passions on
the other…By heroic virtue, Tocqueville usually means great feats of courage and daring in war as well as
chivalry and great acts of principled statesmanship...Whatever his sources of inspiration, Tocqueville holds
civic and heroic virtue to be the highest ethical ideal because it produces noble characters, characters whose
proud self-assertion and voluntary self-restraint make them true citizens and statesmen.” Kraynak,
“Tocqueville’s Constitutionalism,” 1182. On so defining and categorizing virtue, consider what
Tocqueville writes in Recollections, 39: “Virtues of any sort are rare enough, and we can ill afford to
quibble about their type and relative importance.” Tocqueville gives the impression that it is simply better
to practice virtue than theorize about it.

141

doctrine both satisfies personal interest as well as pits it against itself; men are
encouraged to calculate on their own behalves but likewise to so calculate in a manner
that includes the interest of the community from which they know they benefit. The
doctrine cannot, Tocqueville writes, “make a man virtuous,” but it does form “a multitude
of citizens who are regulated, temperate, moderate, farsighted, [and] masters of
themselves,” and insofar as it “does not lead directly to virtue through the will, it brings
them near to it insensibly through habits.” An approximation of virtue—a closeness to
what is otherwise fleeing far from us—seems an acceptable result if indeed the age is as
he sees it. As the doctrine extends its reach, it may well be that some men are prevented
“from mounting far above the ordinary level of humanity,” but the good news is that
“many others who were falling below do attain it and are kept there.” While some
individuals are lowered, “the species…is elevated.” So much is necessary in an age of
equality.
It is in the nature of democracy to have “the idea of political rights descend to the
least of citizens, as the division of goods puts the idea of the right of property in general
within the reach of all men.” This is “one of its greatest merits” in Tocqueville’s view. It
is the positive use of equality, so to speak. Universal suffrage and the spread of wealth
and property has given many “a particular good to defend,” and thus given more of a
stake in understanding and defending such rights to an increasing number. Giving each a
particular good provides support for the general interest, and general improvement of
society. Democracy may have an equalizing force, but at its best—when rights are
properly articulated and applied—it can help to spread a sense of civic participation; or,
what is otherwise called the spirit of the city. Moreover, the idea of rights have helped
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men to define “what license and tyranny are,” and it has helped men of the modern city to
enhance the civic bond: “without respect for rights, there is no great people: one can
almost say that there is no society; for, what is a union of rational and intelligent beings
among whom force is the sole bond?” (I.2.6, 227). Nevertheless, it remains the case that
the idea of rights can be ambivalent insofar as it may either foster the spirit of the city or
help pave the way to individualism.
In order to have a positive effect, the idea of rights must therefore bring about
something of the contradictory elements of the ancient city, namely, its cohesiveness and
its opposing or moving parts. The spirit of the city does indeed consist of a view of the
common, but it is not one of perfect harmony. The importance of dissonance to some
degree is part of what so attracts Tocqueville to the American township, to the frenetic
movement and agitation that he even calls (in Machiavellian language) “a sort of tumult”
(I.2.7, 232; cf. I.2.10, 382). The “real advantages that America derives from democracy,”
include a certain “agitation” that is “constantly reborn,” and one that passes from “the
government of democracy…afterwards into civil society” (I.2.7, 233).160 Shortly
thereafter, Tocqueville approvingly quotes Madison’s Federalist 51 that addresses the
importance of guarding society both against “oppression of its rulers” as well as guarding
“one part of the society against the injustice of the other part” (I.2.7, 249). The plurality
of parties, and the partisan spirit, is what best prevents tyranny; the “most perfected
instruments of tyranny,” namely strong central administrative powers, must be kept out of
the hands of a single group (I.2.8, 250). The plurality of bodies and the multiplicity in
160

Consider how in Recollections, when discussing the period under Louis-Phillipe, he speaks of “political
life itself” being absent, in no small part because “no battlefield could be found on which great parties
might wage war.” Instead, there was a “peculiar homogeneity of position, interest, and consequently of
point of view” that deprived “parliamentary debates of all originality, all reality, and so of all true passion”
(10).
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levels of government allow that “however carried away the national majority can be by
its passions, however ardent it may be in its projects, it cannot make all citizens in all
places, in the same manner, at the same moment, bend to its desires.” Even as a sense of
equality extends across society, the variety of personal interests, rooted in the
particularities of desires and place, ever press back against strict uniformity and outright
unity. While governmental centralization is necessary to help society advance “with
energy toward [a common] goal,” the division of administrative power ought to be upheld
(I.1.5, 83ff). Indeed, such things as municipal bodies, the various counties and their
administrations, and other like internal institutional and social divisions, thereby “form so
many hidden shoals that delay or divide the flood of the popular will” (I.2.8, 250).
Tocqueville likewise finds the means of resistance to uniformity in “the spirit of
the lawyer,” whose study and work instills “the habits of order, a certain taste for forms, a
certain instinctive love for the regular sequence of ideas,” all of which “naturally render
them strongly opposed to the revolutionary spirit and unreflective passions of
democracy” (I.2.8, 252). Lawyers at large, he writes, “naturally form a body,” and
“[h]idden at the bottom of the[ir] souls,” one finds “a part of the tastes and habits of
aristocracy.” In one of the few places where Tocqueville speaks outright about mixing
principles—aristocratic and democratic—he goes so far as to say that the “body of
lawyers forms the sole aristocratic element that can be mixed without effort into the
natural elements of democracy and be combined in a happy and lasting manner with
them” (I.2.8, 254). Insofar as it is the “sole” element that can be so mixed, its singularity
rests in the fact that it can be so easily mixed, particularly since lawyers are so important
for the legal defense and protection of rights. But if they are advocates of rights, it is
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their high task to do so with the “taste and respect for what is old and therefore almost
always joined with love of what is regular and legal.” Their advocacy is one that ought
be a sort of ballast against the power of the people, or what Tocqueville calls “the most
powerful and so to speak the lone counterweight to democracy” in America (I.2.8, 256).
The lawyerly spirit Tocqueville praises is one that allows “lawyers to like the government
of democracy,” but “without sharing its penchants and without imitating its weakness”
(I.2.8, 254-5). Democratic lawyers ought to strengthen democracy by supporting
political rights and tradition, and thereby adhering to the constitution, while serving as
“an almost invisible brake that moderates and arrests” the peoples’ intoxication from
“passions” and the concomitant self-indulgence that lets them be “carried away by their
ideas.” Through the presence of the jury, “the spirit of the lawyer…spreads little by little
beyond their precincts; it so to speak infiltrates all society, it descends to the lowest
ranks, and the people as a whole in the end contract a part of the habits and the tastes of
the magistrates” (I.2.8, 258).
In sum, the involvement individual men have in their government and in the
concerns of society, thereby agitating them for better and for worse—gathered as they are
in particular groups around certain personal interests at numerous levels—suggest that
they share a common but differentiated political world, with allies and opponents alike;
however, other bodies must likewise serve to moderate their activity and agitation, or
help direct it in a manner that strengthens rather than weakens democracy. The plurality
of disparate and even opposing parts combine to make up the spirit of a shared city; one
circumscribed by the articulation of political rights. Such rights amidst the maintenance
of plurality are of great importance for checking the sentiment—and love—of equality in
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democracies, as well as the further theorization of equality, and the desire to bring
equality to the practice of all areas of life.

“The Theory of Equality Applied to Intellects”
Tocqueville writes that it is “of the very essence of democratic governments that
the empire of the majority is absolute; for in democracies, outside the majority there is
nothing that resists it” (I.2.7, 235). In the case of the American constitution, this “natural
force of the majority” has been augmented “artificially.” Institutions have served this
task, by, for example, forcing the legislature to obey and submit to the peoples’ “general
views, but even to the daily passions of their constituents,” as the people directly name
them for a very short period of time. But the structure of institutions is only an
expression of a particular idea and moral sentiment: “The moral empire of the majority is
founded in part on the idea that there is more enlightenment and wisdom in many men
united than in one alone, in the number of legislators than in their choice” (I.2.7, 236).
This, Tocqueville claims, is but “the theory of equality applied to intellects,” and it is a
“doctrine [that] attacks the pride of man in its last asylum; so that the minority accepts it
only with difficulty; it habituates itself to it only in the long term.” This idea of the “right
to govern society that the majority posses by its enlightenment” was yet another idea the
first inhabitants brought with them to the shores of America. It is a new idea brought
from the old world to the new world, where it could be implemented, so as to triumph.
It has an additional “principle” upon which it rests, namely that “the interests of
the greatest number ought to be preferred to those of the few” (I.2.7, 237). Such a
principle finds difficulties in application when a society is strongly divided among parties
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or classes that share little by way of common interest; however, the social state of
America is one of equality, and therefore of few stark differences. So much is now true
of the world beyond America as well, and what was true of America then is more broadly
the case as well: the majority “has an immense power in fact, and a power in opinion
almost as great; and once it has formed on a question, there are so to speak no obstacles
that can, I shall not say stop, but even delay its advance, and allow it the time to hear the
complaints of those it crushes and passes.” Rightly, Tocqueville adds: “The
consequences of this state of things are dire and dangerous for the future.” With every
vice innate to democracy—such as legislative instability, minimal duration of laws,
etc.—grows the power of the majority so that it is “the sole power that is important to
please” (I.2.7, 238-9). Such singularity can certainly have positive effects, when so much
“zeal and activity is brought to certain improvements,” however, chief among the vices
that may surface and fester is that of the tyranny of the majority. Such tyranny swells
from the “impious and detestable maxim that in matters of government the majority of a
people has the right to do everything”—so much is the very “seed” from which tyranny
grows. No doubt such a notion of right is one without boundaries, without any proper
restrictions imposed, say, by the cultivation of the spirit of the city—that is, by a common
understanding of justice and interest, and yet one that has internal differentiation, or is
internally questioned, so as not to simply absorb and consume everything under the name
of the city, or the social, but rather be kept in check and corrected by sources of
resistance.
In fact, it is while discussing the tyranny of the majority that Tocqueville provides
an important definition of a nation: “A nation is like a jury charged with representing
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universal society and applying the justice that is its law” (I.2.7, 240). Each particular
group of people serves as representatives for humanity’s attempt to live justly, through
law—this attempt is itself something Tocqueville refers to as a “general law”—and so it
is that every nation collectively expresses the human need and attempt to order existence
in accordance with right. “Justice therefore forms the boundary of each people’s right,”
and so there are inescapably certain divisions among different peoples. So too, however,
will there always be internal divisions among a people, and it is here that Tocqueville
struggles to discuss this problem, in light of the fact that he claims that the “government
called mixed has always seemed to me to be a chimera. There is, to tell the truth, no
mixed government,” for it is his contention that “in each society one discovers in the end
one principle of action that dominates all the others” (I.2.7, 240). The domination of a
principle does not altogether preclude the presence of other, if subordinate, principles.
Multiplicity of principle, and so of parties, is to be encouraged; even needed for the sake
of liberty.
Tocqueville does underline, however, that the mixing of several principles in the
government so as to set them in stark opposition to one another, or when “a society really
comes to have a mixed government, that is to say equally divided between contrary
principles,” it in fact “enters into revolution or it is dissolved” (I.2.7, 241). Having
equally powerful and contrary principles brings about dissolution and disorder, so one
ought not to institutionalize them as such, but there is an “important point” that must not
be lost in all of this. With the above in mind, he states that the result of the “struggle”
between battling interests—between “the interests of the great doing battle with those of
the people”—must be considered; there are in fact positive effects from such a struggle,
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so long as the struggling interests are not equally strong or mutually powerful enough to
instigate stasis. The difficulty then is in both placing “social power” somewhere so that it
is “superior to all the others,” but likewise ensuring that there is means of resistance
against it, for Tocqueville believes “freedom to be in peril when that power finds no
obstacle before it that can restrain its advance and give it time to moderate itself.”
When the theory of equality is fully applied to intellects, and therefore to all, there
is risk that it will manifest in two extremes: in the equal self that isolates itself from
others feeling no need for its equals, or in the equal self that absorbs itself in the mass of
others like itself. In either case, the individual is at once in a state of equality, but
without any obstacles or restraints, without any of the requisite limitations that are
necessary for cultivating freedom. So far as limits go, Tocqueville draws a most
important lesson from America, even as he does not wish “to abuse the example of
America”: “In becoming larger, Americans did not so to speak increase the powers of
democracy; rather they extended its domain” (I.2.6, 229). To extend democracy is one
thing, and so the spread of democracy as a political regime to various places the world
over may be inevitable, as well as a good thing. However, the democratization of all
things in life—of all spheres of human existence—is a power that must be resisted. Yet
Tocqueville is sometimes unclear as to whether democratization can be resisted, or to
what extent it is in fact irresistible: “But if it were true that there would soon be nothing
intermediate between the empire of democracy and the yoke of one alone, ought we not
to tend toward the one rather than to submit voluntarily to the other?” He then goes on to
ask rather poignantly: “And if complete equality must finally arrive, would it not be
better to let oneself be leveled by freedom than by a despot?” (I.2.9, 301).
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In the next chapter we will see how powerful “complete equality” can be, and
what it means to be leveled either by freedom or despotism. With closer examination of
Volume 2 of Democracy the deep logic of equality at work in the human heart will come
to light, buttressed as it is by the effectual power of the sentiment of sameness. We will
discuss Tocqueville’s teaching of how ideas can pass into mores, and so how
Tocqueville’s science and art addresses both the mind and the heart to mitigate the ideas
and sentiments that stem from complete equality, consisting as they do of overgeneralization and –universalization, so as to stem the tendency to despotism while
encouraging that of freedom.
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5. TOCQUEVILLE:
GENERALIZING IDEAS AND SENTIMENTS:
THE EFFECTUAL TRUTH OF le semblable
“For in democratic centuries, what is most in motion
amid the motion of all things is the heart of man.”
—Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II.3.6
“One does not gradually enlarge one’s soul like one’s house”
—Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II.3.19

In describing his own two-volume work, Tocqueville says that the first volume
treats the “aspect of civil society” and the change it has met while the second addresses
transformations in “the visage of the political world” (Notice to Volume II, 399). His
discussion of the effects that equality has had on both “complete one another and form a
single work.” Of course, equality is the cause of so many things, even the chief cause,
but not the only one. Tocqueville reminds readers that he does not have so “narrow
view” as to attribute a single cause to the “host of opinions, sentiments, and instincts in
our time” that otherwise “owe their birth to facts alien or even contrary to equality.” It is
not, however, his objective to examine such things; rather, his primary aim is to “bring
out the extent to which equality has modified…our penchants and ideas.” Admittedly, it
is an “immense” subject, “for it comprehends most of the sentiments and ideas to which
the new state of the world gives birth” (Notice, 400). In this chapter, we elaborate our
discussion of the effects of equality, particularly in terms of the generalizing of ideas and
sentiments. So much is an important part of Tocqueville’s political science, which has
aptly been called the study of “political psychology.”161 We do so following two broad
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The term is applied by Rahe, who rightly traces it back to Plato, while drawing connections between
Tocqueville and Montesquieu, in, Paul Rahe, Soft Despotism, Democracy’s Drift; cf. Raymond Aron,
“Tocqueville,” 237-302. On the importance of political psychology in the education of statesmen, and thus
for the preservation of liberty and the prevention of tyranny, see, F. Flagg Taylor IV, “Montesquieu,
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trajectories, what might be referred to as the generalizing of particular experience on the
one hand, and of common experience, on the other. Not only are the two types of
experience directly related, but they result in a conclusion of convergence.
To state matters otherwise, we can speak of the “spirit of great independence” and
the “natural instinct to centralize” present among democratic peoples (II.4.5, 660). As
individuals, democrats are prone to doubt while desiring self-sufficiency and
independence; they take pride in their doubt and independence, for both are in accord
with individual reason. However, they often likewise find themselves isolated, weak, and
in great need; this so much wounds their pride that they must rely upon institutions if not
individuals other than themselves. Moreover, as peoples, democrats aspire to uniformity,
simplicity, and unity, which accord with universal reason, and so channel their ideas
through common opinion—a sort of rational measuring rod. So as to mitigate reliance
upon the authority of other particular individuals, democrats turn to the general opinion
of a collection of men like themselves. Somewhat contradictorily then, they generalize
opinion so as to preserve their particular pride. And because certain distinctions and
differences are seen as oppressive, from the democratic perspective, the process of
generalization, and thus of equalization, can go so far as to result in the most general of
general ideas, namely pantheism—the complete removal of any and all separations.162
The political result of the intellectual generalization of ideas and sentiments is an
increasing reliance upon what Tocqueville calls “administrative science,” practiced by
the least particular part of the broader state with the greatest vehemence for rationalistic

Tocqueville, and the Politics of Mores,” in Alexis de Tocqueville and the Art of Democratic Statesmanship,
93-116.
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Peter Augustine Lawler, “Democracy and Pantheism,” Interpreting Tocqueville’s Democracy in
America, 96-120.
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unity, the bureaucracy.163 Thus, both as individuals and as peoples, democrats tend to
naturally long for a strong and universal power, leading them to turn first towards a
particular state, before ultimately longing for a single, universal and homogeneous
state—the global “administration of things”—if not otherwise artfully mitigated.164 For
while equality “disposes men to want to judge for themselves,” it likewise “gives them
the taste for and idea of a single social power that is simple and the same for all” (II.1.6,
424). So much is the taste of those today who aspire to build the architecture of a global
state or a world without borders.165
While Tocqueville’s discussion of growing statism and “soft despotism” is well
known, it behooves us to clarify how this condition is not only related to, or resultant
from, the equality of conditions, but to examine the condition of similitude it fosters—a
certain homogeneity and identity of ideas and sentiments in the minds and hearts of
individuals—and thus the generalization, as well as universalization, of various aspects of
human experience. For central to the phenomenon of globalization is the alleged sense
that certain erstwhile real differences and distinctions are receding. Tocqueville is
acutely aware of this notion, as is illustrated by his remark that “[v]ariety is disappearing
from within the human species; the same manner of acting, thinking, and feeling is found
in all corners of the world” (II.3.17, 588). We shall elaborate on his insight, and thereby
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examine the consequences for politics and human life of this growing sense of le
semblable that the democratic age inaugurates.166 Doing so will clarify the extent to
which such tendencies may be tempered, and thus how the general and the particular
need be balanced in our universalizing and globalizing world.

The Mutuality of Equality and Doubt
We recall that the first volume of Democracy began on a most physical note,
describing the topography and geography of America. The second volume begins in a
particularly spiritual vein, addressing one of man’s noblest spiritual vocations, namely
philosophy. The first chapter is entitled, “On the Philosophic Method of the Americans.”
It is a chapter full of irony, to be sure, not least as immediately after the title announces
an American philosophic method Tocqueville writes, “I think there is no country in the
civilized world where they are less occupied with philosophy than the United States”
(II.1.1, 403). The American philosophic method is decidedly unphilosophical or even
antiphilosophical, which he adds is unsurprising, since “their social state turns them away
from speculative studies.” The strong tendency to attend more to the practical than the
theoretical portions of science is something to “be found in all democratic peoples”
(II.1.10, 434). Americans, at any rate, do not engage in philosophy; democrats are not
prone to philosophizing, properly understood. The science related to theoretical
principles requires meditation, “and there is nothing less fit for meditation than the
interior of a democratic society.” For there is no rest in a democratic society, nor a class
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at repose or one living a life of leisure in the original sense of the word. Rather:
“Everyone is agitated.” “[M]en are so busy acting that little time remains to them for
thinking.” Not only are they occupied, “but they have a passion for their occupations.
They are perpetually in action, and each of their actions absorbs their soul” (II.3.21, 614).
The democratic revolution is constituted, or better to say, defined, by movement,
and in the midst of such flux and momentum few have the disposition to consider or even
grasp anything like an eternal order beyond the agitation. “In a democratic
society…where fortunes are small and ill-secured, everyone works and work leads to
everything” (II.3.18, 595). The mind and imagination of democrats is therefore “given
over almost exclusively to conceiving the useful and representing the real,” driven as they
are by the love of material enjoyments (II.1.17, 459). Thus, Tocqueville concludes, “it is
very difficult to excite the enthusiasm of a democratic people for any theory whatsoever
that has no visible, direct, and immediate relation to the daily practice of its life”—the
daily practice of which consists of industrious work to ever increase prosperity. Such a
love of well-being is itself part of the transformation of the tastes, sentiments, and ideas
of the democratic heart and soul. Not least due to the need for some sense of security in
the midst of a seemingly fluid social state: material goods and their enjoyment offer a
semblance of fixity and stability in the world. One’s own possessions and the pursuit of
them express the concreteness of individual existence and offer proof of one’s hard work
and success. The tangibility of such outcomes makes it difficult to doubt both the effort
and its outcome.
Democratic man requires palpable representations of his labor and life as well as
what he deems to be good. Indeed, the democratic imagination “is given over almost
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exclusively to conceiving the useful and representing the real” (II.1.17, 459). While the
democratic imagination is not extinguished, there is little doubt for Tocqueville that “the
taste for the ideal and the pleasure one takes in seeing it depicted are never as lively and
as widespread in a democratic people as within an aristocracy” (II.1.17, 458). Thus,
equality not only redirects men’s attention away from the ideal in any non-practical
sense, but narrows the range of focus of the imagination. That is to say, equality
sufficiently generalizes particular objects to the point of convergence, or the democratic
mind skims the surface and denies relevance to certain details that the aristocratic mind
might have exaggerated. So far as things converge, or the democratic mind strives for
confluence of facts and things through generalization, one can find nothing broader than
the pantheistic perspective that democrats are prone to, as discussed below.
With this in mind, it follows that American democrats are no more interested in
the European schools of philosophy, and the many names they go by, with their varying
takes on and depictions of the ideal; nor do Americans have a school of their own.
Despite the fact that Americans neither study philosophy, nor the history of philosophy,
“they posses a certain philosophic method,” which is “common to all of them” (II.1.1,
403). They have “never taken the trouble to define” the “rules” of this method, for doing
so would itself suggest the establishment of a school with a name. Rather it is
Tocqueville who offers a list of the “principal features that characterize” this philosophic
method of the Americans, and he situates their method within a broader history of
philosophy. It is not incidental to point out that such a method is a general one, for an
entire people, if not for democrats on the whole. This early discussion leads one to
wonder whether the onset of democracy and equality is coterminous with the beginning
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of the end of philosophy, or at least its replacement with methodology—the latter of
which can, at least in its most common form, be described as the general application of a
ready-made instrument of thought that often substitutes for attentive and categorical
thinking. At any rate, Tocqueville summarizes the American method in what is the
principal feature found “in most of the operations of the mind,” namely that “each
American calls only on the individual effort of his reason” (II.1.1, 403).
Such self-reliance, or individual rationality, mirrors the philosophy of Descartes.
“America is therefore the one country in the world where the precepts of Descartes are
least studied and best followed.” It is not that Descartes is the source of the American
method, but that the feature of doubt—of doubting anything other than one’s own
reason—is as central to a democratic social state as it is natural to Descartes’ thought.
Tocqueville’s notable insight here is that social equality and intellectual doubt are
inextricably linked—even two sides of the same democratic coin. Why is this so? To
begin with, it is important to recall that democratic society is one without classes, or at
least without fixed classes. As discussed in the previous chapter, there is a “continual
movement that reigns in the heart of a democratic society.” Moreover, one does not find
“a numerous class that stays at rest” and is therefore capable of meditation in democracy
as one does in aristocracy, but instead, as just underlined, “everyone is agitated” (II.1.10,
434). Such movement implies the utter absence of external reference points—social,
familial, traditional, or otherwise. Whereas in “aristocratic peoples all men are joined
and depend on one another,” in contrast, democratic individuals are separate and
independent. While it is the case that among aristocratic peoples “a hierarchical bond
exists among all with the aid of which one can keep each in his place and the entire body
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in obedience,” no such hierarchy, bond, or structure of obedience exists in a democratic
social state (II.121, 472). Nobody is fixed or bound to a particular title, name, rank, or
place in society, or even in history for that matter.
Bonds that erstwhile united generations are “relaxed or broken.” The very
continuity of history falls away in the democratic mind. So much is exemplified by the
practice today of giving each generation its own proper name—“Baby Boomers,”
“Millenials,” etc.—as though each were born anew, altogether distinct from previous
ones in time and space. Tocqueville himself writes, “in democratic nations each new
generation is a new people” (II.1.13, 448). This stands in contrast to earlier aristocratic
times: “In the aristocratic nations of the Middle Ages, generations succeeded one another
in vain; each family was like an immortal and perpetually immobile man; ideas hardly
varied more than conditions. Each man therefore always had the same objects before his
eyes, which he envisioned from the same point of view” (II.3.18, 596). So great is the
movement in democracies that each generation feels it has nothing to learn from
preceding ones, and yet has everything to gain by its own endeavors; focusing as each
does on a great variety of apparently new objects. Thus, “each man easily loses track of
the ideas of his ancestors or scarcely worries about them.” Again, the movement is rapid
and continuous enough to make men forgetful of the past, and therefore doubtful that any
important lessons could be gleaned from earlier wisdom.
A remarkable paradox presents itself, for democratic man is at once more prone to
think in broad terms, applying the category of humanity as a whole to his political
thinking, and yet he is hardly capable of truly conceiving or imagining a people other
than those of his own immediate place and time—or better to say, those just like himself.
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The ability to think in terms of humanity, generally speaking, is just as much a
consequence of similitude, for all peoples must be assimilated to meet the exigencies of
such a general category. We will question below the extent to which this kind of thinking
is or is not conducive to political thought and action. What Tocqueville demonstrates,
however, is that men today do not share the same worries as those of yesteryear, or at
least they are not worried about having forgotten older insights, despite their own
assumptions of equality. Perceiving themselves as equals on an individual basis, so too
does the logic of equality apply on the whole to generations. What can one learn from
the past that one cannot discover on one’s own? Doing so with the “individual effort of
[one’s own] reason” is a method applied by collectivities no less than by individuals. In
short, when men truly understand themselves to be equal, the logic extends to each source
of authority outside of oneself: no man or institution, no social body or group, past or
present, has any greater stature than one’s present self. To be sure, such independence is
not without its strengths, for it displays a certain degree of intellectual ambition and
pride, or even a form of courage, insofar as one is confident of finding one’s way in the
world without external guidance. However, it is far from self-evident that individuals can
be properly oriented without some assistance from authorities beyond the independent
self.
To acknowledge an authority is to accept a rule or power outside of oneself—a
form of superiority or command one did not oneself author. It is, therefore, to
acknowledge the fact of inequality, and thus to doubt oneself—one’s own reason and its
efforts—rather than to doubt all but one’s individual reason. Therefore, the logical
conclusion of social equality is intellectual doubt, just as intellectual doubt reinforces
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social equality. Whether one ends up a democrat due to devoted study of Cartesian
philosophy or one becomes a Cartesian in practice having been born into a democratic
social state, the result is the same. While Tocqueville finds it surprising that Descartes
himself did not apply his own method to all things, and instead made use of it “only in
certain matters,” so as to judge for himself strictly philosophical and not political matters,
his method was further encouraged by equalizing conditions. If for a period certain laws
and the social state itself, as well as the habits of mind that follow from these, were
opposed to universal doubt, slowly “when men were beginning to be equal and to
resemble each other” doubt became more acceptable.
The effectual truth of similitude and equality—le semblable—was to extend the
Cartesian method to all human ideas and institutions. Thus, the logic of equality is to
generalize doubt: democracy inclines men to general doubt, which raises doubt to the
status of the greatest, if not the only defensible, intellectual virtue, insofar as it is itself
justified by the “continual movement that reigns in the heart of a democratic society.”
After all, who could remain convinced of anything outside of oneself when nothing is at
rest; when the present place and existence of all things is doubtful, and can only be
understood to be contingent, or accidental? To put it technically, democracy’s unstable
social ontology is directly related to the unsettled, restless disposition of the democratic
soul: restlessness is the central psychological trait of the democratic man who is adrift in
his social setting and intellectual life.167 But can one adequately doubt something without
first garnering some knowledge of the thing to be doubted? And yet, given the lack of
time to properly examine things in detail, democrats are led to doubt without such
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preliminary examination, doubting instead on the premise of doubtfulness’s own readyat-hand success.
It is little wonder that such social instability combined with doubtfulness is
likewise conducive to what Tocqueville calls individualism, a phenomenon discussed in
the previous chapter. Individualism can be said to be “the reflection and affirmation in
the soul of each of this [democratic] social condition. It is the affirmation by the
individual of his self-sufficiency.”168 Whether such self-sufficiency is adequate, stable,
or even real, remains an open question. In fact, the total reliance upon the effort of one’s
own reason may result in certain unreasonable outcomes. Nevertheless, the phenomenon
is intelligible given the social conditions, and the democratic tautology comes to light:
relying solely on the effort of one’s own reason, one concludes that this faculty alone is
consistent and reliable, justifying retreat within as the safest haven both socially and
intellectually. In a state of equality men are left almost altogether to their own devices,
with little to fall back upon, which in turn suggests to most men that the effort to forge
ties is not likely worth the bother.169 Thus, if social equality and intellectual doubt
heighten men’s sense of independence it is not without certain political costs. Indeed,
“equality, which introduces great goods into the world, nevertheless suggests to men very
dangerous instincts” (II.1.5, 419).
Independence and Weakness
While intellectual self-sufficiency grants democratic citizens great independence,
as they separate themselves from the bonds and authority of others, as well as from
society’s institutions, it makes them politically weak. Contrary to the expectation that
168
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individual independence might foster great civic virtue the apparent self-assurance and
strength garnered within does not necessarily translate into social strength: “one finds
none who exert a very great or above all a very lasting power over the mass” (II.1.20,
470). In fact, Tocqueville makes it plainly clear when he writes the following: “As
conditions are equalized in a people, individuals appear smaller and society seems
greater, or rather, each citizen, having become like all the others, is lost in the crowd, and
one no longer perceives [anything] but the vast and magnificent image of the people
itself” (II.4.2, 641). The rather uncanny result is that individuals sense, on the one hand,
their independence, but on the other, equality presents them in the image of a single
group, or a large and nebulous mass. Independence amidst equality is hardly a genuine
or positive independence if it does not translate into action on the part of individuals, but
leads them to turn towards “the crowd.” As Mansfield writes: “As equals [men] have an
instinct towards pride and independence, but as individuals they suffer a sense of
weakness and isolation that results from independence.”170
The undermining of old privileges and social structures—the situation of an
unstable social ontology—frees the desires of men but provides few assured channels to
fulfill them. Men at once feel they can chart their own personal destinies while their
means to do so are not correlatively enhanced, due to the dramatic chance in social
circumstances.
When all the prerogatives of birth and fortune are destroyed, when all professions are open to all, and when
one can reach the summit of each of them by oneself, an immense and easy course seems to be open before
the ambitions of men, and they willingly fancy that they have been called to great destinies. But that is an
erroneous view corrected by experience every day. The same equality that permits each citizen to conceive
vast hopes renders all citizens individually weak. It limits their strength in all regards at the same time that
it permits their desires to expand.

170

Mansfield, “Tocqueville: A Very Short Introduction,” 79.

162

Not only are they impotent by themselves, but at each step they find immense obstacles that they have not
at first perceived.
They have destroyed the annoying privileges of some of those like them; they come up against the
competition of all. The barrier has changed form rather than place. When men are nearly alike and follow
the same route, it is difficult indeed for any one of them to advance quickly and to penetrate the uniform
crowd that surrounds him and presses against him (II.2.13, 513).

The result is that at the very moment men appear to be independent, they retreat from it
by making themselves dependent upon society; unable to rise above the “uniform
crowd,” men are absorbed by it. Le semblable persists amidst an openness of possibilities
while revoking the desire for distinction among so many men who sense their similitude;
sensing that their individual ambitions are their own indeed, individuals likewise sense
the futility of publicly pursuing them. Thus, the consequence of so much independence
among the many is to “naturally [give] men in democratic times a very high opinion of
the privileges of society and a very humble idea of the rights of the individual. They
readily accept that the interest of the former is everything and that of the latter, nothing”
(II.4.2, 642).
Such ready acceptance of collective privilege rests in large part on the fact that the
real intellectual authority of democratic peoples is found in “common opinion,” which
Tocqueville argues is “the sole guide that remains for individual reason among
democratic peoples.” The appearance of independence can become just that, an
appearance. As Tocqueville’s work shows at length, the method of applying the efforts
of one’s own reason in democratic times so often amounts to following “the intellectual
empire of the greatest number” in practice. In times of great variety and inequality,
rooted in social and political structures and forms, one cannot speak of opinion in the
singularly common sense of the term—the vast differences and inequality among men
constituted the foundation for direct sources of hierarchical authority. “In times of
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equality, because of their similarity, men have no faith in one another; but this same
similarity gives them an almost unlimited trust in the judgment of the public; for it does
not seem plausible to them that when all have the same enlightenment, truth is not found
on the side of the greatest number” (II.1.2, 409; emphasis added). When men come to
see others as identical to themselves, and therefore doubt that any such individual could
be a source of truth, this similitude of men likewise leads them to believe that the
aggregate of equals alone must result in right. So much is an obvious part of our daily
existence today, when we speak so readily of such things as “popular opinion,” “the
scientific community,” “the experts,” or even more generally of the “global conscience,”
as though there were a faceless collective voice that pronounces proper judgment—as
though from greater numbers follows enlightenment and wisdom.171 Dismissing personal
forms of authority, democrats are more willing to submit to an impersonal form of
authority, for doing so avoids violating their sense of self-sufficiency.172 However, it
only further exemplifies the weakness associated with such independence.
Tocqueville makes clear just how difficult it is to stand athwart of common
opinion, writing that in times of equality, “general opinion puts an immense weight on
the mind of each individual; it envelops it, directs it, and oppresses it.” So much so that
even in the attempt, when a man fails to find anything that raises or distinguishes himself
from his fellows, “he distrusts himself when they are at war with him; not only does he
doubt his strength, but he comes to doubt his right to it, and he is very near to recognizing
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that he is wrong when the greater number affirms it. The majority does not need to
constrain him; it convinces him” (II.3.21, 615). The “immense weight” of general
opinion requires no aid from force, but rather makes uncommon opinion itself the
greatest burden. In this light, we find further reason for the widespread nature of
individualism, insofar as it is precisely a form of retreat into the inner being of one’s own
heart, or self, based on the assumption that one need not act or engage publicly. Reliance
on common opinion coincides with the assumption that one need not think critically
regarding the politics that carry the day. In this sense, there is little difference between
the isolated self, and the voiceless self huddled amongst the crowd. Therefore: “Men
who inhabit democratic countries, having neither superiors nor inferiors nor habitual and
necessary associates willingly fall back on themselves and consider themselves in
isolation” (II.4.3, 643). The meaning is characteristically double here: men consider
themselves, above all, and they undertake the consideration of the self as isolated from
other selves and objective reality more broadly speaking.
The situation is cause for concern insofar as it can make men more likely to hold
ideas that diminish the importance of politics, and so of collective action and
responsibility. On the one hand, additional incentive—appeal to a sense of material
interest—becomes a regular requirement: “When citizens are all independent and
indifferent, it is only by paying them that one can obtain the cooperation of each; this
infinitely multiplies the use of wealth and increases the value of it” (II.3.17, 587). And
on the other hand, in an age of increasing doubt—or loss of faith—men’s perspectives
become narrowed while their desires take less lofty form. Combined with a sense of
weakness men become more prone to dangerous ideas, such as doctrines of fatality that
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deny human freedom: “our contemporaries are only too inclined to doubt free will
because each of them feels himself limited on all sides by his weakness, but they still
willingly grant force and independence to men united in a social body” (II.1.20, 472).
Doubting free will is akin to denying the possibility of social life and of a people’s power
to chart its own course. There is scarcely a doctrine more destructive of political life.
Accepting that all is determined and otherwise beyond one’s control conduces
passivity among peoples, making the situation ripe for despotism. Furthermore, the
denial of free will is not unrelated to doctrines of materialism, which deny any nonmaterial part of being like the soul, or an active force and agency beyond mere matter and
its movement based on chance or necessity. Insofar as democracy “favors the taste for
material enjoyments” this taste may become “excessive” so as to eventually dispose men
“to believe that all is nothing but matter; and materialism in its turn serves to carry them
toward these enjoyments with an insane ardor” (II.2.15, 519). With the prominence of
such doctrines, combined with a sense of weakness and isolation, one wonders whether
the possibility for fellow feeling is altogether precluded. An examination of
Tocqueville’s views on the likelihood of mutual aid among democrats and its limits
further illustrates the generalizing phenomenon. For compassion is perhaps the most
readily generalizable sentiment, and yet is weakest when void of particular substance. If
democrats are capable of enlarging the object of their compassion to humanity as a
whole, and are therefore more successfully humanitarian in theory, it is not clear that
such generalized compassion is either sustainable or politically responsible.
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Mutual Need and Democratic Compassion
We have just discussed one of the important paradoxes that Tocqueville illustrates
to be inherent to democracy: men may feel an inner strength alongside experiencing an
outward weakness. If their hearts grow, their ability to act upon their sentiments
decreases. The two states of independence and weakness, Tocqueville underlines, “must
neither be viewed separately nor confused,” as these states “give the citizens of
democracies very contrary instincts.” Such independence fills men with “confidence and
pride among his equals,” while “his debility makes him feel, from time to time, the need
of the outside help that he cannot expect from any of them, since they are all impotent
and cold” (II.4.3, 644). The democratic heart is equally filled with pride and shame; the
democratic mind suffers from the mutuality of strength and weakness; the democratic
man is torn between opposing instincts of and abilities for action and inaction, on his own
behalf and for his fellows. Thus he is prone to turn towards the state: “In this extremity,
he naturally turns his regard to the immense being that rises alone in the midst of
universal debasement. His needs and above all his desires constantly lead him back to it,
and in the end he views it as the unique and necessary support for individual weakness.”
However, the logic of democracy also opens new vistas for compassion—that is, it
generalizes it, even universalizes it, so that as men become increasingly equal, they
become all the more aware of their mutual and similar capacity for suffering. The
experience of similitude makes compassion a predominant sentiment in democracy, as it
is intimately related to the notion of mildness that Tocqueville repeatedly discusses.
Mildness is no contingent fact, for Tocqueville links it “directly to the profound logic of
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the democratic social state.”173 In fact, Part III of Volume Two, which addresses the
“Influence of Democracy on Mores Properly So-Called,” opens with an explicit
discussion of “How Mores Become Milder as Conditions are Equalized” (II.3.1, 535).
Equality opens the hearts of men to the humanity and suffering of others like themselves.
There is, Tocqueville writes, “real sympathy only among people who are alike”
(II.3.1, 536). Under feudal institutions, and during periods of inequality, men do not feel
sympathy or obligations towards man in general. Instead, individuals understood
themselves in accordance with their class, or place in society, to say nothing of their
ethnic, national, linguistic, and religious identities. Allegiances and sentiments rarely
transcended these delineations. Thus: “Feudal institutions rendered one very sensitive to
the ills of certain men, but not to the miseries of the human species,” and even then it was
not “genuine sympathy,” but a sense of obligation and duty. Only among men of the
same class could there be any such sentiment. To illustrate his point, Tocqueville
provides evidence by way of the correspondence of an aristocratic woman, Madame de
Sévigné, who was by all accounts a kind, loving, and enlightened woman—the farthest
thing from being “a selfish and barbaric creature.” In her letter, penned to her daughter,
she recounts the effects of a tax that adversely affected the peasants, inspiring their revolt
and the reciprocal response of the executive that brought down the full force of the law
upon them. Mme de Sévigné lets her pleasure and satisfaction regarding the punishments
administered be known to her daughter, stating that their province is a “beautiful example
for the others,” before turning to address more trite details of life in the countryside. It is
Tocqueville’s conclusion that “Madame de Sévigné did not clearly conceive what it was
to suffer when one was not a gentleman” (II.3.1, 537). He goes on to say that it would be
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inconceivable in a democratic age for even “the hardest man, writing to the most
insensitive person” to “dare engage in cold blood in the cruel banter” reproduced from
the Madame’s letter. The mildness of manners is today an inescapable fact.
While compassion was not previously predominant and so had little political
import, the aristocratic age nonetheless fostered obligations. Tocqueville underlines just
how important the political order was for establishing such bonds, when he writes, “these
mutual obligations did not arise from natural right, but from political right.” It was the
artifice of politics—the regime—that established and maintained such relations. To this
he adds the following conclusion: “society obtained more than humanity alone could
have done.” This is an important insight, insofar as it illustrates the weakness of
humanity without political form, as well as its inability to bring about actual and lasting
obligations. These bonds, while artificial—bound through the artifice of forms—were
fixed across time and adhered to by both sides. It is not clear that a broad association
based on a generalized natural sentiment could establish as much.
In aristocratic society was not an immediacy of sympathy, nor even a mutual
understanding in the sense of empathy, as it were, but society’s structure remained intact,
and men knew where they stood and what was required of them, without having to rely
on passing sentiments. In contrast, it is true that the democratic regime undermines such
rigidity, and in turn opens the human heart to the possibility of vicarious experience of
those similar to oneself, in that so many appear similar. However, in its breadth,
democratic compassion loses strength, which is to say it wanes in its commitment and
longevity.
When ranks are almost equal in a people, all men having nearly the same manner of thinking and feeling,
each of them can judge the sensations of all the others in a moment: he casts a rapid glance at himself; that
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is enough for him. There is therefore no misery he does not conceive without trouble and whose extent a
secret instinct does not discover for him. It makes no difference whether it is a question of strangers or of
enemies: imagination immediately puts him in their place. It mixes something personal with his pity and
makes him suffer himself while the body of someone like him is torn apart. In democratic centuries, men
rarely devote themselves to one another; but they show a general compassion for all members of the human
species (II.3.1, 536, emphasis added).

The effect of similitude is the sense that one has immediate access to the emotions and
experience of those like oneself. This access, so to speak, is garnered through sight and
with the power of imagination—reasoned speech is itself unnecessary. The distinctions
and details that speech may offer are superfluous for general compassion. Once
sufficiently generalized, the differences of particular experience recede into the
background, for it is not only a generalized form of compassion, but the object of
emotion is itself as broad as possible: “all the members of the human species.” Yet
having gained in breadth, democratic compassion loses the strength of devotion, for
genuine commitment requires the strength of a particular will, which is necessarily
limited in terms of the objects to which and time with which it may devote itself. The
problem is even more acute in a world where the information revolution has spawned
what might now be called the “globalization of the spectacle of suffering”—something
Tocqueville could only have imagined. As Orwin writes, “In a global village where so
much misery is always on display, democratic compassion sustains an inclination toward
humanitarian intervention. At the same time, however, isolationism (the collective
counterpart to individualism) will remain an equally deep inclination of democratic
peoples. Their will to sacrifice for humanitarian ends will be as weak as their wish to
promote these ends is earnest.”174
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In asking whether “we have more sensitivity than our fathers” as a result of the
mildness equality fosters, Tocqueville replies that he does not know, adding: “but surely
our sensitivity bears on more objects” (II.3.1, 538). That said, it is not self-evident
whether it is better to be fully devoted in one’s compassion towards fewer objects than to
spread one’s compassion towards a greater number. Whatever the case, the question
highlights the problematicity of compassion and its inescapable limitations. With the
invocation of compassion’s temporal and spatial limits one cannot help but be reminded
of the contrary and transcendent form of compassion, or love—namely that of God’s
love, which does in fact extend to all individual men and the human species as a whole.
While the teaching of Christian charity informs men to approximate this feat, it admits
requiring God’s intervening grace. The democratic regime so transforms men’s
imaginations as to no longer require this intermediating force, or its interceding form of
the Church. Notwithstanding the fact that democracy is in many important respects an
outgrowth of Christianity, and that Tocqueville clearly argues for the continued
importance of religion for maintaining liberty, the dismissal of forms and the democratic
desire for unmediated equality dampens the voice of religion.175 Likewise, democracy
seeks to transform and thereby secularize Christian charity; to turn it into democratic
compassion that no longer relies on any mediation but instead leaves each man’s heart
directly responsive to the suffering of all. However, as a substitute democracy reveals its
weakness in its inability to bring about great devotion. In contrast, what greater sign of
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devotion, and thereby better example of genuine compassion, can one find than the
sacrifice of certain saints and martyrs, suffering and dying on behalf of others, in
imitation of Christ?
Theological virtues aside, the fact remains that democratic compassion is full of
ambivalence, and it is equality itself—the experience of le semblable—that serves as its
tenuous support. For, “the same man who is full of humanity for those like him when
they are at the same time his equals becomes insensitive to their sorrows as equality
ceases.” And according to Tocqueville, this same truth that applies to individuals is
equally true of peoples (II.3.1, 538-9). So it is that democracy “does not attach men
strongly to one another, but it renders their habitual relations easier” (II.3.2, 539).
Furthermore, as Tocqueville illustrates in his chapter on the democratic family,
“democracy loosens social bonds, but it tightens natural bonds” (II.3.8, 563).176 One may
wonder then whether the natural is easier, or the easier is more natural, as well as whether
this is a fact that democracy naturally draws out, or perhaps a fact that democracy creates,
as it were. Whatever the case, Tocqueville reveals the ambivalent nature of certain socalled easier relations, for men more easily come together just as they more easily come
apart, or stand at odds. Because equality is coterminous with greater movement and
mobility—a general agitation—it means that a “muted war among all citizens is
immediately established” (II.3.2, 540); something that does not exist to the same extent in
aristocratic regimes. Even amidst social equality, great economic disparity may persist,
and certain privileges may still be gained. So much is obvious from our own daily
experience today.

176

On the question of the greater or lesser naturalness of democracy as compared to aristocracy, see,
Manent, Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy, esp. 67-82.

172

The difference with previous times is that the possibility of acquiring great wealth
and privilege is open to all men, from which follows, however, that “those who possess
them are constantly preoccupied with the fear of losing them or of seeing them
partitioned; and those who do not yet have them want at all cost to possess them, or if
they cannot succeed at this, to appear to—which is not impossible.” So it is, on the one
hand, that men depend upon one another for the sake of great action, including for the
generation of wealth, among other things, inasmuch as “all feel themselves to be subject
to the same weakness and the same dangers, and their interest as well as their sympathy
makes it a law for them to lend each other mutual assistance when in need” (II.3.4, 545).
And thus on the other hand men have much to fear from one another since there are no
fixed places or lots, and all are equally positioned to vie for the same positions, privileges
and goods; they feel one another’s pain while being equally likely to cause one another
pain, at large. This situation makes cultivating a civic sense of the utmost importance,
and doing so rests upon developing faculties beyond an easy, even natural, general
compassion. The basis for this cultivation is a proper development of certain ideas, as
well as limiting the over-generalization of ideas. For just as a regime is constituted by
and constitutes men’s sentiments, so too does it persist and contribute to their ideas.
Indeed, certain common ideas are necessary for political life: “without common ideas
there is no common action, and without common action men still exist, but a social body
does not” (II.1.2, 407). Society is held together by way of the “principal ideas” that bind
men’s minds together, and the character of such ideas in turn determines the kind of
public and political life of a people. Arguably the most important fundamental ideas men
hold in this regard are of the nature of man and of God. As Tocqueville writes: “There is

173

almost no human action, however particular one supposes it, that does not arise from a
very general idea that men have conceived of God, of his relations with the human race,
of the nature of their souls, and of their duties toward those like them. One cannot keep
these ideas from being the common source from which all the rest flow” (II.1.5, 417).
Even as men’s ideas of God may be little more than general, it is important that they are
restrained from generalizing their idea of God to the ultimate extent of pantheism, as the
logic of equality tends toward.

General and Particular Ideas, and the Generalization of Ideas
In a remarkably epistemological chapter, one that follows upon a discussion of
beliefs, and the sources of beliefs, among democratic peoples, Tocqueville examines the
relevance and necessity of general ideas. He opens the discussion (II.1.3, 411) by stating
the fact that God does not need general ideas, for at “a single glance he sees separately all
of the beings of which humanity is composed, and he perceives each of them with the
similarities that bring [each one] closer to all and the differences that isolate [each one]
from [everyone else].” God does not need to generalize, because his mind grasps actual
particularity—both similarity and difference—without any requisite mediation. He sees
immediately the vast array of things in themselves, despite their multitude, and therefore
“never feels the necessity of enclosing a very great number of analogous objects under
the same form so as to think about them more conveniently.” Man’s mind lacks such
perspective and capaciousness, for “if the human mind undertook to examine and judge
individually all the particular cases that strike it, it would soon be lost in the midst of the
immensity of detail and would no longer see anything.” Pure particularity blinds man, or
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offers but a blur to his mind, which leads the human mind to have “recourse to an
imperfect but necessary process that both aids it in its weakness and proves its
weakness.”
General ideas offer men a means by which to name, categorize, compare, and
consider similar things, or things that resemble one another to greater or lesser degrees.
In turn, men are able to make judgments, sometimes with rapidity. However, general
ideas “never provide anything but incomplete notions, and they always make [the mind]
lose in exactness what they give it in extent.” For, according to Tocqueville, “there are
no beings in nature exactly alike: no identical facts, no rules indiscriminately applicable
in the same manner to several objects at once.” Nature is an infinite series of
particularities, containing only a range of similarity, but not so much as to speak of
identity. To the extent that the beings of humanity come close together through their
similarity, they remain isolated to some degree through their differences, ultimately
united only in the mind of God—in the midst of his general ponderance of the human
race.
Tocqueville’s epistemological discussion outlined here highlights a basic but
important ontological insight with political consequence: men are brought together on the
basis of similarity and separated on the basis of difference. Generalization generates
extension and inclusion but thinness, while particularization confers depth or substance
but exclusion. To this basic truth is added the specific political context or social
condition: conditions of equality foster greater likeness while inequality fosters greater
distinction. “When conditions are very unequal and the inequalities are permanent,
individuals little by little become so unalike that one would say there are as many distinct
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humanities as there are classes; one always discovers only one of them at a time, and
losing sight of the general bond that brings all together in the vast bosom of the human
race, one ever views only some men, not man” (II.1.3, 412). Democracy opens the way
to thinking of man, in general. While aristocratic periods gave rise to exemplary men,
and great consideration of them in their distinctive and distinguishing virtues, democratic
periods enlarge thought beyond the exceptional examples: “the man who inhabits
democratic countries finds near him only beings who are almost the same; he therefore
cannot consider any part whatsoever of the human species without having his thought
enlarge and dilate to embrace the sum.” The consequence runs further: “All the truths
applicable to himself appear to him to apply equally and in the same manner to each of
his fellow citizens and to those like him” (II.1.3, 413; emphasis added).
While men grow in equality under democracy, it is an error to presume that
equality eliminates all human differences. Tocqueville himself insists that certain
inequalities remain, and thus a difference in talents and abilities persist all the same
(II.2.20, 532; II.3.21, 613; II.1.2, 408; II.1.9, 431). Nonetheless, the appearance of
similitude may lead men to a kind of in-difference and self-absorption in thought to the
extent that they are unable to discern or detect any distinctions in experience outside of
their individual selves. So much indicates a complete absence of dialectic when one
mentally subjects all others to the same solipsistic standard, or when one presumes the
subjective to be identical to the objective, establishing the former to be the standard of the
latter. The habit of generalizing as such—of applying general ideas—is one in which
Tocqueville finds the democratic man to increasingly engage, carrying it over into all of
his studies and pursuits.
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The habit of generalization is linked to the growing abstraction in language: “This
love of general ideas manifests itself in democratic languages in the continual use of
generic terms and abstract words, and in the manner in which they are employed”
(II.1.16, 456). As is the case with general ideas, so too do abstract words demonstrate
merit and weakness. Generic terms and abstract words “aid the work of the intellect”
because they allow for the inclusion of so “many objects in a small space.”177 One can
cover a lot of ground in a short period of time, insofar as “these expressions enlarge
thought”; however, if thought expands as such, it rarely pauses to examine the
qualifications, particular cases—either in support or against the idea—and its constituent
elements. Thought thereby slides thoughtlessly—if easily—along. Tocqueville speaks of
the laziness of the democratic mind that is exhausted by the work of analyzing so many
incongruous and distinct facts, so that it ultimately “denies them.” It is much easier
instead to speak in the abstract terms of “the nature of races, the physical constitution of
the country, or the spirit of the civilization,” all of which helps to shorten the mind’s
work, providing greater satisfaction at less cost (II.1.20, 470).
It is thus the case that abstract words, which are readily used “without linking
them to any particular fact,” both “enlarge and veil a thought” (II.1.16, 457). Tocqueville
connects this phenomenon to the constant movement in and of society no less: “as their
situation changes constantly, [democratic men] are never held firmly to any of their
opinions by the very immobility of their fortune. Men who inhabit democratic countries
therefore often have vacillating thoughts; they must have very large expressions to
contain them” (II.1.16, 457). Instability is a cause of abstraction, as is novelty, for one
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never knows if an idea expressed today will suffice for tomorrow’s newness, and thus “a
taste for abstract terms” naturally develops. Tocqueville’s eloquent metaphor for an
abstract word is to view it as “a box with a false bottom: one puts in it the ideas one
desires and one takes them out without anyone’s seeing it.” The charm and secret power
of abstract words follow from the fact that they can be all-inclusive and less than readily
challenged by intentionally neglecting the concrete details that might otherwise challenge
them.
Tocqueville goes so far as to say that the democratic habit of generalization
eventually turns into a need. “[T]he need to discover common rules for all things, to
enclose many objects within the same form, and to explain a collection of facts by a
single cause becomes an ardent and often blind passion of the human mind.” So strong
can the penchant become that “democratic peoples are always ready to abuse [general]
ideas and indiscreetly to become inflamed over them” (II.1.3, 415). If democrats are
prone to doing away with forms, they may nonetheless retain the broadest, or abstract, of
forms. Arguably the most common of all is that of the human species at large. It is
important to reiterate that there are certainly some positive outcomes from the spread of
general ideas—and even abstract words—for it gives rise to the very idea of the human
species in general, which in turn makes men aware of a degree of natural likeness and
equality among them, in contrast to the radical particularity of previous ages where
people drove a firm wedge between the master and slave classes, for example. Thus,
general ideas can contribute to maintaining and realizing “the natural dignity of the
human species” (I.2.5, 194).
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However, generalization can be carried to the extreme, when indeed one begins to
generalize strictly from one’s own experience to that of all others, considering every
thing to be inherently identical, and equality to exist on all levels of existence and of the
person. The consequence for politics when generalization is so great as to reject the need
for any but the most encompassing of forms—forms that mediate and separate people—is
the denial of any importance to particular political regimes, or even national borders and
courts of justice. So much is a step well along the way towards the ultimate form of
generalization, namely, pantheism. Indeed, pantheism is the most general of general
ideas, and poses a serious threat to political freedom and action. Latent within the
penchant to generalize is the desire to remove distinctions that are deemed to be
oppressive—forms of inequality, on the one hand, but forms at large, on the other hand—
but it is a process that can likewise undermine the sources of human action and the very
space within which liberty thrives; not to mention expressions of human freedom rest
upon the activity of individuals distinguishing themselves. Thus, there is a link between
the annihilation of distinctions, or pantheism, and what Tocqueville calls the “doctrine of
fatality” (II.1.20, 472).
Pantheism and the Doctrine of Fatality
Tocqueville provides a brief statement on how much “progress” pantheism has
made in his day, and the extent to which its influence and presence in European
philosophy and literature has grown. Its very progress is the ultimate progress of
equality: “There is no conceivable democratic or egalitarian progress beyond pantheism.
It is the most general idea.”178 Tocqueville finds that authors of various kinds either
178
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betray a tendency towards pantheism or borrow opinions and ideas from it. And for
Tocqueville, it is no accident, but is “due to a lasting cause” (II.1.7, 425). For, among the
various systems of thought and conceptualizations available to help explain the world and
guide men, pantheism appears to Tocqueville as “one of the most appropriate to seduce
the human mind in democratic centuries” (II.1.7, 426). It is a doctrine that lives under
various names, permeating numerous modern ideologies that live on today, whereby the
distinctions between transcendence and immanence are collapsed, or entire realms of
being are blurred. It is an idea, however, for all those “who remain enamored of the
genuine greatness of man” to unite and do combat against. The “genuine greatness of
man” rests in something other than unifying all aspects of being; genuine greatness
requires separation in the parts of being, and therefore distinctiveness—or to put it more
emphatically, the assertion of distinctiveness on behalf of individual human beings.
Pantheism’s lasting presence derives from the equality of conditions, and so is
inherent to, even inextricable from, the experience of le semblable. When individuals are
increasingly equal and start to resemble one another, each appears “weaker and smaller,”
for none stand out, or tower above others as either natural rulers or leaders. From the
perspective of thought, “one gets used to no longer viewing citizens so as to consider
only the people.” Equality leads the eye to larger groupings of peoples, until eventually it
rises to the highest level of abstraction: “one forgets individuals so as to think only of the
species.” So much is at the heart of our present day consciousness, or the global
perspective, which some today aspire to establish as the only legitimate viewpoint. As
has been convincingly argued, on the basis of Tocqueville’s work, democracy gives rise
to a few select kind of human beings. One of the sub-types of democratic man that James
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Ceaser teases out of Tocqueville’s work is that of “Globo-Man.” His chief psychological
trait is his utter lack of unattachment to any particular society, leaving him instead drawn
to humanity as such: “He is a practicing congregant of the religion of humanity.”179
Among the numerous ways this macro-perspective—or the psychology of
“Globo-Man”—manifests itself is in the work and approach of those Tocqueville refers to
as “democratic historians.” These writers and thinkers largely deny any role of import to
particular individuals in shaping the destiny or history of peoples, seeing instead some
general cause, or inevitable trajectory for the species to progress. The particular
individual, even the particular nation for that matter, is absorbed into a larger entity,
drawn as it is towards some abstract goal. Democratic historians today might claim that
globalization is ineluctable to the point that national sovereignty is no longer legitimate—
that it is a mere throwback to an older age, when particular nations mattered—insofar as
we have now entered a global age, beyond political forms. Democratic historians “not
only deny to a few citizens the power to act on the density of a people, they take away
from the peoples themselves the ability to modify their own fate, and they subject them
either to an inflexible providence or to a sort of blind fatality” (II.1.20, 471). Such a
perspective is seen to be an improvement upon a more narrow one, caught up as it was in
examining distinctive features, attending to particular details, and sometimes attributing
too much significance to the wills and actions of a few.
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It may be granted that aristocratic historians exaggerated to some extent the
importance of individual actors, when their attention was “diverted to individuals at every
moment” to the extent that any or every “sequence of event elude[d] them” or that they
denied any such sequence whatsoever. This perspective is admittedly not without its
limitations as well. As Tocqueville professes, the ancient historians, while having written
“such beautiful histories,” could not offer “a single great historical system.” In contrast,
modern works are replete with systems of various kinds. Democratic historians are led to
“assign a great cause to each fact.” Moreover, they end up trying to link every single fact
systematically, as though everything is intelligible through a singularly causal lens.
Notwithstanding the great diversity of objects and events, the democratic mind strives to
embrace them all, seeking as it does “to link a multitude of consequences to a single
cause” (II.1.7, 426). Just like in the case of general ideas, there is some validity to such
seeking, but only to a limited extent, and when justified by the facts. To be sure,
Tocqueville himself finds equality to be such a prominent cause; however, he also notes a
remarkable number of particular details and additional causes. One might say, he ever
qualifies such singularity. He professes as much in terms of understanding history and its
events: “As for me, I think that there is no period in which it is not necessary to attribute
one part of the events of this world to very general facts and another to very particular
influences. These two causes are always met with; only their relationship differs”
(II.1.20, 470). Moreover, he is well aware of “ one of the most familiar weaknesses of
the human intellect,” namely, “to want to reconcile contrary principles and to buy peace
at the expense of logic” (II.1.6, 425). Some principles simply cannot be reconciled; some
elements of human life remain necessarily separated; some facts are unsystematic in that
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they arise from sources other than strict reason, and are therefore sufficiently particular as
to preclude systematization. And yet, despite these insights, it remains that in democratic
times, “[t]he idea of unity obsesses [the mind].” It is this obsession that paves the way
for pantheism.
Pantheism is the culmination of the mind’s unification of all things. It is the utter
elimination of all distinctions that human beings may encounter or perceive, whether real
or imagined, to the extent that everything is collapsed into a single unity—all differences
are done away with, among or across human beings, as well as among things animate and
inanimate, material and spiritual, even human and divine. The democratic mind,
obsessed as it may become, seeks unity,
on all sides, and when it believes it has found it, it willingly wraps it in its bosom and rests with it. Not
only does it come to discover only one creation and one Creator in the world; this first division of things
still bothers it, and it willingly seeks to enlarge and simplify its thought by enclosing God and the universe
within a single whole. If I encounter a philosophic system according to which the things material and
immaterial, visible and invisible that the world includes are considered as no more than diverse parts of an
immense being which alone remains eternal in the midst of the continual change and incessant
transformation of all that composes it, I shall have no trouble concluding that such a system, although it
destroys human individuality, or rather because it destroys it, will have secret charms for men who live in
democracy; all their intellectual habits prepare them to conceive it and set them on the way to adopting it.
It naturally attracts their imagination and fixes it; it nourishes the haughtiness and flatters the laziness of
their minds (II.1.8, 426).

The reconciliation of all principles, the drawing together of all things and all beings,
offers the democratic mind a kind of peace—there is a “secret charm” to unity. The
passion of equality that so moves the democratic heart leaves it unsettled in the presence
of anything other than itself, or anything it cannot identify with without requiring
mediation; hence the collapsing of all distinctions into a grand, nebulous, unity. So much
is appealing to the democratic heart, and its direct form of compassion, which soon
expands beyond the entirety of humanity to all other beings as well. Never before our
time has a concern for animals been greater, to the extent that some advocate human

183

rights to certain clever creatures, like whales, dolphins, and chimpanzees. Likewise, one
can witness a divinization of the environment, or the world at large—not to say nature
itself—in certain environmental movements of the day, all of which is part of the
pantheistic mindset. Whatever its charm, however, the consequence of pantheism, and so
of this idea of god, is an idea of man that comes to negate his uniqueness, and so too the
distinctiveness of individuals. It is an idea that attacks outright the remarkableness of the
human will and the capacity for action—that is, of the kind of action and activity that
allows man to express the highest elements within him, which otherwise distinguish him
at once from all that is non-human, as well as from other humans. So much is what
Tocqueville means when he speaks of greatness, which is both a product and preserver of
human freedom that pantheism otherwise saps, or relaxes.
To lose sight of the impact that the action of individuals can have on nations is
akin to “see[ing] the world moving without discovering its motor” (II.1.20, 471). To see
things only in terms of unity and at the highest level of generality is to become blind and
deaf to the reasons—to the particular speeches and deeds—that individuals initiate and
assert. Consequently, one is tempted to believe that the movement of a people, or the
activity of a nation, is anything but voluntary; instead, such a mind is inclined to perceive
some larger force dominating and moving societies along. Tocqueville argues that the
discovery of a general cause directing the particular wills of all individuals could not save
human freedom. “A cause vast enough to be applied to millions of men at once and
strong enough to incline all together in the same direction easily seems irresistible; after
having seen that one yields to it, one is quite close to believing that one cannot resist it.”
The democratic historians’ assertion of a general cause offers a charming lullaby against

184

the power of citizens to act, against their belief that they may modify their own fate, or
that they are capable of anything great. The histories of “our time” suggest, “man can do
nothing either about himself or his surroundings.” This is the kernel of what Tocqueville
rightly calls the “doctrine of fatality,” which is so prominent among democratic writers,
that is passed on to their democratic readers, and ends up “penetrating the entire mass of
citizens and taking hold of the public mind.” It is a doctrine that is particularly dangerous
in the democratic age, for there men are all the more inclined to doubt free will when
“each of them feels himself limited on all sides by his weakness.” His independence
leaves him isolated—lonely among a crowd, whose fate is seemingly determined.
It is both encouraging and a concern, however, that such minds may “still
willingly grant force and independence to men united in a social body.” It is
encouraging, for men bound by common ideas are capable of acting in concert,
preserving their political freedom; however, it is a concern if men rely solely upon
society to act for them or on their behalf. Hence Tocqueville states with earnest: “One
must guard against obscuring this idea, for it is a question of elevating souls and not
completing their prostration” (II.1.21, 471). One must not obscure the idea of the social
body, in terms of individuals in a given social body, and a particular social body among
the broader grouping of humanity’s distinct societies. Not obscuring this idea requires
properly conceiving the idea of humanity—a proper representation of the ideal—which is
to say understanding the continued importance of political plurality, and the particularity
of peoples despite a genuinely general, or transcendent, human unity.
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The Poetry of Humanity
We have discussed how important ideas and sentiments are for political life, and
just how relevant certain ideas about God and man remain in the democratic age. The
nature of the latter ideas is such that they operate in the realm of the ideal as well, for
they are ideas that rest at least in part on the power of imagination as well as on reason
and feeling. Thus, they rely, if not require, the use of poetry, which Tocqueville himself
defines as “the search for and depiction of the ideal” (II.1.17, 458). Poetry “completes
and enlarges nature” and thereby adorns truth, offering “a superior image to the mind.”
Poetry is both an example of man’s distinctiveness, in terms of his unique ability to
represent the ideal, as well as a means by which his own greatness can be represented.
However, like so many things, poetry too is shaped by the social conditions of the day,
and according to Tocqueville, the very sources of democratic poetry differ from those of
aristocratic poetry. Put most simply, aristocratic poets find “a thousand diverse subjects
to depict” in that they live in a world “peopled with supernatural beings who do not come
before the senses, but which the mind discovers” (II.1.17, 459). The religiosity of
aristocratic peoples, and the strong faith of the aristocratic mind, leads the poet to depict
things transcendent and divine, which is to say the ideal that arises from contemplation
and the many objects outside and beyond the individual’s own mind—the aristocratic
poet depicts what might be called an objective order, or its various aspects. In contrast,
the democratic poet is inclined to depict the ideal in the useful and what is materially real,
and what might otherwise be associated with his own subjectivity. Whereas doubt
“brings the imagination of poets back to earth and confines them to the visible and real
world,” aristocratic belief suggests that “aristocratic people will always be inclined to
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place intermediary powers between God and man.” The aristocratic mind relies upon
mediating forms, and depicts what is greater than man so as to depict man’s greatness; it
discovers intermediary powers between God and man because God and man are not one
and the same. This radical separation that requires inter-mediation to bring them together
is one of the great sources of aristocratic poetry. On the other hand, the democratic mind
dismisses forms to depict what is immediately before man, and his pantheistic
metaphysics precludes any need for intermediary or mediating forms or powers. Thus,
Tocqueville’s verdict is that “equality, in establishing itself on the earth, dries up most of
the old sources of poetry,” however, it nonetheless “uncovers new ones” (II.1.17, 460).
Tocqueville provides a remarkable account of the stages of democratic poetic
development. He argues that the democratic imagination passes from depicting and
embellishing the material and inanimate things of the earth, before it eventually “turns the
imagination away from all that is external to man to fix it only on man.” In a striking
statement, Tocqueville summarizes how democratic poetry becomes the poetry of
humanity: “Democratic peoples can amuse themselves well for a moment in considering
nature; but they only become really animated at the sight of themselves.” This selfadulation is not unrelated to the fact that the democratic mind is prone to the idea of the
“perfectibility of man” as something that is “indefinite” (II.1.8, 426). While an old idea,
it is one that the aristocratic mind confined “in advance within certain impassible limits.”
With man’s constant attention to himself, he sees no limits to the extent of his
perfectibility, and without any distinctions between the transcendent and immanent
realms, it becomes all the more conceivable that his own perfectibility here and now is
the very meaning of existence. With little concern for the past, democratic peoples turn
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their attention towards the future, and “in this direction their imagination has no limits;
here it stretches and enlarges itself beyond measure” (II.1.17, 460). The future holds
ultimate meaning, and the meaningful future is a perfected humanity, united as one.
Initially, the effect of le semblable is to make the individual of little interest to
poetry, for one and all are alike, so that “the nation offers itself to the brush” instead. The
logic of similarity makes men inseparable, and unites them in the mind of the poet, so as
to “include all of them in the same image” and thereby depict the “people itself” as the
object of poetry. This is only a stage, however, at which point democratic nations so
clearly perceive “their own shape”—more clearly, that is, than previous peoples.
Depicting the nation becomes the highest form of the ideal for the poet to represent, but
as a stage, and in accordance with the effect of le semblable, this moment of national
grandeur and aggrandizing must pass, for nations too are under the influence of le
semblable. So the attention of the poet is drawn not vertically towards the heavens but
horizontally towards the breadth of humanity. For there comes to be both appearance and
reality to the similitude of nations and peoples, which is a consequence of “the extreme
mobility of men and their impatient desires.” One would be hard pressed to find a better
shorthand phrase to summarize globalization of style. At any rate, this extreme mobility
and impatience of desire results in the following:
the inhabitants of different countries mix with each other, see each other, listen to each other, and borrow
from each other. Therefore not only do members of the same nation become alike; nations themselves are
assimilated, and in the eye of the spectator all together all together form nothing more than a vast
democracy of which each citizen is a people. That puts the shape of the human race in broad daylight for
the first time.
All that relates to the existence of the human race taken as a whole, its vicissitudes, its future, becomes a
very rich mine for poetry (II.1.17, 461).
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The democratic poets come to see only “humanity itself” and the grand shape of the
human race, whereas in the past “the general notion of those like oneself was obscure.”180
Neither the poets depict, nor do the people perceive, any objective sense to their social
world, or any standard of measurement outside of themselves. So powerful is the
appearance if not the substance of similitude, that depictions of the ideal preclude any
attention to differences and distinctions. Each individual comes to easily identify with
every other individual simply by virtue of being human, and democratic poetry both
reflects and seeks to advance this experience.
Despite the often faltering faith in positive religions in democratic centuries, “men
are…disposed to conceive a much vaster idea of divinity itself, and its intervention in
human affairs appears to them in a new and greater light” (II.1.17, 461-2). So much is
consistent with the democratic tendency towards pantheism. With fixation upon
themselves, the divine becomes the force at work guiding the species: humanity’s history
is thus divinized, and is thereby understood to have followed a necessary plan. This
divinity is not given body or any proper form, for democratic poets “will always appear
small and cold if they try to give corporeal forms to gods, demons, or angels, and if they
seek to make them descend from Heaven to contend for earth.” Instead, God—no longer
transcendent—is the force in and of history that becomes associated with the indefinite
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perfectibility of the species, the ever-growing status of equality, and the ultimate
unification of all peoples. This combination of ingredients, with its combination of a
general consciousness of humanity and the inevitable triumph of progress, cannot help
but result in a sort of passivity; locked within its own gaze upon itself, humanity becomes
its own object of worship. The passive and self-recessed disposition is itself perfectly
consistent with the individualism that Tocqueville so keenly analyzes.
One should hardly find it surprising that individualism has the potential to operate
on the level of the particular individual and the general species, in an age of globalized
and globalizing democracy and democratic consciousness. After all, it is in the chapter
on individualism where Tocqueville draws the following comparative insight:
Men who live in aristocratic centuries are…almost always bound in a tight manner to something that is
placed outside of them, and they are often disposed to forget themselves. It is true that in these same
centuries the general notion of those like oneself is obscure and that one scarcely thinks of devoting oneself
to the cause of humanity; but one often sacrifices oneself for certain men.
In democratic centuries, on the contrary, when the duties of each individual toward the species are much
clearer, devotion toward one man becomes rare: the bond of human affections is extended and loosened
(II.2.2, 483).

The relationship, on the one hand, between the forgetting of self in the devotion to
another particular individual amidst obscurity of le semblable, and, on the other hand, the
absorption of self in unison with humanity through clarity of le semblable, could scarcely
be clearer. To the extent that democracy gives rise to a new-found duty to humanity, it is
not clear that it will be enacted upon, or is sufficient to draw self-satisfied men outside of
themselves to make genuine sacrifices. Indeed, the cure for the broader problem of
individualism, which can be consistent with complacent forms of humanitarianism, is a
means to draw the individual, and even the species, outside of itself—to transcend itself.
Tocqueville powerfully suggests that a properly transcendent religion can aid in this
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regard, for it alone can provide a genuine form of universality that preserves the
particularities of political life.
The topic of religion in Tocqueville’s work is a vast and complex one, and cannot
be addressed at length here.181 The subsequent chapters will discuss the broader problem
of religion and politics—or the theologico-political problem—at greater length. In
conclusion, however, we recall that Tocqueville makes it clear just how important
religion was for the American founding, and in its point of departure, stating that readers
“must never forget” that “religion gave birth to the Anglo-American societies” (II.1.1,
405). And while religion’s role in American life, and religion itself, have changed over
time, key to the “particular strength” of religion in America is how it became
“intermingled with all national habits and all the sentiments to which a native country
gives birth.” Perhaps above all, however, one must be clear that “in America religion
itself has so to speak set its own limits.” It is the limitation of religion that allows for the
space of politics, but the presence of religion helps foster political freedom. Religion is
at once mixed with habits and sentiments—is present in the American heart—but is
separated from American politics: “the religious order there has remained entirely distinct
from the political order.” This separation—one is inclined to speak of the separation
between the City of God and the City of Man—is central to the balance between what is
ultimately universal and what is necessarily particular, for true universality is beholden to
the transcendent. The confusion of religion and politics in a democratic world is another

181

For helpful discussions, see, for example, Ralph Hancock, “The Uses and Hazards of Christianity in
Tocqueville’s Attempt to Save Democratic Souls,” in Interpreting Tocqueville’s Democracy in America,
348-93; Catherine Zuckert, “Not By Preaching: Tocqueville on the Role of Religion in American
Democracy,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (April, 1981): 259-80.

191

manifestation of pantheistic tendencies, and is far from helped when the democratic
religion of Humanity is itself preached by democratic poets.
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6. MANENT:
WESTERN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:
HUMANITY AND A HISTORY OF POLITICAL FORMS
“The drama of modern humanity is one that oscillates between the affirmation of universality and the
affirmation of particularity…In the idea of modern humanity, there is a very noble need to recognize the
humanity of another. at the same time, it bears a weakness and a danger, insofar as it rests upon the
postulate that this recognition can be immediate and facile…We are in a situation where the word “man” is
sufficient unto itself, as though prior to its annunciation, we evoke, by way of a phenomenon of resonance,
something immediately intelligible and definitive. To understand what is man—how he realizes himself,
the manner in which the human world revolves around the ideas of justice, of truth, of love, of religion—is
an immensely complex task of philosophy.
—Pierre Manent, “La Tentation de l’Humanitaire”
“The rule adopted on board the ships on which I have met ‘the man without a country’ was, I think,
transmitted from the beginning. No mess liked to have him permanently, because his presence cut off all
talk of home or of the prospect of return, of politics or letters, of peace or of war,—cut off more than half
the talk the men liked to have at sea.”
—Edward Everett Hale, The Man Without a Country182

We concluded the previous chapter by discussing the “poetry of humanity,” after
tracing some of the major effects—and so the logic—of the sentiment of “the same,” or le
semblable, which operates in and through the modern democratic regime. The poetry of
democracy, like the ideas and sentiments of the democratic age more generally, both
reflect, and instill, universalism—that is, the unity and universality of humanity. To
speak of humanity is inescapably to deal in abstractions; the very idea of humanity is a
general concept—it is one of the most important generalizations in an age of
generalization. However, it has now become more operationalizable, so to speak, and
more prominent in political discourse than in any previous time. Far from being a
concept used solely by academics and philosophers, or even by poets, it is today the
language uttered by larger groups of people, often by those said to speak “for the people”;
in short, it is a universal universally invoked. Given its usage by statesmen and citizens
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alike, it requires examination, in terms of what it evokes or means, as well as what is
implied or hoped to be operationalized in the context of the political.
Among the numerous topics he has addressed, Pierre Manent has sought to
examine our discourse of and on humanity, and therefore thoughtfully penetrate our
sentiment of humanity. His examination is cast in and through a political gaze; his
critique of the present discourse and sentiment emerges through his partisanship, not to
any particular party, but to the political as such.183 In other words, Manent writes first
and foremost in defense of self-government. He therefore examines the meaning and use
of the concept of humanity from the perspective of the question of self-government—
asking, what is self-government to humanity and humanity to self-government? Or, can
humanity at large govern itself and can self-government be universalized to the level of
humanity? Thus, his discussion of the emergence of a concept and its application is born
through detailed elaboration of a history of political development, namely of Western
political development, for the idea of humanity is born in the West and must be
understood in and through its political history.
In this chapter, we outline Manent’s rather unique history of Western political
development, or what he calls a history of political forms. It is by way of this history that
we garner a better grasp of both Manent’s particular mode of political philosophizing and
of how the question of humanity and self-government come together—that is, of how
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each can in fact question the other.184 A subset of Manent’s science of political forms
discussed herein is what he calls the science of Rome, for there is, on the one hand,
something especially unique about Rome, and on the other hand, something comparable
to the present European situation. Thus, we will tease out Manent’s comparison between
the universalism of ancient Rome and the present attempt to inaugurate a universal state.
So much opens the way to our discussion in the following chapter on the apparent
emergence of a global architecture of law and a universal sentiment of morality—two
kinds of modern empire, as it were. After elaborating on Manent’s understanding of
these phenomena and his critique of them, we will then turn to question the universality
of Manent’s approach to the universal. More specifically, chapter seven will
subsequently take up the question of whether Manent’s understanding of the West and
Western political development is not overly European, or even French, insofar as it may
misunderstand the differences—the particularity—of America. To the extent that a great
Frenchman, Tocqueville, came to understand democracy in general through America to
address his fellow Europeans, we argue that another great Frenchman, Manent, somewhat
insufficiently accounts for the particularity of America when extrapolating from
European experience to account for the West in general.
While this can be seen as something of a shortcoming in analysis, Manent’s work
nevertheless stands as a powerful teaching for Americans all the same. In fact, one may
read this apparent analytical shortcoming as a rhetorical provocation. Given the amount
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of time Manent has spent in America, and his sensitivity to differences and similarities in
political thought and practice more generally, his apparent failure to differentiate
America within the West may be something of a strategic ploy, at least for American
audiences: exaggerating American and European similarities could serve to draw out, if
not awaken, the American desire to distinguish itself anew. After all, even within Europe
itself, Manent argues that the differences across peoples, and the healthy sense of
competition among Europe’s nations, contributed in large part to its past greatness.
Over-generalizing can wound the pride of particular peoples and individuals, and thereby
summon them to action—insofar as their pride remains sensitive to such blows. No
doubt, Manent is much concerned with a dissipating ability for political action in the
West, and so of a lack of Western pride properly cultivated. His political history,
therefore, is arguably directed at bolstering Western political imagination on both sides of
the Atlantic so as to recall both the possibility and need for action.185 Whatever the
likelihood of this rhetorical technique, and the validity of his view on America, we shall
see that Manent remains today’s most profound analyst of the sentiment of humanity, and
one of the most insightful thinkers on what he calls more broadly “our contemporary
political situation.” Thus, it will be shown that America can be understood as something
of today’s greatest anomaly to this sentiment and situation, but only insofar as it remains
tethered to its particular founding, in and through the strength as well as the pride in and
of its constitution.
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A Formal Account of Western Political Development
Manent’s account of the West is an endeavor to understand its history in light of
man’s irrevocably political nature—that is to say, out of men’s natural desire to govern or
to be well governed. “The only possible principle—the only possible cause—of the
movement of human history is man himself, who strives to order his humanity by
governing himself.”186 A history of political forms, therefore, is not simply one of many
equally plausible lenses that may be adopted, or perspectives from which one may choose
to examine the unfolding of what Manent refers to as the “human adventure.” Rather,
such an account of political development is precisely the most significant recollection to
be offered: it literally signifies the deepest truths of our past and of human nature—that
is, the ways in which particular peoples express their universal humanity. For the
different attempts that peoples have undertaken to govern themselves or to be well
governed in particular communities indicates such a universal desire and truth—or the
truth of this human desire. Political history then is the architectonic history.187 And
human nature is—or at least certainly has been—constantly mediated by politics: the
immediately human world has always presented itself through the mediated forms of
politics and political activity. An account of political forms thereby provides the very
context for all other activities and histories, insofar as the political is the broadest context
for human action. In other words, the human community makes human action possible—
primarily so, as far as the first community was the first framework of human action, and
every subsequent community is a prime cause of action—while the different types of
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communities are more or less conducive to different types of action, as they may or may
not make possible certain kinds of regimes that likewise shape the activities and ways of
life of peoples.
The political aspect of our nature then is not incidental for Manent; in fact, the
political is no mere “aspect” but, one is tempted to say, is rather the best “access” to
human nature, and so to humanity. This is not to say that human nature is solely
exhausted by the political, but that things both trans- and sub-political are inextricably
related, or relatable to—again, mediated by—the political.188 The birth of the city, for
example, emerges out of a less than truly political community, while the Church, as
community a that is more than purely political should nonetheless be understood as an
association with great political import. At bottom, a central fact for Manent is that
“politics holds together the diverse aspects of human life, individual as well as social.”189
For the political order is “the great mediation, or the mediation of mediations,” insofar as
politics is inescapably and in so many ways related to, and intervenes in, the lives of
private citizens, both for better and for worse.
The history of political forms examines these various types of human associations
that have organized and shaped the lives of individuals and have successively unfolded in
the West. Manent’s account is one through which Western history becomes articulate;
or, alternatively, it is a way by which one can most adequately articulate the history of the
188
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West and its particular dynamic.190 The science of political forms examines the principle
contained within these various forms, which otherwise animates each one and its actors,
as in the case of philia for the ancient city, or caritas for the Church. It is therefore a
science that penetrates these forms to their principle while understanding the relationship
between these forms and principles, as they encounter one another in succession as well
as simultaneously, in history; the trajectory of which creates and continues the broader
dynamic of the West. Of course, to speak of a dynamic is to speak of movement; to
speak of the trajectory and a dynamic is likewise to offer a single principle for this
movement above and beyond the numerous communities and their respective principles.
The very principle of Western movement is itself politics—the repeated endeavor of
individuals to govern themselves, or their desire to live orderly lives, and thereby make
190
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their self-rule a conscious project—which truly begins with the movement of the city, the
latter of which is the first genuine political form.
Two things must be underlined at this point. First, for Manent, “there is no
indefinite political form.”191 Drawing on the work of Jean Baechler, Manent notes that as
far back as Paleolithic man, individuals lived in bands and tribes, which were clearly
defined in practice thousands of years ago. Upon living politically, people necessarily
live in a given political form, or at least in transition from one form to another.192 To be
sure, there is a qualitative difference between the band and the tribe, on the one hand, and
the city, on the other. But the point is that “one cannot live politically in an undefined
way.” Not living politically means not living in order, or with articulate organization; unpolitical life precludes the ability for coherent action and cogent meaning. For insofar as
groups are organized for action, a certain amount of communal integrity is required, and
if there is to be a reasonable self-understanding, the various parts and problems of life—
the recurring questions of existence—must be offered some kind of formal response.
Manent is not alone in pointing this out. Consider the following remarks by Voegelin
when he discusses what he refers to as political or social “articulation”:
Political societies, in order to be in form for action, must have an internal structure that will enable some of
its members—the ruler, the government, the prince, the sovereign, the magistrate, etc., according to the
varying terminology of the ages—to find habitual obedience for their acts of command; and these acts must
serve the existential necessities of a society, such as the defense of the realm and administration of
justice—if a medieval classification of purposes will be allowed. Such societies with their internal
organization for action, however, do not exist as cosmic fixtures from eternity but grown in history; this
191

Manent, A World Beyond Politics?, 44.
Barry Cooper’s recent work discusses the “religion” and “politics” of the Upper Paleolithic period
(between 50KYBP-10KYBP), highlighting structural and substantial equivalences to later human
experiences and communities (while not neglecting important distinctions—hence the use of quotation
marks for “religion” and “politics”). One point of import is that significant, stable, and continuous political
organizations were necessary to construct the public works we now know as Neolithic monuments as found
at Newgrange, Knowth, Stonehenge, and various North American Indian sites. Cooper, ““Politics” and
“Religion” in the Upper Paleolithic: A Voegelinian Analysis of Some Selected Problems,” presented at the
2011 APSA Conference.
192

200

process in which human beings form themselves into a society for action shall be called the articulation of
society. As the result of political articulation we find human beings, the rulers, who can act for the society,
men whose acts are not imputed to their own persons but to the society as a whole…

Voegelin discusses this notion in the context of the problem of representation, and goes
on to say that when there is sufficient articulation and one or more can so act to have his
deeds imputed as such, he or they can be said to be representative of a society.
“Articulation, thus, is the condition of representation.” Providing further clarity, he adds
that behind the concept of “articulation” is “nothing less than the historical process in
which political societies, the nations, the empires, rise and fall, as well as the evolutions
and revolutions between the two terminal points.”193 Without formal and distinct
communities, without the mediation of particular communities and their respective
representatives, is it possible to conceive of universal representatives of humanity; and
better yet, who would they be? The questions of formal mediation, or the forms of
politics, naturally present themselves in the context of articulation and representation.
The second point of importance is that the number of political forms is not
unlimited but finite. This insight stands in contrast to the common suggestion of our day
that political variation is as great as the numerous cultures, groups, or even individuals in
existence.194 It is said that no two units are alike, and in accepting as much attention is
focused on the splendor of differences—the understanding of political forms thus
becomes altogether blurred. That said, emphasizing uniqueness across space and time is
not logically wrong, for indeed differences persist; however, at a certain point if diversity
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and uniqueness are stressed for their own sake—that is, assumed to be the only, or the
categorical phenomenon—other important facts are obscured and understanding is
inhibited. So much have we seen in our preceding chapters on Montesquieu. Needless to
say, the simple fact of diversity is not itself reason to establish either its degree of
naturalness or its desirability. An exclusive focus on the apparent limitlessness of types
or kinds of human groups or cultures is born of the disposition of relativism. It follows
from an at least tacit assumption that reason cannot actually know (or compare) anything
in the external world because reality at large is unknowable: we know only the concepts
or ideas of our minds that are subsequently imposed upon reality. Accepting as much,
relativism refrains from any rigid classificatory impositions, which is to say that the
relativistic mind neglects engaging reality for the purpose of understanding, or making it
intelligible by way of evaluative distinctions. Such being the case, relativism and its
consequent denial of reason has rightly been considered a “closing of the mind.”195 Thus,
in praising and accepting diversity it offers little more than indulgent flattery, since
diversity from this perspective amounts to a muddled and undifferentiated mass,
celebrated for its own sake; colorful, perhaps, but otherwise overwhelming to the mind
and eye in its unintelligibility.
Approaching the world in this way is to engage it from a non-political
perspective, which is to say from a view that is void of practice and practical reason. The
participant knows that his political community has some kind of definite form, so long as
it is an order capable of action, and that it therefore exists in a particular place, delineated
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as it is from others. Manent’s stress on this point then becomes obvious, insofar as the
political perspective preserves the possibility of self-government. As he writes, “This is
one of the most important ‘theoretical’ propositions of political science. Inasmuch as the
human world is political, it does not present an indefinite variability. It is structured and
ordered.” To which he adds that such a “theoretical proposition is heavy with ‘practical’
consequences”—the consequences of which require that we not abandon political forms,
or a politically defined way of life, if we desire to be governed well.196 This drive to
abandonment is inherent in today’s largely European attempt to shed itself of its present
political form, the nation, and the sentiment that humanity can be unified by somehow
going beyond its political past. Rather than simply defending the nation, Manent
embarks first to understand the nation, which is no simple task, particularly in a climate
that collapses the study of the nation into that of nationalism, presumed to be its inherent
logic. Studying the nation requires, Manent argues, comparison and understanding of its
contrasting and preceding forms. Thus, the question of the nation is another means by
which to enter his history of political forms.
The first genuine political form, as alluded, is that of the city. Better yet: “The
starting point of any political reflection is indeed the city.”197 In his magisterial work,
Metamorphoses of the City, Manent devotes the first of three parts to what he calls, “The
Original Experience of the City.” This section is in turn divided into the following three
chapters: “What Science for the City?,” “The Poetic Birth of the City,” and “The Civic
Operation.” The second part is entitled, “The Enigma of Rome,” while the third is,
“Empire, Church, Nation.” The collection of forms in these titles constitute the general
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range of political forms experienced thus far in the West. Manent admits that the work as
a whole rests on an insight that suggests a sort of “defect” in his earlier work. Much of
Manent’s previous scholarship elaborated in various ways an interpretation of European
political development that placed “modern democracy” at the center, and even as the aim,
of this development. His realigned search distances itself from what he refers to as this
earlier “Tocquevillean” perspective, which can be described as an exaggeration of the
“political and human transformation, the ‘anthropological transformation’ that the
progress of modern democracy brings with it.”198 The more substantial “anthropological
transformation,” he now argues, is the Greek one, which the modern democratic
revolution has built upon. The directionality of his approach has therefore shifted: rather
than seeing history “running toward us, toward the grandeur and miseries of our
democracy,” he increasingly came to see it as,
more and more clearly unfolding starting from the prodigious innovation that was the first production of the
common, something much more substantial and moreover much more interesting than the virtues and vices
of our too-famous equality. I saw more and more clearly the forms of our common life unfolding from the
first and master form as so many reverberations of this original conflagration, as so many metamorphoses
of this primordial form.

The argument that the Greeks invented politics is by no means unfamiliar, after
all, the very word derives from the Greek name for the self-governing city, polis.199
What Manent underscores is the importance and continued influence of what is otherwise
a twofold foundation: of Greek politics and Greek political science. To be sure, the latter
followed upon the former, but they came about within the same framework—within the
same whole—and that both experience and knowledge about this experience emerged in
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a natural manner, albeit not without important and ineluctable tensions. In fact, Manent
argues that this Greek foundation best illustrates “the circle within which we will not
cease to struggle: political science is the science of political experience, but science and
experience are distinct and at the same time inseparable.”200 At any rate, it is the
framework of the city that made the experience of politics, of action and self-government,
and therefore self-knowledge, possible at all. An altogether new way of life is brought
into being, which operates according to the principle of the common (koinon), insofar as
the city is the locus where speeches and deeds are put together in common, and are so
held together by the literal and metaphorical contours of the city. Men therefore come to
govern themselves in and through conscious awareness of this activity. Reflection upon
political activity is not itself an incidental element, but both a responsive and suggestive
engagement with it. The framework of the city, however, gives rise to a number of
possible ways for men to govern themselves—that is, there are a number of different
types of regimes that men may establish—particularly according to the number of those
who govern—one, few, or many. And it was to just this question that Greek political
science was primarily devoted.

An Old and New Science, or A Necessary Modification of Classical Science
As is well known, central to classical political philosophy was a concern with the
politeia. The term is rich with meaning as partly indicated by the fact that English
translations vary, rendering it as “constitution,” “republic,” or “regime.” Arguably
“regime” is the most appropriate term since politeia includes, but is not exhausted by, the
formal or legal constitution of a political order, nor is it necessarily republican, in any
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strict sense. Nonetheless, most concretely, the regime is the arrangement of authoritative
offices or honors, particularly regarding the highest form of office. More broadly, any
given regime both represents and constitutes a certain way of life, a political culture or
ethos—that is, a public morality and sense of justice that its laws, institutions, and
members personify. In short, it is “a comprehensive good and moral order” to varying
degrees.201 Classical political philosophy, however, not only took for granted, but even
made explicit, that such a comprehensive good and moral order could only exist in the
city, or polis, for this kind of human association alone reached the requisite level of
autarkeia, or self-sufficiency.202 Thus, the extent to which a science of regime in the
classical sense is helpful for modern political societies may be debated.203
One thinker who has stressed the continued relevance of a classical science of
regimes, and one who has had a great influence on Manent himself, is Leo Strauss.204
Strauss makes it very clear how important the ancient insight of the regime remains
today: “The qualitatively different regimes, or kinds of regimes, and the qualitatively
different purposes constituting or legitimating them, […] by revealing themselves as the
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most important things, supply the key to the understanding of all political things.”205
Manent does not reject this claim outright; however, the regime, any regime, must be
somewhere, which is to say it is embodied in some way—within some broader form—
and these embodiments have changed over time. The classical political philosophers
engaged in the study of regime change, but the broader form never changed in their
experience—or at least they did not raise this experience to the level of conscious
reflection—and they largely denied the possibility of politics beyond the polis, as found
in their critique of non-Greek, imperial life.206 Nevertheless, with the transformation of
the city to a new and distinct form, it is plausible that the regimes will be impacted. Is it
not then conceivable that the ancient cycle of regimes operates differently, or becomes
more than altered, even broken, when the framework—or form—of regimes alters or
expands?
For Manent, the form of human association is the framework and instrument “to
put things in common” and so to “crystallize the fact of being human.” Each such
political form or body relates the speeches and deeds of a community to a broader
complex of space and time, providing continuity with the past and hope for the future.
Stated differently, a political form is the political endeavor—requisite for the being that is
a political animal—to make universal humanity concrete in a particular form or cadre,
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and thereby mediate this inevitable tension.207 Such formation or concretization is the
condition for what Manent calls opération, or political action, and every form bears
intrinsic properties and possibilities of opération; the community is the cadre for action,
and thus the delimited body that makes certain internal and external actions possible.
Therefore, each form can be conceived as a manifestation of human confidence in the
ability to act, providing the circumstances that shape morals and passions, human selfunderstanding, and the range of human activity in life as lived with others. It is fair to
say that according to Manent, there is a certain link between the dimensions, or size, of a
form and the potency of its inhabitants’ souls, and thus the kind of rule and rulers, or
regime, that is made possible: political physics and political psychology intertwine.
Thus, while certain changes have certainly occurred over time, Manent denies that the
“springs of the human soul” can be radically altered or destroyed; thumos, for example, is
not altogether undermined by modern democracy. “The relative role of the diverse parts
of the soul can change within a given political and social regime, but it remains true that
in every human being all the parts of the soul are always present, even if not always
active.”208 Thus, speaking concretely, a form makes possible the “production du
commun,” where the forces within individual souls may become present, and thereby
seen in the activities of its members. And the first “common” emerged in and through
the “primary and master form,” namely the ancient city, from which other forms
metamorphosed.209 By no means rejecting the science of regimes, Manent therefore
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offers what emerges as a necessary supplement to the classical perspective with his
science of political forms. If the regime is the “key” to unlock political understanding, as
Strauss suggests, then its displacement into a new kind of political space or body has
opened the door to an additional, or concomitant, science.210
One may suggest here the analogy of the human body with its visible form, and
the human soul in its invisible form, which together form the person. We know from
experience that bodies and souls come in a variety of shapes and kinds, and shape does
not necessarily correlate with kind, but all such ensouled bodies are living persons. For
example, one finds courageous souls in both large and small bodies, just as both tall and
short people can have either just or unjust souls. Yet a courageous soul manifests itself
differently in a different body, for action depends on some level on the contingency of the
body’s size and strength, or its unity and ability. Thus, it is a question of some interest
whether any given regime can exist in any size or kind of form and whether or not there
are certain limitations. One may wonder, say, can democracy exist in both a small form
like a city or a large form like an extended state? The dimensions and expanse of a
political body is not without consequence, and the differences between ancient and
modern democracy are not unrelated to this, as well as other differences, between the
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So as to dispel any confusion, since the “regime” is often understood to be the “form” of a city, and thus
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ancient city and the modern state.211 However, all such forms, or polities, are on some
level human creations, even as they are extensions or reflections of human nature, for
they result from human speeches and deeds. Being so constituted suggests a certain
amount of fixity as well as the ever-present possibility of change. In light of this, a
science of political forms asks to what extent certain virtues or characters are related to
particular forms or political contexts: are all passions and excellences of the human soul
always and anywhere possible, or does the concrete cadre of community delimit what
may become manifest?
There are, as Manent repeatedly outlines, strictly speaking four political forms:
the city, the empire, the Church, and the nation (or nation-state). The Western historical
succession has roughly followed in this order, although not to the utter exclusion or
elimination of previous forms, and indeed non-Western empires preceded the city (which
are arguably non-political), just as tribes of a less political nature preceded the original
civic order. As intimated, the importance of the first form can hardly be overstated, for it
is the ancient city that began the course of succession; it is the first establishment of
human order oriented towards action and is itself a sort of work of action, or better yet “a
common action,” having evoked the appearance and reality of human self-government. It
is neither reducible to an instrument that satisfies basic human needs, nor is it in essence
a means of protecting rights. Rather, the city is action, which ever carries with it the
possibility, or danger, of transgression; therefore, it must be governed. At one point
Manent characterizes governing as “action over action,” and as the most difficult action
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of man. There is, therefore, a “sad truth” to the city.212 Although the city is constituted
by liberty—the freedom to act and the production of common activity—it is nonetheless
inseparable from war: both internal faction, or civil war, and external war with
neighboring cities.213 After all, there is something “terrible” about or in human action,
for it both expresses the human being and exposes him. Every actor steps outside of
himself at the risk of losing himself, or of initiating a course that is transgressive, beyond
his intentions and various other limits. Later efforts of reform in political thought and
action have sought to transform the dynamic of the city, so as to separate the liberty of
the city from its accompanying disorders; that is, to allow for action while vying to
circumscribe its destructiveness.214 “Subsequent history appears overall as the ever
renewed search for the political form that might make it possible to gather again the
energies of the city while escaping the city’s fate as free but destined to internal and
external enmity.”215 What is more, Manent argues that the energy and action of the city
and the possibilities bound up with it likewise make the later modern project possible;
hence the aforementioned continuity from the first emergence of the ancient city: “If we

212

Manent’s most extended study of the city is found in Les métamorphoses, Part I (“L’experience
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wish to understand the modern project, we must understand it on the basis of this first
complete mobilizing of human action, that is, of the city.”216
The ancient city’s energy was both its source of liberty and greatness while it was
the very same that led to its downfall, for the Greek cities exhausted themselves in what
Thucydides memorably called the megiste kinesis, or history’s gravest crisis, namely the
Peloponnesian War. In its wake emerged the superimposition of the Macedonian empire.
While the city is the first form, and indeed a natural political form as it contains all the
ingredients of political life and its fulfillment, the empire too is “a natural political idea”
since it “corresponds to men’s unity, to the universality of human nature, which wants to
be recognized and addressed by a unique power.”217 The city and the empire then are the
two polar forms, and two opposing answers to the balance between the particular and the
universal: the city is particularity in abundance whereas the empire is universality in its
apparent fullness. The two extremes otherwise represent the alternative possibilities of
comprehension and extension: the former seeks to put as many things as possible in
common among its members, and thereby is rather exclusive and exclusionary, while the
latter results in a search for the lowest common denominator among people, arguably to
the extent that it so dilutes commonality as to diminish any concrete sense of the
common. In practice, of course, there is something of a synthesis, and hence a balancing
of the universal and particular.218 The Church is unique because it offers a new
combination of the two, insofar as it is extensive to the point of including all of mankind,
but it does not do so by seeking what is low and common; rather, by recognizing what is
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profound and of great significance. To be sure, however, prior to the emergence of the
Church was the case of the empire of Rome, which was unlike any other.
Manent offers an extended study of Rome that consists in a comparative
examination of the transition of the Greek cities to empire with the Roman transition; so
much an important part of his science of Rome. It is indeed this science that likewise
adds further analysis to the Church as a political form. In comparing the Greek and
Roman situation, Manent is very adamant about the fact that the Greek empire did not
radically transform the cities; while there were changes to the cities, the “profound
transformations…did not affect the city as such.” In other words, “Athens submitted to
Philip of Macedon while retaining its form as a city.”219 As previously mentioned,
classical Greek political philosophy resigned itself to studying regime change, and
neglected consideration of changing forms, even perhaps denying the possibility as such;
at any rate, dramatic transformation in form was outside of Greek experiential
reflection.220 In contrast, what makes Rome so fascinating is that “it underwent the
greatest political transformation ever seen”—a change of the regime that included, or
better yet led to a transformation of form. Roman thought was both brought to bear on
this event while likewise contributing to it.
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An Important Intermediary Term: The Science of Rome
There is something “enigmatic” about Rome, partly because of its difference with
Greek political experience, but it has uniqueness beyond the Greek comparison. Indeed,
the central section of Manent’s book engaging the question, Les métamorphoses de la
cité, is entitled “L’énigme de Rome.” This section is further divided into three sections:
“Rome and the Greeks,” “Rome under the gaze of the Moderns,” and “The study
[l’enquête] of Cicero.” While forming the bulk of Manent’s science of Rome in the text,
it is not isolated to this part, for the third division of the work, entitled, “L’Empire,
l’Église, la Nation” devotes two out of three of its sections to an interpretation and
discussion of St. Augustine, particularly his Civitas Dei. A science of Rome consists in
examining Rome from the point of view of its three primary forms—the group of which
Manent refers to as “the Roman series”—namely, the city, the empire, and the Church.
We will discuss the first two of these three here, reserving our discussion of the Church
as a political form in the following chapter, when we engage the theologico-political
problem in greater detail.
Manent addresses the question of why Rome took such a different course from
Athens even though both began similarly as cities, and so how it came to be that a city
could give rise to an empire from within—how “the city itself could give birth to the
empire, the city itself that experienced such an extension, which made this nearly
unbelievable effort unto itself to transform itself from a small city into a global
empire.”221 He traces the causes and consequences, or the human motivations and effects
related to such an extraordinary event, revealing the political meaning of such an
occurrence and its effect on human life. In his discussion he reveals how “the most
221
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delicate questions of morality, and even the most difficult question of ontology (such as
the status of individuality) find themselves related to the question of political form.”222 If
historians face the question—both in terms of comparing Athens and Rome, and Rome’s
transition itself—political scientists, he argues, rarely engage the problem
systematically.223 Thus, a “comparative political physics” is in order.224
One finds many of the same elements in the political history of both Athens and
Rome, the numerical division between the few and the many and their associated
dissensions, as well as the notable personages who led either of the parties as all bearing
especial importance—these being the primary sources of regime change. However, the
class war developed differently in the two instances. Manent recounts that the spring of
political development in Athens was in the fact that the power of the people grew due to a
succession of eminent men, from Solon to Pericles, who took the side of the people,
meeting their demands and guiding them. This succession of brilliant and aristocratic
leaders drove the growing power of the people in Athens. In contrast, Manent argues, in
Rome, the peoples’ demands were controlled, and thereby used, diverted, and hindered,
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by an aristocratic body, namely the Senate.225 No such equivalent body existed in
Athens; however, the difference does not reside in institutional controls alone. For while
Athens’ chain of great leaders came to an end with Pericles’ death, the invitation of
corruption through election of men of ill repute such as Cleon, and the final ignominious
defeat by Sparta in the Peloponnesian war, the equivalent instillation of corruption in the
Roman city did not take a parallel course. Again, something unique happened, for if
Athens was consumed by a spiral of corruption that included simultaneous internal
faction and external conflict, typical of all cities in demise, Manent writes that Rome was
“wholly renovated or renewed” in the midst of similar disorder. The self-destruction of
the republican city in this case signified the coming into being of the empire. In Rome’s
case extreme corruption meant neither death nor end, but the introduction of a novel
metamorphosis. As Manent profoundly and provocatively puts it: “if in Rome alone
extreme corruption did not prove mortal, then it signifies that Rome is a phenomenon that
enters in contradiction not only with political ontology, but even with ontology tout court:
in Rome, death is not mortal [la mort n’est pas mortelle].”226 No doubt the figure that
best resembles or summarizes this problem of the transformation from city into empire
and the defiance of ontology is that of Caesar.
Caesar’s name is itself associated with a new phenomenon, “Caesarism,” and his
name remained a title of rule well after his death. Once again, Manent describes how
such novelty was beyond the purview of Greek political science. In doing so he
addresses Aristotle as well as Strauss and the latter’s unequivocal defense of classical
political philosophy. Reading Aristotle’s Politics as an account providing “a natural
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history of the city” and as the most exhaustive account of the city’s development as a
political form, Manent finds that its course moves towards a situation where a democratic
regime is increasingly the only possible regime. The natural history of the city follows
something like a natural course of democratization; democracy, whether of the good or
bad variety, is the final regime of the city. It is therefore no accident that the good form
takes for itself the generic term for regime, politeia. Consequently, Manent argues that a
“caesarian” future—a truly stable and genuine rule of one—was not foreseen; especially
as a regime that follows upon a republican or democratic one. True government by one
alone was foreign to the Greek city, and the traditional cycle of regimes erstwhile had an
order, or chronology to it.227 The numerical interplay of the few and the many dominated
the ancient polis, as accounted for by Aristotle, and while the latter eventually discusses a
variety of monarchies in the Politics, there is only one that turns out to be effective and
not merely a species of another kind of regime: the royalty of “heroic times.” But this
singularly effectual form of royalty in the Greek world was only ever a momentary
phenomenon, akin to a founding moment rather than a concrete regime—before a
republic’s existence—and Aristotle himself treats it hastily. The long and short of
Manent’s argument here is that royalty and tyranny, the two forms of rule by one, are
ultimately “two modalities” of oligarchy in Greek experience: “there is no regime of one”
in the Aristotelian analysis of the city.228 Novelty of a caesarian kind presupposed a
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entitles Ch. 8 of Bk. XI, “Why the ancients had no clear idea of monarchy,” followed by a chapter entitled,
“Aristotle’s manner of thinking,” that begins by saying: “An awkwardness is clearly seen in Aristotle’s
treatment of monarchy,” concludes thus: “The ancients, who did not know of the distribution of the three
powers in the government of one alone, could not achieve a correct idea of monarchy.” So far as “the kings
of heroic times,” Montesquieu writes that it was “a kind of monarchy [that] was established [but] that did
no continue to exist” (167-9ff).. Manent is herein explicitly following and citing Montesquieu.
228
Manent, Métamorphoses, 157ff. The “greatness of the Greek city rested on the fact that the monarchical
part existed only in the guise of the leading democratic statesmen, that is, it existed only in its activity or

217

transformation of the political form itself and its emergence indicates a reversal in the
normal course of regime succession, for Caesarism is the case where monarchy succeeds
a republic no longer capable of governing itself.229 Manent herein argues that it is Rome
that made genuine monarchic experience possible, and the “vector of European political
history is the victory of monarchy, properly understood.”230
Political life, always and everywhere, is a question of numbers. Political life always rests upon a certain
relation, a certain mixture, between the many and the few; between the people and the nobles, or the
“greats.” It was the particular case of the ancient cities to ignore the essence of the third number, for there
was no third number. The third number, that of One—the monarch, the prince. To be sure, one member of
the few could appropriate power, and become a tyrant. But tyranny was merely an extreme modality of
oligarchy, and did not introduce a qualitatively new number; it did not clearly constitute the one. Certainly
Caesar can be called a tyrant and he was. Cato, said Cicero, preferred to kill himself than be forced to raise
his eyes to the face of a tyrant. But Caesar was also something else. At the moment of extension, the
interplay between the few and many, the republican challenge, could no longer order the city. Thus the city
fell beneath the power of the one. It was not however only a matter of power…for the very idea of being
together changed.231

The “political physics” of Rome—the extension of the city’s dimensions—can be
examined through the parallel distance that emerged between one citizen by the name of
Caesar and his equals. The “question of Caesar” is inextricably bound up with the
“enigma of Rome.” The case of Caesar is one of a man having detached himself from the
regime and rulers, garnering sufficient power so that his death and divinization serve to
found a new form, that of the empire.232 For a citizen to have been so “extraordinarily
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elevated” above those who were erstwhile his equals “presupposes a considerable
modification in the form of the city. For such an elevation to have been possible it was
necessary that its base—which is to say the city itself—experience a prior extension
capable of supporting this elevation.”233 But what most characterizes the Caesarian
period is the confusion and indeterminacy of the political and moral order, and Manent
argues that precisely this problem of indeterminacy, this confusion about order and form,
and the blurred nature of the human association, is witnessed and expressed in “one of the
works that in truth has been the most influential in the moral history of Europe, and a
work that precisely seeks to add order in the moral and political landscape in the time of
all disorders,” namely Cicero’s De Officiis.234

“Caesar and his opponents thus represented two disparate realities: the old reality, which had once been the
whole and was suddenly reduced to a aprt, and the new, which had detached itself from the old and could
hardly have been realigned with it even if war had been avoided—so wide was the gap, so great the mutual
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Manent’s analysis at times privileges the transformation of the form and then
otherwise suggests that it was Caesar’s action that gave rise to the transformation.
Additionally, he speaks of the role of philosophy and Cicero’s impact upon Roman
thought and action. It would seem that searching for one cause of human change is to
belie the complexity of human and political phenomena. The science of Rome as situated
within a science of political forms does not offer a static model for political development;
rather it seeks to understand the political and moral disposition of actors within their
respective communities—the form that delineates as well as informs political and moral
possibilities. It is the kind of science that is sometimes referred to as “non-linear.” If the
character of politics changes, as does the shape or form of community, its essence
nonetheless remains the same, which is precisely why one can and must continue to
speak of both “the city” and its “metamorphoses.”

Rome and “the Ciceronian Moment”
Manent writes of the “perplexity of Cicero.” The latter grappled with of a period
of “indetermination,” or a “gray zone” between two forms, facing the dual task of
understanding and response. Thus Cicero is “really the first to have confronted the
political problem of the West, that of the viability of the city, of the “exit” from the city,
and the passage from one form to another.”235 Such a remarkable extension of the city
and transition of forms leaves political and moral things blurred and uncertain, the
sources and forces of authority insecure. No less distorted was the relation between
theory and practice, and here again the contrast with Greece is helpful. For in the Greek
city, philosophy, or political philosophy, appeared only after the flourishing of the city,
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and even amidst its decline. “Greek philosophy played, so to speak, no role in the
political history of the Greek city. This is altogether different in Rome.”236 In fact, so
great is the political role that “Greco-Roman philosophy” played in Rome Manent argues
the Roman empire “effectively realized the union of philosophy and the political order.”
Or, to put it differently, “something like a “passage from the Ancients to the moderns” is
already produced in Rome at the end of the republican period.”237 Thus, taking Cicero
seriously in and through Manent’s science of Rome helps make intelligible the fact that
the original, or classical, political-philosophical experience was spiritually present even
while its very concreteness was receding and the difficulty of recovery was setting in.
Reading Cicero in light of political forms and their transition makes manifest the great
significance of his thought.
For Manent, Cicero appears as something of both a passive witness to the
transformation—as a classical philosopher reflecting on the truth of the situation—and a
sort of active agent of transformation—as a modern philosopher effectuating the truth of
a new situation. It is not that Cicero consciously developed a wholly original approach,
for he himself freely admits to adopting and introducing Greek philosophy to Rome.
However, Manent argues that it is precisely the absence of intended originality that is of
interest, which itself constitutes the originality of his position: “he sought to illuminate an
experience that did not produce its own light by way of a light from without,”238 and in
the process, because of the emergent political context he was pressed to make certain
modifications to the classical categories. All he had learned (i.e., from the classical
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understanding of the republican regime, the notion of the mixed regime, etc.) was no
longer adequate to make sense of a Rome that sundered its original civic boundaries
while submitting to a single, divinized man—a Rome that did what no city had done
before: stretch itself to embrace the entirety of the known world under the rule of one.
We cannot follow the intricacies of Manent’s profound textual exegesis here, but
suffice it to say that Cicero’s resultant adaptation of classical thought offers a redefinition
of political order, approaching or anticipating the moderns in various ways, even as it
seeks consistency with classical thought. The developments intimated include: the
“instrumentalization” of politics, the privatization of virtue and the importance of private
initiatives, the concomitant attention to the individuality or particularity of each, the
protection of private property as a priority of politics, the new definition of the magistrate
as embodiment of the public person, and the separation of morality from a concrete or
particular community and its strictures.239 So far as monarchy is concerned, Cicero adds
a princely part to the classical notion of the mixed regime. The sum of these changes
amounts to raising, or energizing, the numerical one over an expanded but politically
thinned out, or tamed, many.240 Stated otherwise, the erstwhile Greek relation of man
and the city is profound modified:
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uniform law, the boundaries of political territory are opened to expansion. Citizenship as equal access to
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For the Greeks, the individual citizen, dependent as he was on the city, was likewise the equal of the city,
insofar as the city in its turn was dependent upon him, on his command and obedience. This equality took
on a spiritual sense and became paradoxically visible with the person of Socrates, who treated Athens as if
he was dealing with an individual interlocutor to whom he might offer several reproaches. In Rome, the
reciprocal dependence between the citizen and the city is loosened, and the city becomes definitively much
larger than man.241

So large does the city become, so far are the citizens’ souls stretched from the
particularity of, and participation in, their city, that Cicero invokes something striking
and wholly foreign to Greek thought: a “society of human beings as a whole [universi
generis humani societas].”242 The “opération romaine” consists of unifying,
“miraculously,” the two ancient and opposed political forms of the city and empire and so
by extension its two principles: the ideas of liberty and of universal peace. No doubt this
opération is constituted by great tensions, not least between republican virtues and
imperial right. And in the process Rome moved close—the closest in Western experience
at that time—to collapsing the distinction that is decisive for any particular form: the
difference between the interiority and exteriority of its form.
Rome carries the promise to gather humanity, the hope for l’humanité rassemblé,
in the universal combination of liberty and peace. Rome’s chaotic and violent history
notwithstanding, its authority persists today, under another name: “The promise of Rome
is always present and tentative under the abstract name of democracy.”243 This promise
towards the magistrate who, as carrier of the ‘person’ of the city, is the object of confidence of the citizens”
insofar as he defends the dignity of the republic and applies its laws, but more significantly assigns to each
his rights.
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has today become a temptation, even an illusion, which Manent refers to as the desire for
“pure democracy,” or a kratos without a demos: “democratic governance, which is very
respectful of human rights but detached from any collective deliberation.” 244 He argues
it is particularly manifest in the European project. If there is something imperial about
the European Union in its process of going beyond the national form, Manent argues that
it lacks the “cruel dynamism of the Caesarian transition” and is “deprived of all real
principles of movement, superimposing an empire without emperor to a republican
liberty deprived of energy, under the authority of an undefined notion of humanity.” One
may find a sign of progress in the fact that the European construction is a process as soft
as Roman history was cruel, however, the European Union’s unlimited enlargement and
absence of foundation—its lack of “Roman ambition”—really signifies, for Manent, that
“nothing significant is taking place and nothing durable is being produced.”245
Contemporary Europeans are therefore in a “gray zone” anew, but now the political
ambition requisite for founding is replaced by the hope of going “beyond politics,” of
living “post-politically,” in a truly global or universal community: the community of
humanity. So much of this ambition arises from a certain form of progressivism, and one
altogether lacking in—or dismissive of—a political perspective, a regard politique, and
thus of an understanding of the political nature of human beings.

attended to Roman experience, and the political science of the Federalist Papers found much to draw from
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The Ambiguity of Progress: History and the Universal
Putting off until the next chapter further elaboration of the genesis of the nation,
and indeed why and how it came about as a proposed solution to a problem—the
theologico-political problem—which emerged through the presence of another form, the
Church, we are nonetheless in a position to introduce discussion of a certain conviction
that Manent argues has dominated Western consciousness since the eighteenth century,
and one that is still very alive today.246 It is a conviction that represents the drive for
universalism in Europe today, and is a belief suggesting that the only possible meaning of
human history is its progress towards the universal. History, according to this view, is
intelligible to us only insofar as we understand it to move along a trajectory constituted
by major stages of increasing universality. One shorthand way of describing this view is
to refer to it as the “Hegelian” understanding, insofar as the progress of civilization
entrails ever-greater universality and liberty—or the universalization of political liberty—
for example, as passage was made from the familial or feudal order to the civic or
national order. On some level this fact is undisputable, and one need not be Hegelian to
agree with it; after all, we have seen with Tocqueville how real transformations occurred
from the old regime to the new one of democracy, and equality has spread. What Manent
wants to underline, however, is that with an increase in generalization there has been
substantial change in the basic elements of the community and human life but always
alongside the emergence or production of a new element, namely a new framework for
real political action, and thus the possibility for self-government.
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As discussed, the Greek city created the common (koinon), and in turn Rome
established the public thing (or res publica). While things changed, and citizenship was
extended, there was nonetheless a new human association or framework for opération, or
action. With the later birth of the European nation, along came the public in its various
manifestations, such as public interest, public opinion, public space, and so on. To
reiterate, the operation has otherwise been that of “self-government.” The transformation
of the framework has initiated what he refers to as a “quantitative” change—an extension
of universality insofar as the modern nation is undoubtedly more general than that of the
ancient city: all the nationals of the former are citizens while only a select few are of the
latter, not to mention the real difference in size. However, alongside this change—the
increase in political rights and freedom, at least of the formal kind—is the matter of its
“qualitative” transformation, and here we encounter a certain amount of ambiguity. In
light of the quantitative change, the operation of self-government has necessarily taken
on a different form: ancient democracy or ancient republicanism is different from the
modern form due to the fact of representation. Thus, if the modern form is more general
or universal than the ancient, it is not self-evident that its form of self-government is
actually better, or more complete, or in fact a further realization of what the very word
“democracy” entails and aspires toward.
To be sure, this is not a new debate, and it is one with deep roots in the French
tradition, as well as in the broader tradition of political thought. However, Manent’s
history of political forms opens it up anew, and forces us to reconsider it with great
seriousness. This is his most poignant probing of the question regarding the Ancients and
the Moderns. And if it sounds like Constant’s inquiry, he certainly gives the Ancients
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more voice than Constant, or at least seeks to let their perspective speak for itself; unlike
Constant he does not side prejudicially with the Moderns. In fact, his history of political
forms questions the validity of such progressivism. For it goes further by adding the
complicating fact that philosophy itself emerged in the more restrictive political
landscape of the Greek polis: “the citizens are not numerous, but one of them—
Socrates—is a citizen of the world.” Thus, over and against the political operation of the
ancient city and its particularity there emerges the activity and experience of philosophy
that detaches itself from the city, in turn accomplishing a further progress in generality or
universality. The operation proper to philosophy is the “theoretical life,” which emerges
as a new human possibility so that “the philosopher separates himself from other men at
the very moment when he otherwise defines man in his universality as a “political
animal” and “rational animal.””247 There is an interesting relationship, as it were,
between particularity in politics and universality in ideas, so to speak; or, alternatively
how the universal progresses in and through the production of new and different human
associations or communities.
Manent likewise discusses this connection in light of the Israelite experience,
suggesting that Israel’s election is no surfeit of particularity when compared to the
particularism of the ancient pagan city with its “gods of the cities.” To the extent that
Israel is separate from the other nations, the novel divinity that reveals itself at this time
is one that is Creator for every and each creature. One can say that a theological
universalism emerges amidst the separation of peoples. At bottom, universalism is
extended through separations: the philosopher from the many, and the Isrealites from the
nations, both by way of new associations. So far as Christianity goes, it too produces a
247
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new association in the form of the Church, which represents real universality as a
community, creating the framework for the operation of charity. But this universality no
less comes about through a further separation between the city of God and the city of
man, not to mention Christianity—or Christendom—comprises only a part of the larger
human world, not to mention the further separations that follow upon doctrinal
differences and confessional disputations. In the wake of this ambiguous progress of the
universal Manent argues that the modern political and philosophical movement has taken
upon itself the task of overcoming the sundry preceding separations by establishing a
truly effectual universality. Upon asking the questions regarding the form, framework, or
association for unification as well as what operation or action it will be geared towards,
the only sufficient response that follows is the association of humanity itself. But what
this ultimately means, or as to whom this association encompasses, there is no clear
answer, and Manent argues that part of this uncertainty further obfuscates the issue
regarding humanity’s proper opération: what does humanity do? Self-government seems
to be out of the question, and without an alternative, there is no evidence to believe that
humanity can or would constitute an effective political community.
This range of problems can be seen in the microcosm of the present political
situation of Europe. It is not clear what new framework or human association the
European project will establish, and whether the opération of self-government will
continue amidst the process of dismantling the nation. For while there is much talk about
a European public interest, a European public opinion, or a European public space, no
actual political form—or cadre—to realize this public has yet emerged. It is not from
mere discussion alone, as Habermas and others would have us believe, that political
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orders are born. Habermas himself argues that there are already various examples of
“new forms of organization for continental ‘regimes’…emerging above the level of the
state [suprastaatliche],” which he proclaims are “regimes which could one day provide
the requisite infrastructure for the currently rather inefficient United Nations.”248
Altogether consistent with the conviction that Manent describes, Habermas claims that
there is an “unprecedented increase in abstraction,” and so an inevitably rising tide of
universalism, which “is merely the continuation of a process, the first major example of
which was the integration achieved by the nation-state.”249 The nation-state was simply
one step along an inexorable historical course towards greater abstraction, universality, or
globality—a process towards the final integration of the Weltgesellschaft. Nevertheless,
Habermas curiously says he thinks, “we can take our orientation on the precarious path
toward postnational societies from the very historical model we are on the point of
superseding.” The nation-state, despite its ultimate contingency, as well as its
particularity lamented by universalists, and its past and present failures to fully socially
integrate from this perspective, somehow nonetheless remains the model for the future.
Habermas and similar universalists wants to move beyond the nation—he
welcomes and advocates the “postnational constellation”—and yet he cannot imagine an
altogether different “model.” The nation is both a way station between past and future, as
well as the model for the future. Interpreting the same facts differently, however, one can
just as easily conclude that Europeans are not yet beyond the nation. It is then more
248
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likely a hope than an empirical claim that “new forms…for continental ‘regimes’” are
truly “emerging,” inasmuch as one understands “forms” and “regimes” in any strongly
political sense, as a definite and delineated political thing, having had a concrete
foundation. At any rate, the real alternative to the national form for such thinkers as
Habermas is a cosmopolitan individualist, which follows a Kantian understanding of
universal morality that appears as one of the most effective ideational vehicles thus far in
attempting to overcome the separations of Christianity, despite its erstwhile political
failures—all of which we shall elaborate in the following chapter.
The desire to move beyond the nation in Europe, however, is altogether
intelligible. For it is well known that modern democracy emerged within the framework
of the nation, but in so giving democracy a body through the nation, it later became
democracy’s worst enemy in the form of virulent nationalism. This “terrible dialectic,”
as Manent evocatively calls it, had become manifest in the wars and totalitarian
movements of the past century, and has inspired the desire to altogether detach
democracy from its originating condition. However, Manent argues, this democratic
movement seeks to make “democracy unconditional, to free the democratic soul from the
national body, and to endow democracy with the purity of angels,” which is to deny any
limits or circumscription: thus “democracy could create for itself a body without limits, a
body of indefinite extension, all to ensure that democracy could never become the slave
of its own condition.”250 If this sounds ridiculous, Manent argues it is exactly what the
European Union pretends to be: “‘Europe’ is indeed the astral body of angelic
democracy.” But what is key is for such a development to succeed, Manent writes, is that
“we need to suppose that the human condition has been radically altered such that man as
250
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a political animal has undergone a decisive modification, or else that man is simply no
longer a political animal.” To this he rightly adds: “it is a risky wager to make when
embarking on an enormous political enterprise.” Even as we aspire to construct a world
on the universal principles of equality and rights it is far from self-evident that an
“empire of law” and an “empire of morality” can persist without concomitant political
bodies, or that the law and morality alone can and will be the sole regulator of social
life.251 Thus, it can be said that if “Europe” or “Europeans” do not a community make,
then we are a long way from one of Humanity. The European project’s own failures and
difficulties of coordinating action in a state of formlessness intimate as much.
“Humanity” cannot act, and there is no correlative discourse, or opération, to make such
action possible. In light of Manent’s histoire raisonnée des formes politiques there is no
reason to believe life will be more satisfying or better ordered without a plurality of
properly constituted political bodies. Morevoer, we ought to be weary of the desire to
overcome all divisions and separations in seeking pure universalism, or total unification
of humanity; or at least not be so naïve as to presume no further divisions may follow.252
Thoughtful consideration of Western political history—and of the dynamique de
l’Occident—helps strip us of such risky wagers and dangerous illusions.
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7. MANENT:
THE CITY IN METAMORPHOSIS:
THE WESTERN DYNAMIC AND AMERICAN DYNAMISM
“[I]n the political order, the self and the other have something in common: precisely the political order, the
body politic, the republic that is a common thing. In the political order, as a consequence of this
commonality, there is a sort of active confusion of the self and the other. It is then possible for individuals
to forget themselves and to be willing to sacrifice themselves in a sacrifice that is both selfish and generous,
the patriotic sacrifice.”
—Manent, A World Beyond Politics?, 205

We concluded the preceding chapter by discussing the widespread conviction of
our day, particularly alive among European thinkers since the eighteenth century, that the
only possible meaning of human history is its progress towards the universal. We begin
this chapter by tracing the original problem behind this conviction, or better to say the
problem that this conviction holds to be no longer problematic, namely the theologicopolitical problem. The historical conviction supplants, or at least covers over, this
problem, for it is a problem that gave rise to the political form of the nation; indeed, the
nation was one proposed solution to the theologico-political problem. Manent’s
thoughtful analysis of the nation, at a time when the nation has itself become either
problematic or irrelevant for some, is such that it returns the theologico-political problem
to consciousness while demonstrating the questionability of the progressive historical
conviction. Even as the Church brought the theologico-political problem into full light—
that is to say, Christianity and the Catholic Church heightened the theologico-political
problem—the so-called ‘secularization’ of Europe and the West, and the decreased role
of the Church in Western life, does not negate the original problem, but perhaps obscures
it. The religion of humanity—that is, the strong faith in the ultimate unity of humanity
under the aegis of universal human rights—is, therefore, only the latest proposition
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directed at the problem, even as it is largely oblivious to it.253 Thus, there is no perfect
solution to the problem, but only different, as well as better and worse, modes of living
with, as well as within, it.
In fact, as a number of thinkers have highlighted, the very strength of Western
civilization has come from the tension brought forth by the problem. That is to say, the
spiritual substance of the West derives from its constant grappling with the relationship
between religion and politics. And while Europe, as well as the preponderance of
present-day European intellectuals, seems to hope for more than a resolution to this
tension, insofar as they hope to create a world beyond both religion and politics, the same
cannot be said about America. And while American public life consists of ongoing
debates over religion and politics, it is a nation that was consciously created without
many of the same pressures and powers that gave rise to European nations. Indeed, as
The Federalist famously put it, America is an answer to the question of whether the
establishment of good government could emerge “from reflection and choice” rather than
be “forever destined to depend…on accident and force.”254
Thus, after addressing these concerns, we will turn to discuss the American
exception, in order to demonstrate that America is, on the one hand, an exception to the
ultimate universalizing tendency so prominent in Western Europe, and, on the other hand,
serves as an exception to Manent’s theorizing, due to its political character and
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constitution. America declared its sovereign independence as a nation from the outset,
and founded a government on the basis of its own proper constitution, which likewise
limits the government. To whatever extent observers are inclined to think of America as
approximating a universal state, or empire, or would otherwise like to see America
subordinate to a global scheme of governance, the American Constitution precludes such
possibilities, making it something of an outlier in Manent’s generalized view of things
Western.255

The Theologico-Political Problem I: A Universal Problem
The “theologico-political problem” is a technical phrase with a disputed meaning
that otherwise embraces a complex set of problems. At bottom, it refers to the
relationship between religion and politics—between God, or the gods, on the one hand,
and the city, or human community, on the other. It is neither a new problem, nor one that
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has lost relevance.256 In fact, it has become a matter of renewed interest as of late,
particularly in the wake of the resurgence of religious forms of terrorism and
fundamentalism. That said, for a number of thinkers it ever remained a central problem,
insofar as it is a universal problem—one inherent to the human condition, irrespective of
what might be the level of religiosity of the day. It was of fundamental importance for
Leo Strauss, for example, and Strauss likely did more than any thinker of the twentieth
century to return it to consciousness within modern liberal thought. It appears he even
coined the phrase, “theologico-political problem,” that is now prominently used.257
According to Strauss, the heart of the problem consists of competing sources of
authority—that is, whether the foundations of political authority reside in the claims of
reason or of revelation, or, as Strauss liked to say, in Athens or Jerusalem.258 Thus, as
has often been argued, the matter of sovereignty is at the heart of the problem.259
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For Strauss, the problem can be found, and was explored in classical Greek
thought, but was given especial emphasis by modern thinkers like Spinoza and Hobbes.
Early modern thinkers sought to make religion safe, as it were, for politics, in an age of
great religious controversy and war. For example: “Because, or so long as, men believe
in the power of other men, acting as ministers of powers invisible, to grant them eternal
bliss or eternal torment, theology, according to Hobbes, cannot be separated from
political philosophy.”260 Thus, both Hobbes and Spinoza “try to modify the claims of
religion by a radical reinterpretation of Holy Writ,” not least since both believed men to
be largely moved by their passions, and men in their time were especially passionate
about their religious beliefs. Political philosophy, for them, aimed at reconstructing
men’s religious beliefs. The strategy for this reconstruction was one of modifying
prevailing passions by substituting the objects that most gratify men. Insofar as
religion—or the objects of religion, as well as in the case of ersatz religions—is
gratifying, even by nature, political philosophy cannot avoid the matter: “The
fundamental political book is a theologico-political treatise because it is based upon the
recognition that the relationship between religion and politics is not just an accident of
history, but stems from man’s nature.”261 It was Spinoza’s objective to steer men’s
desires away from God and his Law—that is, his Law as revealed, and thus the
experience of revelation—towards the truth of science, or philosophy, and ultimately
human reason, strictly speaking.
Spinoza sought to offer a new and wholly rational interpretation of the Bible as
well as provide the requisite political structure to establish this interpretation as
260

Laurence Berns, “Thomas Hobbes,” in History of Political Philosophy, 2nd Edition, ed., Leo Strauss and
Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 390.
261
Stanley Rosen, “Benedict Spinoza,” Ibid., 433, 438.

236

politically authoritative, or sovereign. He sought to champion Athens—his Athens, as it
were—over and against Jerusalem. For example, by demonstrating that every miracle
results from natural causes, and that there is a rational approach—a scientific or
philosophic interpretation—to all phenomena, the achievement would be to free peoples
from the violence and bloodshed that occurs on the basis of priestly power and visceral
religious disputations.262 While modern rationalism certainly expanded its reign in the
wake of Hobbes and Spinoza, the debate nonetheless continues as to whether it has, or
even can, offer an exhaustive interpretation of all things. The apparent triumph of reason
over revelation may be just that: the appearance of victory, insofar as modern reason has
more mocked revelation than actually engaged and defeated it on its own terms. Rather
than having epistemologically, or philosophically, refuted the claims of revelation, it has
belittled religion and attacked it rhetorically. So much is seen in the Enlightenment’s
critique of religion, and out of which is born a new set of passions: hope for a peaceful
and unified humanity of the future.263 Part of the difficulty, however, is due to the fact
that the two claims of reason and revelation rest on precisely different—even
incommensurate—terms, and cannot actually refute one another but must stand abreast in
tension.264 This very tension, Strauss has argued, has served as a great source of strength
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for Western civilization, intellectually, spiritually, and politically, for it is not, in truth,
about the tension between rationality and irrationality; rather, two irreconcilable starting
points with two wholly irreconcilable criteria for even establishing the point of departure.
Thus, the difficulty, or better to say the impossibility, of either revelation or reason
(ancient or modern, for that matter) wholly refuting one or the other is what makes the
“theologico-political problem” a universal, and indeed permanent problem. By contrast,
the modern (scientific) denial of the incommensurability between reason and revelation
has been fatal to both revelation and to modern philosophy, whereby the former is no
longer taken seriously (i.e., atheism) and the latter has culminated in the denial of any
rational standards at all (i.e., nihilism). So much is no small part of what is referred to by
Strauss and others as the “crisis of the West.”265 Those treading somewhere between
atheism and nihilism hold firm in their belief of a progressive future. Convinced of a
future with a new international order, such progressives imagine a world constituted by a
global legal apparatus—a rational scheme comprising all the world’s peoples—yet they
fail to acknowledge the very fideistic elements of their own position. There is no rational
Voegelin, such that the object and subject are the same, the only structural difference is the directionality of
the experience: man seeking God or God seeking man. In contrast, Strauss speaks less about Christianity
and takes his point of departure of revelation from the Jewish Law. For Strauss, the objective experience of
revelation is that of revealed law—the Law of God—and is altogether different from philosophical
knowledge. The revealed law in fact establishes the pre-philosophical context that allows for philosophy to
emerge at all, and it erstwhile offers an entire way of life and account of things, in submission to God, that
is ultimately at odds with the searching, inquisitive, and otherwise subjective way of life of philosophic
reason that emerges clandestinely, or better to say, esoterically, in a religious and political context imbued
with a strong sense of law. Thus, it might be said, Strauss largely addresses revelation politically (at least
exoterically), on the basis of what he learned from reading premodern Medieval interpreters of the Law
(e.g., Maimonides, Alfarabi, etc.), while Voegelin does so epistemologically on the basis of his elaboration
of a philosophy of consciousness. Furthermore, a decisive difference between them follows from Strauss’s
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evidence, as it were, that the world will be one day so ordered—that law alone can
govern all peoples, or that politics can be supplanted by law so that sovereignty and selfgovernment ultimately become anachronistic concepts. We return to these matters
below.
It is from the very title of Spinoza’s work, A Theologico-Political Treatise, that
Strauss draws the language for the “problem.” The problem, for Strauss, can be
characterized as operating on two “levels,” those of which have just been indicated,
namely the practical and the theoretical. For, to the extent that there is ever a concern
regarding the misuse or abuse of religion for political power (as well as vice versa),
which may culminate in violence or tyranny, there is the relation between reason and
revelation, or Athens and Jerusalem, as an irresolvable philosophical problem.266
However, Strauss largely focuses on the theoretical, or philosophical side of the problem.
Thus, one may wonder at the fact that the real issue seems to be the challenge to
philosophy from revelation, and why the problem is nonetheless overtly deemed to be
political. The answer, it would seem, as Heinrich Meier puts it, is the following: “it is
only by wrestling first with the concerns of politics that one can work to understand the
framework within which the conflict between revelation and philosophy must take place.”267
After all, as previously noted, reason and revelation provide alternative sources of political
authority.

It has likewise been argued that Strauss employs the term and engages the
problem in the two following senses: the “diagnostic” and the “reconstructive.” The
former refers to Strauss’s interest in the endeavor and successes of early modern thought
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to separate theology from politics, and the latter to his attention to earlier, premodern,
thinkers who “thought it necessary to grapple and live with the tensions, if not
contradictions, that by definition arise from human society.”268 Suffice it to say that the
various questions, approaches, and aspects raised by the broader problem were central to
Strauss’s thinking, such that he could go so far as to label it “the theme of [his]
investigations.” Consequently, there is no shortage of literature on the matter.269

The Theologico-Political Problem II: Through a History of Forms
These preliminary remarks only outline the larger issue, and are but a sketch of
one approach to the problem. But as previously mentioned, Strauss’s thought has been of
especial importance and influence for Manent. However, for our purposes, the difference
in their approach is of greater interest. As can be gathered from the aforementioned,
Strauss’s approach is primarily philosophical, which is to say that he engaged the
problem textually and exegetically. This is not to deny that he had political, or practical,
intentions, for so much of his work was pedagogical; however, he did not historically
situate the problem in any thorough sense. In contrast, Manent’s approach to the problem
is intentionally historical. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Manent makes the theologico-political
problem one of the central axes of his history of political forms. While his analysis is
still textual and exegetical, it is ever mindful of the political institutions and associations,
their real historical interactions, and the outcomes of the tensions and relations between
268
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them. Of especial interest is that the political forms of Europe had to deal with the
Church, and what Manent sometimes calls “the Christian proposition.”
In a work that is largely one of interpretation, as suggested by its title—Histoire
intellectuelle du libéralisme—Manent nonetheless begins by outlining an interpretation
of European history that precedes liberalism. In the Preface he notes that the book is not
“a political history of Europe” at large, “but rather a scale model of this history, a
summary of its major articulations.” Focusing on “major articulations” allows the
observer to interpret history in broad strokes with particular incidents that exemplify key
themes. As guides for this history, he has taken “some of the principal works of political
philosophy, from Machiavelli to Tocqueville,” since, in his view, the history of political
philosophy “sheds the most light on the unfolding of our history and on the nature of our
political regimes.” Manent does not offer a systematic philosophy of history, but is ever
engaging in an “essai sur la dynamique de l’Occident.” As the French, “essai,” would
have it, it is an ongoing attempt, a sustained thoughtful reflection on political history,
which is open-ended. In so doing, Manent draws an immediate relation between theory
and practice, or between texts and regimes. And this is not by accident, for he argues the
following: “A singular feature of the present historical situation is that political thought
and political life are, in modern times, intimately linked. This is something new.”270 The
present is a consequence of conscious decisions made in the past, and made on the basis
of certain new and powerful ideas. Such ideas largely have to do with the relationship
between power and opinion—opinions regarding God, salvation, eternity, and the like—
and thus permutations of theological opinion and political power. What is more is that
the remarkable history of European political development is not simply the past but is our
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present. “Not only are our roots in it, not only does it pervade our memory. Our present
political regime remains determined, in its generating principle, by this origin. Its
singularity still dwells in us because we continue to feel the consequences of the solemn
decisions taken three centuries ago.” Consequently, Manent opens this book of
intellectual history with a chapter entitled, “Europe and the Theologico-Political
Problem.”
The chapter offers a quick overview of a history of forms from the fall of the
Roman Empire, while highlighting the confrontation between the particularity of the polis
and the universality of empire and Church. The polis and empire were the only known
available forms by which to organize, or re-organize political life, after the fall of Rome.
However, with the entrance of the Church, a new dynamic emerged. Despite this, given
the outstanding prestige of Rome and empire in Europe, as well as the continued
emergence of so many powerful cities in its history, it is no insignificant fact that Europe
did not continue to organize itself more or less durably in the form of cities or an empire,
but instead produce a radically new political form. The Church, of course, operates on a
different level since its ultimate objective is not to organize the social and political life of
men; however, it inevitably posed a political problem. For it purports to be a perfect
society, even if on some level an imagined one, and as such cannot help undermining to
some extent the moral constitution and conditions of both the city and empire as given
communities. Manent argues that its principle is “charity,” which speaks directly to its
teachings on virtue and salvation, but is no less a principle that binds men together, and is
therefore inescapably political, even as it points beyond politics. “The mere notion of
charity—love of neighbor for the love of God—opens up perspectives and possibilities
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that are enough to reorder the way we look at the human association.”271 Being at least
in part political, it necessarily posed challenges for overtly political institutions and men.
Insofar as charity never did (nor arguably could) become the ultimate principle animating
political associations—after all, the Church’s own founder stated it is not of this world—
the Church was sufficiently influential to pose a problem but insufficiently strong to
outright govern men politically. The consequences of this can be summarized as follows:
This point must be stressed: the political development of Europe is understandable only as the history of
answers to problems posed by the Church, which was a human association of a completely new kind. Each
institutional response created in its turn new problems and called for the invention of new responses. The
key to European development is what might be called, in scholarly terms, the theologico-political
problem.272

One can see how Manent would find the tension between religion and politics to
be a great source for European strength and creativity, even if in something of an agonic
sense—the necessity to face problems and invent new responses to them requires men to
bring their intellects, imaginations, and wills to bear on matters of importance. Thus, the
theologico-political problem is not only an Ariadne-like thread of interpreting Europe’s
past, but has itself been a vector of European history.273 For part of the problem has to do
with “a remarkable contradiction” at the heart of the Catholic Church; its operation is
logically ambivalent. While the Church grants men the freedom to organize and govern
the temporal sphere themselves—according to their natural reason—it cannot help but
tend towards imposing a theocracy upon them—insofar as their natural reason
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insufficiently realizes truth and the highest good, which the Church professes as the gift
of its founder. Thus, the Church both liberated and constrained at once, freeing the
secular sphere while imposing upon the religious one. Both cities and empires had to
respond to the problem—to this problematic logic—and often did so contentiously. The
competition for authority made for great instability, and the city and empire were only
able to manage for so long. The particularity of the cities gave way to the universality of
the empire, while the empire ever competed in universality with the Church that had a
wider and deeper reach. Such being the case, the great political problem for Europe that
emerged was that “the nonreligious, secular, lay world had to be organized under a form
that was neither city-state nor empire, a form less ‘particular’ than the city-state and less
‘universal’ than the empire, or whose universality would be different from that of
empire.” Presented in mathematical form, Manent summarizes as follows: “given the
characteristics of the Catholic Church, find the political form X that makes it possible to
ensure the secular world’s independence.”274 The apparent answer to the problem—the
form that was sufficiently but neither overtly particular or universal—first emerged as the
absolute or national monarch.
The king made no extended claims to universal monarchy, and thereby was not at
odds with the Church’s universality, while he nevertheless paid homage to the teachings
of the Church and Christian virtues. This new national but Christian king could appeal to
“divine right” but did so within the limits of his realm, and thereby avoided threatening
the universality of the Church outright. This both placated the Church and allowed for
distance or independence of the political body from the Church, bringing about a new
sort of balance. Additionally, the people of the realm had greater freedoms from political
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life than those in city-states; they were not as consumed by the energy of the latter, which
we discussed previously. The people could therefore pursue with greater zeal what
Machiavelli famously called “the things of this world”—or, if so inclined, the things of
heaven, as it were. Nevertheless, the people were subordinate to their monarch, and were
in a position of obedience to him, which was in accordance with the general disposition
of the Church and its hierarchical view. In sum, monarchy and the Church were more
compatible with one another than were the Church and the city-states.
However, as Manent insightfully points out, this new national monarchy
“appeared to be less a regime than a process,” for with time, each such monarchy slowly
tended towards absolutism and eventually incorporated the Church within its borders.
The kingdom became the “nation” once it became the supreme political body, while the
clergy were brought under the imposition of the civil laws. So much is one part of the
emergent history of sovereignty.275 This unfolding process was the king’s continued
action, as the monarchy continually worked towards establishing the political body as a
whole, independent from the Church. The nation, as Manent says, “could come into
being only through the action of the form itself, of what is the most formal in the form—
that is, its unity. The entering wedge of the nation-to-be was the Christian king. The
European nation came into being through obedience to the Christian king.”276 While the
king as head of the nation speaks to the substance, or soul, of the new political form, to
be sure, the body of each nation was contingent upon various things natural and human,
which contributed to the variety of the European peoples. But at heart, the body of the
form served as “a kind of mean between the powerful localism of the city (a Florentine
275
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citizen is loath to venture very far from the Ponte Vecchio) and the imperial impulse to
look toward unsubdued regions beyond the horizon (there is always an expedition being
prepared against the Parthians).”277
Alongside this mean—or in this mix—was the continued importance of charity,
which teaches that each human being is one’s neighbor, mitigating the pressures of those
naturally close while drawing closer together those farther away. Charity “weakens the
grasp of localism while it assuages the vertigo of faraway domination.” In short, this
virtue helped shape the perspective and imagination of the nation. So much was an
important step along the way to the eventual emergence of the secular, neutral, abstract,
or simply modern, state.278 The continued presence of charity, embodied in the church’s
teaching, if not in its own universal and politically unmediated presence, in what Manent
refers to as the “conjunction of a neutral state and a Christian nation,” all of which
approximated something of a solution to the original theologico-political problem as
conceived by Manent.
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This original and dynamic form of European monarchy “set history in motion,”
Manent argues, and we are still living with the consequences. Modern politics and its
concomitant concepts were born in, and emerge from, this “polemical situation”—a
situation where different forms of human association were at odds with one another in
terms of their structure and orientation, their degree of universality and their principle,
and the drive to separate the powers in and of this world from the opinions regarding
God, salvation, and eternity. The “conjunction” of modern state and nation allowed
European peoples to each chart their own course, under their own set of laws and
institutions, with a connection to past traditions alongside the freedom to act in the
present. Each nation, as Manent repeatedly underlines, may be understood to be a
particular window into the universal—each nation representing a part of humanity at
large.
Manent’s political science and his approach to the theologico-political problem
take off from where Strauss left off—in terms of the alternatives of revelation and reason
as sources of authority—resulting in something like a simultaneous complication and
simplification of the problem. Revelation and reason, examined politically, may each be
seen to be either universal (e.g., universal Church, universal empire), or particular (e.g.,
ancient civic religion or national church, on the one hand, polis or homogeneous nation,
on the other hand). The dynamic of the West has been fertile and complex as a result of
the competing political forms that otherwise extend and contract in size as a well as have
their wellsprings of authority in more or less universal or particular sources. The
theologico-political problem takes on a truly historical and live sense in reading Manent;
it is no mere intellectual problem, but underpins both the thought and action of the West.
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To be sure, the more recent history of the nation is well known, regarding the
withering of Christian charity and its supplanting by an eventually toxic form of
imperialism and nationalism. In today’s Europe, however, both Christianity and national
sovereignty have been largely curtailed. Furthermore, any notion of a transcendent
destiny is discarded, which is to say that the theologico-political problem appears to be
solved once and for all.279 Revelation—universal or particular—is dismissed as
irrational, and reason is circumscribed by the logic of human rights, the legal
manifestation of the sentiment of humanity. Europe presents itself as the embodiment of
such an unfolding; as proof of the historical progression towards an “empire of universal
fellow-feeling.” The once-problematic matter of discovering and establishing the most
legitimate source of authority—in either divine or human wisdom—and the equally
difficult matter of how to properly mediate or represent it—linguistically, institutionally,
and otherwise—has been supplanted by the conviction that History is the source of truth,
and its veracity emerges in universal form. The progressive unfolding of history will
deliver people towards a more peaceful, less divisive, and ultimately unified existence on
the level of humanity, under a rationally orchestrated legal structure.
What might be called the progressivist’s dream, is a vision of the future
constituted by the act of doing away with the nation, and therefore all national
constitutions, since the nation’s logic is condemned to be one of virulent nationalism—
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the nation is passé, and those defending it are retrograde. More than do away with the
nation, however, the progressivist perspective sees no substantial need for anything
particular to hold human things together, other than the vague notion of universal
humanity itself. It is a vision of post-political world. Thus, elements of human life that
bind individuals to the past, to a place, to a religion, or to a given tradition and a
particular culture, are equally dismissed. This dismissal, however, likewise results in the
inhibiting, if not inability, of peoples to govern themselves, which is to say that particular
peoples will no longer have the freedom to choose to act as a smaller collective on
matters of politics and policy, not least of all with respect to self-defense. For without a
common language, a particular set of institutions, and a known and established tradition,
no basis or means exist for individuals as a particular group to act. The nebulous
bureaucracy of an emergent world government, the international legal community and
transnational courts, NGO activists, or idealist scholars—all unelected and
unaccountable—would seem to replace the erstwhile consensual, national, sovereign, and
constitutional community. If it is the strange dream of some, it remains the nightmare of
others, and is far from being a self-evident reality outside of Western Europe. Among the
most resistant in the West to this dismissal is America. And its resistance is perfectly
consistent with its foundation, as well as with the American peoples’ understanding of
self-government.

Exceptional America: A Formal People, or a People with Constitutional Form
America has always been a political experiment where the particular and
universal have been in tension, where politics and religion have coexisted and contended,
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and where the nation has assumed a different form than in the European context.
America retains a particular form while its citizens nevertheless understand themselves to
be a universal example to the rest of humanity. Moreover, America has increasingly
become something of a workshop for progressivist ideas, yet one where the debate
continues with vigor—both defenders and detractors are alive in the national
conversation—such that the jury is out regarding the success of proleptic prophets of
universalism. America is therefore the perfect topic for discussion to both conclude the
present dissertation and to question some of Manent’s views on the West in general. For
there is reason to believe that rather than submit, America will remain sovereign, by
remaining true to its founding as a formal people, thus retaining, through adherence to its
constitution, a proper and particular political form.
In the 2004 “Preface to the American Edition” of his work, A World Beyond
Politics?, Manent notes the audience for whom he initially intended the book, namely
students at Paris’s Institut d’Etudes politiques as well as the general French readership,
adding that it was his hope to offer an “impartial overview of the political order—or
disorder—of today’s world.” Therein he suggests that while something of a rift has
emerged between Europe and America, there is much more that remains in common. The
two sides, he argues, are “being driven apart by the very thing which is supposed to hold
them together—their common commitment to democracy,” and while both sides identify
with democracy, each understands it in different, or possibly opposing, ways. He
summarizes his oft-made argument about the European project of “building Europe,” and
its problematic proposal for a “pure democracy,” whereby the regime is separated from
any sense of a people; that is, of creating a democracy without a people, and thereby
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breaking altogether with the past. Manent then argues that the opposite development in
America is taking place insofar as its people “seem more than ever willing—and this
disposition extends well beyond the partisans of the current administration—to identify
everything they do and everything they are with democracy, as such.” Thus, he charges,
“Americans increasingly identify American democracy with the universal as such.”
While the two positions appear at odds, Manent concludes that at bottom, there is
something deeply similar: there is an equal degree of discounting “the political and
human meaning of a mankind naturally divided among different peoples.” Drawing
Americans and Europeans together, it appears that each understand the right and just
political ordering of the world as a mere extension of their own “brands of democracy.”
Both Americans and Europeans, he concludes, “wildly exaggerate the docility or
plasticity of the peoples of the world, including Western peoples.” The real consequence
of such an error is to misunderstand the extent and limits of Western power in the world.
There is certainly some truth to what Manent writes here, for Americans have,
since the beginning, and sometimes with more or less justification, been accused of
universalizing their way of life, or of establishing it as a—even, the—universal standard
of political right. Yet, while the American Founders genuinely believed themselves to be
embarking on a novel experiment in government that would provide an important
example to the rest of the world’s peoples, they were also very conscious of certain
limitations—inherent to human nature and with respect to the intractability of the
political world. If certain latter day Americans have held beliefs regarding the plasticity
of the world’s people, their projects have been checked anew by reality’s constraints,
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thereby affirming the wisdom of the Founders. Over the course of the history of
American foreign policy “reality therapy” has continually reset thought and action.280
Thus, if America has consistently sought to establish and maintain order in the
world, it has been conscious of the continued sources, and the very likelihood, of
disorder. Americans then and now, while understanding their regime to be exceptional
and exemplary, have overwhelmingly engaged the world with full regard of the
importance of the state and the persistent reality of a world of multiple polities. To the
extent that Americans see themselves as a light unto the political universe, and that others
may be so inspired to mimic them, they likewise understand the landscape to be a
pluriverse, and that any such mimicry will occur within the confines of other peoples’
borders. If, therefore, America can be characterized as a “dangerous nation,” it is largely
because Americans have in turn consistently seen the world outside to be one filled with
threats.281 However, a world of multiple sovereign states, filled with competing powers
that may come into conflict with each other, is also understood to have a positive side,
insofar as it is a world where different peoples are free to pursue their own ways of life.
So much itself is an image of the American ideal of freedom.
America, therefore, has neither given up on its own political form, nor on the fact
that other communities with a variety of forms and substance have and will continue to
emerge. As Jeremy Rabkin has noted, while many people in today’s world no longer find
national independence to be self-evident, “[g]iven its own constitutional history and
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culture, the United States was bound to resist,” and indeed has resisted, nearly all
measures that subordinate individual states to transnational courts, laws, and global
institutions.282 While many European nations have already surrendered large amounts of
decision-making powers and areas of sovereign authority to the European Union,
Americans and America remain sovereign. There are, to be sure, certain Americans who
would like to limit American sovereignty in the same way that European nations are
doing; however, they must first constitutionally transform America.283 It would
ultimately require an act of destruction for the sake of creation that most Americans
would surely resist.284 The impact of elites in modern societies is of no mere minor
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constraints of the tribe or the empire, without inviting the political instability of the polis” (253); “the
nation-state is…a sort of compromise between the tribe and the empire in the demands it makes on
identity”; through representative institutions it “seems to offer a compromise between the intensely
politicized and unstable direct democracy of the city-state and the denial of all political accountability in
the empire” (255). Sovereignty is central to all such compromises “because it supplies the idea of a
political authority which can accommodate differences—precisely because it is distinguished from private
life—and yet still demand (and sustain) ultimate political allegiance.”
283
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(New York: Encounter Books, 2011), 176-77. For an account advocating this view, see, Strobe Talbott,
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degree, not least of all with respect to matters such as law and war.285 Nevertheless,
Americans guard their sovereignty with pride; they continue to exhibit that “irritable
patriotism” that Tocqueville witnessed in his travels. And contrary to what certain
modern elites argue, patriotism is a perfectly natural human sentiment, even as it may be
more or less rational, as Toqueville likewise distinguished.286 The most obvious sphere
wherein this truth holds for Americans—as often as it apparently no longer does for many
Europeans—is in the international, diplomatic, and martial one.287
The questions and concerns surrounding national security were front and center
during the founding debates and are inscribed within the constitutional arrangement that
continues to shape American institutions, opinions, mores, and actions. That said, the
issue of national security is by no means a simple one, and has always been part of a
competing set of problems, in tension with questions of liberty, virtue, and related aspects
of the American way of life with its aspiration to the good. However, precisely because it
is situated in direct relation with other pressing concerns, national security remains an
ever-present problem both intellectually and practically. Thus, Americans remain awake
to the human political condition—Americans generally remain political realists, in the
broadest sense of the term288—and irrespective of their humanitarianism, or their display

285

For a general discussion of the phenomenon, engaged systematically and thematically by chapter, see,
Thomas Sowell’s Intellectuals and Society (New York: Basic Books, 2011).
286
For naturalistic accounts of the naturalness of patriotism, and even of the nation itself, see, Robert
Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative (New York: Atheneum, 1966); and, Roger Masters, The Nature of
Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), esp. 117-87.
287
While it may be true that “contemporary Europe is a search for an exit from hell,” due to the
slaughterhouse that spanned from Verdun to Auschwitz, which so exhausted Europeans to the point of
imagining “a world in which all conflicts were economic and bureaucrats in Brussels managed them all,”
George Friedman has forecasted “Europe’s return to history,” and present-day events suggest he is not off
the mark. Whether or not Europeans will in fact mobilize for action in history remains to be seen.
Friedman, The Next Decade: Empire and Republic in a Changing World (New York: Anchor Books,
2011), 142ff.
288
Consider Robert Kagan’s Of Paradise and Power (New York: Vintage, 2004), which draws striking
contrasts between American and European views on politics and the world. He characterizes Americans as

254

of certain tendencies towards the universal, America remains an exceptional nation, as
well as an exception to Manent’s theorizing about the West. The remainder of this
chapter offers a brief overview of how ultimately—or better to say, foundationally—
America has and will likely continue to be a formally sovereign democracy.
The American constitution explicitly constitutes both a people and a government,
and indeed, in the words, “We the People,” it makes very clear that a self-consciously
sovereign people exist. This is not to deny the pluralism of Americans, and exactly when
a truly “American” perspective emerged is much debated. “It would seem to be conceded
on all sides, however, that a new political culture came to startling maturity in the
creative period we call the founding.”289 Despite the vast diversity of America, past and
present, the American people have their constitution in common, insofar as they are
governed under the Constitution. The Constitution explicitly establishes a political form
to provide the means of self-government for its people, so that American citizens
themselves may have the freedom to act, shape their destiny in the world as they decide,
and otherwise sovereignly legislate, execute, and judiciously review their own laws, at
both the federal and state levels. The Constitution offers no room or possibility for
Hobbesians, still aware of the world’s dangers and the concomitant need to use force, and Europeans as
Kantians, believing that a global network of legal institutions establishing peace is around the corner,
relegating the use of force to a backward way of thinking and acting. The work opens with the following
stark lines: “It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world,
or even that they occupy the same world.” The argument is elaborated, albeit from a different angle with
something of a different intention, in, The World America Made (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012).
Compare with, Jürgen Habermas, The Divided West (Malden: Polity Press, 2006), which laments that
America is so committed to sovereignty and not more Kantian in its commitment to global norms and
universal human rights that transcend the authority of national governments. In broader terms, the division
can be examined through Fonte’s categories, elaborated in Sovereignty or Submission, of democratic
sovereigntists versus global governancers, which he argues represent “incompatible worldviews” that will
be “locked in ideological combat throughout the twenty-first century” (182-87, et passim). The global
governance project is the only serious ideological challenger within the West, as radical Islam (a form of
violent antidemocratic transnationalism) and authoritaian (nondemocratic) nationalism as found in China
and Russia, are external alternatives, or challenges, to liberal democratic sovereigntists.
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legislative power to be delegated to authorities operating outside of the Constitution
itself, such as international or trans-national bodies. Any treaty entered into by the
United States government is done so, and becomes binding, because the government
itself has agreed to do so; however, the Constitution itself restricts the government in its
treaty powers, not least in the most fundamental sense of not granting a treaty supremacy
over the Constitution, substituting a treaty for the Constitution, or in any way altering the
Constitution by way of a treaty.290 So much is basic truth, notwithstanding the efforts of
certain trans-national operatives, activists, lawyers and scholars, to maneuver outside or
around the Constitution to effect change in the American government and its activities.
From the beginning, the Founders had consciously been involved in what is often
called “state formation.” The argument of The Federalist Papers can be seen “as an
attempt to convince the American public about the need to build a powerful state and to
explain how this state would work.”291 The need for America to establish a strong state
arose from the challenge of facing powerful and efficient “fiscal-military states” in
Europe—that is, states with professional armies, navies, public debts, and large revenues,
as was standard among European powers of the eighteenth century. “A state that did not
possess these institutions was exposed to the states that did.” The exigencies and
constraints of the international system, therefore, framed the alternatives facing the
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Founders.292 Of course, in addition to concerns regarding “foreign war,” the Founders
sought to secure against the dangers of “domestic convulsion.” Thus: “To a very great
extent…The Federalist determines the role of government with reference only, or
primarily, to the extremes of external and internal danger.”293
In this context the Founders—both Federalists and Anti-Federalists—shared what
one scholar has called the “unionist paradigm,” which consisted of a variety of questions
addressing “two competing fears—of the anarchy of states and the despotism of
consolidated empire—and two mutually interdependent values: independence and
union.”294 While disparate and sometimes opposing views existed on how best to keep
such fears at bay and realize these values, the writing and ratification of the Constitution
may be viewed as a “peace pact,” settled among the particular sovereign states, which has
been no small achievement. However, success on this smaller national scale does not
logically give rise to any assumption of extended success on a global scale.
Having so intentionally formed a particular state—ensouling the political body,
as it were, with the constitution—the bottom line is that due to its constitutional
arrangement and traditions, it is less prone to enter into the framework of international

292

Ibid., 220. Edling is careful not to follow the sociological tradition of state-formation by saying the
international system, with its pressures of war and competition, determine the development of states in an
absolute sense, for while certain pressures exist, the state can nonetheless be formed according to “different
trajectories.” Ibid., 221.
293
Martin Diamond, “The Federalist,” in American Political Thought: The Philosophic Dimension of
American Statesmanship, ed., Morton J. Frisch and Richard G. Stevens (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Publishing
Co., 1971), 62.
294
David C. Hendrickson, Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 2003), 14ff. Hendrickson distinguishes the unionist paradigm from “liberal ideology” and
the “republican paradigm” that historians generally use to characterize and categorize early American
thought. While not disputing the relevance of these ideas, he argues that there is a deeper problem and set
of questions. “Both liberal ideas of consent and individual rights, on the one hand, and republican ideas of
civic virtue and community, on the other, were thus immensely complicated by the existence in America of
different conceptions of the commonwealth—centering on state, section, and nation—to which the idea of
consent, the vindication of individual rights, or the sentiment of virtue was appropriate.

257

institutions or into schemes of global governance that others today find so enticing.295
“The Constitution does not allow Americans to experiment with implant surgery on their
common political body—not at least without first changing the Constitution.”296
Consequently, as long as it remains true to its Founding, America exemplifies what
Manent calls the Western dynamic of self-government.
To be sure, America does not altogether deny the legitimacy of international law,
for the Founders spoke of the law of nations, and supported traditional views of
international law, such as was succinctly formulated by Vattel in his work of 1758, Le
Droit des gens, as “the law of sovereigns.”297 Thus: “The founders plainly understood
that the nation could not flourish, or even survive, without giving due respect to the laws
that governed peaceable relations among sovereign states.”298 The idea of genuinely
inter-national (rather than supra-national) institutions was something familiar and
welcomed by them, whereby sovereign states could better coordinate their activities and
cooperate as a result. The Founders were certainly interested in defending individuals’
rights—the inalienable rights with which each is endowed—the violations of such rights
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having led to the outbreak of Revolution and the founding of a new government in the
first place. However it was their belief that such rights could only be effectively
defended by a strong federal government, one limited in important regards, and as such
mindful of the peoples’ aversion to government. So much was borne out in the
elaboration of federalism, to which we return below. In short, it had been concluded that
no powers beyond or outside the framework of the people’s constitution could more
successfully meet the aim of securing individual and collective rights of Americans.
To the extent that national independence may today be less of a self-evident
claim, Rabkin poignantly reminds us, “American independence was launched with a
Declaration.” And while Americans felt obliged to justify such independence,
acknowledging that others might hold different views, even at odds with the truths that
Americans hold to be “self-evident,” such a Declaration continues to emphasize “the
readiness of the United States to fight for American independence.”299 American
independence, moreover, is inextricable from the right of consent to government, not
least considering American independence followed upon the British violation of this
natural right. “The case for the independence of ‘one people’ from another rests on the
right of revolution that ‘the people’ have against their own government, whenever that
government becomes destructive of the rights it was instituted to secure.”300
Independence and consent are, it may be said, two sides of the same right, both of which
rest upon the fact that all men are equal in these rights. Independence and consent are
two fundamental aspects of self-government, for men cannot govern themselves if they
are not independent, nor can they be said to be mutually and equally engaging in
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governing without consenting, as such. To elaborate on the matter, it is worth quoting
Jefferson, from A Summary View of the Rights of British America, where he writes:
“From the nature of things, every society must at all times posses within itself the
sovereign powers of legislation.” Commenting upon this passage, Harvey Mansfield
adds the following: “The foundation of liberty is the supremacy of the legislative power;
and this supremacy is understood not merely as a principle of internal organization but
chiefly as the reason for the divisions of human beings into independent peoples. It is
through political organization that men are united into a people, and by virtue of their
union, divided from other peoples.”301 Giving up one’s independence is akin to
absolving one’s right to self-government; hoping to supplant the sovereign legislative
capacity of distinct peoples through a supra-governmental structure that has no proper
foundation or consent of the various peoples is precisely what Manent fears Europeans
are in the process of doing as they slowly dismantle not only their borders, but their
independent political forms and sovereign, as well as national, legislative powers.302
American independence and self-government does not face such a threat, not least due to
the difference in the American form. Furthermore, in stark contrast to the present
European project, America was founded with the consent of the people through the
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process of ratification, while giving birth to a new kind of government in the form of a
federal system that consciously balances the particular and universal.
While the American people are often referred to as a “nation,” as the word has
come to have less strict signification, it should be underlined that Americans are of a
distinct kind compared with European nations. As previously mentioned, America was
founded upon reflection and choice, and so is distinct by emerging not over the course of
a long period of time, but, as Machiavelli liked to say, was founded at “a stroke.” To be
sure, America has now been in existence for some time, and there have been changes
within the regime, as well as perhaps to the regime, but its original form remains largely
present and indeed formative. Moreover, the American people did not emerge by way of
what later became known as the right of national “self-determination.” Virulent forms of
nationalism do not logically follow from the doctrine of popular sovereignty, as the
American example proves. As just discussed, the Declaration of Independence makes no
such claim to self-determination (of a cultural, historical, traditional or other variety), but
rests upon the idea of free and independent government. The Declaration “is not a
document of nationalism arguing for the necessity of revolution in giving expression to
national aspirations.” Indeed, “it is as little a document of internationalism as of
nationalism.”303 The Declaration made possible a choice for the American people—the
political choice par excellence—after declaring their independence from Britain due to
the violation of their right to consent and free government, on the basis of the right of
revolution. The Declaration granted the people of the United States the “most
comprehensive choice that men can have or presume to have: how to govern themselves
for their mutual safety and happiness.” As a consequence of this choice, the people
303
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adopted the Constitution that outlined the kind of government that was thereby founded.
American nationalism is therefore best categorized as a form of constitutional
nationalism (or patriotism), which nevertheless may contain greater or lesser degrees of
emotion and sentiment, but is different in form from various European varieties.304 Not
to any particular administration, but to the government as constituted and thus to the
Constitution itself—to what might be described as the universal values inherent in the
Constitution—Americans pledge their allegiance: to the particular government of the
people with the express aim of securing their safety and happiness. Needless to say,
achieving the latter rests upon guaranteeing the former.
From the beginning, the reality and idea of America centered on the problem of
the nation’s sovereign ability to govern and defend itself. The debates surrounding the
Constitution that would eventually replace the Articles of Confederation indicate the
centrality of national defense as an issue. In the Federalist Papers, Madison refers to the
“security against foreign danger” as “one of the primitive objects of civil society” and
adds that it is “an avowed and essential object of the American union” (41; 208). To the
question of whether the power of declaring war is necessary, he writes, that no man could
possibly answer in the negative, and it would be altogether superfluous to even “enter
into a proof of the affirmative.” Thus, there must be sufficient power granted by the
constitution to the federal government to raise armies, equip fleets, and carry out all
requisite activities involved in the power of self-defense; so much is itself the precursor
304
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to the possibility for domestic self-government. Not only is sufficient power granted, but
what is required is in fact what Madison describes as “indefinite power.” He reiterates in
part what Hamilton already discussed in an earlier passage, where it is made clear that the
powers essential to the care of the common defense “ought to exist without limitation”
(23; 113). The reason for such limitlessness rests upon the impossibility of being able “to
foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent
extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.” What is more,
Hamilton underlines that the very “circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are
infinite.”
So potentially dangerous is the world—in its infinite permutations of danger—that
the power of national defense must be correspondingly vast to address it. No man can
possibly know the modes, means, kinds, and sources of future threats; however, one can
be assured such threats will arise. Consequently, “no constitutional shackles can wisely
be imposed on the power” entrusted with national security. The federal government
established by the American constitution was designed to provide the tools and energy
for whatever action might be necessary to defend the country. The preservation of
independent republicanism necessitates a mighty fighting force. However, as Max
Edling has argued, the American Constitution sought to establish this strength in a
manner distinct from European states: “The Federalist program should…be seen as an
attempt to combine the elements from the European state with respect for limits to state
expansion inherent in the American political tradition and American political
institutions.”305
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It should be underlined that national strength is argued to be the case both during
times of war and peace. Furthermore, the entirety of these statements made regarding
national security and the constitutional means of defense must be considered in light of
the long view held by the Founders. As Hamilton writes (34; 163):
In pursuing this inquiry, we must bear in mind, that we are not to confine our view to the present period,
but to look forward to remote futurity. Constitutions of civil government are not to be framed upon a
calculation of existing exigencies; but upon a combination of these, with the probable exigencies of ages,
according to the natural and tried course of human affairs.

Hamilton goes on to speak about the error of deducing foundational rules based on the
present situation, or even what might be narrowly imagined. The government must have
the capacity to address future contingencies, which cannot be known in their
particularities at this point, but are likely to arise and follow “the natural and tried course
of human affairs.” He therefore encourages his contemporaries to broaden their
imaginations well beyond quotidian politics to consider a broader “course,” which itself
can only be vaguely grasped, and yet from which certain important principles can be
derived—that is, immutable truths of politics. This “natural and tried course” is one that
can be studied, understood, and expected, in general terms.

formation, which, among other things, he argues, helps to make sense of the prevalence of matters military
and fiscal. He buttresses his argument by comparison with a discussion of European state-formation. His
interpretation is one that seeks, as he says, to go beyond a Madisonian understanding of the constitution,
insofar as he addresses broader sources of both Federalists and Anti-Federalists, which culminates in the
following: “What the Federalists had to do, and what they did, in the debate over ratification, was to
develop a conceptual framework that made it possible to accommodate the creation of a powerful national
government to the strong anti-statist current in the American political tradition” (219). The latter tradition,
Edling demonstrates, is best captured by the Antifederalists, who did not devise their own alternative plan
for a national government but largely brought forth a critique of the Constitution. They nonetheless made
an important contribution to the founding: “they did so precisely by being nothing more than the bearers of
the anti-statist arguments of the Country tradition” (222). Although the popular fear or aversion to
government may have been strong in early modern Europe as well, the American situation differed by
being able to translate this “aversion into action,” due to differences in “the socioeconomic structure and
the political system—among the most important factors were the equal distribution of property and the
absence of legal privileges, the widespread suffrage, and the short terms of government office.”
Furthermore: “the government’s administrative weakness coupled with dominant political ideals made it
possible to govern only with the cooperation of the governed” (222).
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Knowledge of this “course” consists of at least two parts that otherwise underlie
the Federalists’ strong argument regarding national defense. The first argument is the
general understanding of human nature held by the Founders, which today remains a part
of the American self-understanding. The relationship between human nature and
government may be said to be the central problem of political science, and so much is no
less true for the political science of the Federalists, as indicated by Madison’s famous
rhetorical question, “But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on
human nature?” (51; 269). The Founders were well aware of the ambivalence of man’s
pride and ambition, his tendency to succumb to base instincts and appetites, and
otherwise fall short of the good, even as he may seek to know it and aspire to it, in
politics and elsewhere. Thus, to whatever extent politics involves the pursuit of the good,
it is an activity that inevitably falls short of perfection.
Notwithstanding certain Enlightenment ideals of the day, the Federalists were
clear about a certain intractability in human nature: “Is it not time to awake from the
deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our
political conduct, that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote
from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?” (6; 25). The debate and
design of the Constitution and the institutions to which it gave rise reflect this truth, and
while present-day progressives seek such a dream anew, reality and the broader will of
the American public continue to press back upon such conceits. The second argument is
a reasoned account of the weaknesses of confederacies, which in turn gave rise to the
compromise known as federalism. Based on historical study and ample evidence, the
Federalists conclude that anything less than a strong national government has little
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likelihood of enduring. In a world of competing states, the attempt to amalgamate
multiple communities in a loose association without a properly binding tie is tantamount
to political irresponsibility, and yet this tie—to carry the metaphor—it was argued, must
in turn be restricted in the degree to which it could be tightly drawn. While America is
heavily involved in international endeavors and actions of various kinds, it continues to
refrain from signing certain treaties, or “pooling” its sovereignty, with organizations that
would stand athwart or above its own federal constitution. The limited degree to which
America has tended towards universalism rests in the weight and powers retained by the
states, just as America’s success in avoiding fragmentation (or anarchy) within out of
particularist claims by the states, is due to the weight and powers granted to the federal
government.
Before elaborating on federalism, returning to the aforementioned argument there
is little denying that the Federalists had a most balanced view of human nature, aware of
both the heights and depths—the virtues and vices—of which men were capable, based
on both a theoretical and practical understanding of man: “As there is a degree of
depravity in mankind, which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust: so
there are other qualities in human nature, which justify a certain portion of esteem and
confidence” (55; 291). Thus, they were “disposed to view human nature as it is, without
either flattering its virtues, or exaggerating its vices” (76, 395). This realist disposition,
combining a measure of “circumspection and distrust” with “esteem and confidence” led
the Founders to believe there was a need to not only encourage virtue, as political science
had sought to do since its inception, but also to set certain vices against one another—that
is, to channel particular passions. Rather than transform or do away with man’s
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passionate nature, a properly designed constitution would rationally guide human
passions to the point that individuals could govern themselves. Chief among the passions
is the one most important for politics, namely ambition. The summit of ambition might
be said to be the love of fame, which Hamilton refers to as “the ruling passion of the
noblest minds” (72, 375).
Ambition, to be sure, is an ambivalent passion, insofar as it can indeed rule over
noble minds, or be directed towards noble ends; however, it is equally capable of
overextending itself, as well as becoming altogether self-serving. The nobly ambitious
may raise themselves while bettering the lives of others, ruling over them to their benefit,
whereas the ignobly ambitious may use others as merely means to their own glory. The
Federalist makes it clear that “ambition must be made to counteract ambition” (51, 268),
for while virtue may direct people towards proper action, relying upon virtue alone makes
for a precarious situation. The entire institutional apparatus of the constitution, consisting
of the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the recurrence of elections, speaks to the
Founders’ insight into human nature—that while virtue can be promoted, ambition must
be relied upon to spur action, and yet ambition itself must be counterchecked by a force
equal in strength, namely ambition itself.306 Indeed, it has been said that the very
“principle of countervailing passion…was the foundation of the new state” in America.307
For truly, “ambition and avarice” are two of the greatest threats that sever or dissolve the
“sacred knot, which binds the people of America together” (15, 68)
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The power and ambiguity of the love of fame in the souls of men is additionally
comparable in force to the love of wealth. Money may certainly be put to better or worse
uses, and after all, founding a commercial republic, the Founders were well aware of the
difficult task of both fostering such material desires and seeking to keep them within the
exigencies of the good of the republic. According to the Federalists, the “love of wealth”
is arguably “as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory” (6, 23).
And it is these two passions that most strongly manifest themselves in the international
sphere, found as they are in the activities of commerce and war. They were under no
illusions that such passions could be eliminated in the human soul; taming them is no
small feat, and they could only expect to succeed in affecting any positive change
domestically, through a legally-ordered republic at home. The founding of such an order
was a major accomplishment, replacing as it did the previously weak confederacy among
states. To think that a certain confederation among all nations could definitively bring
about peace would have been deemed fantastical by the Founders, for the achievement of
peace among the American states was itself a grand achievement, not to mention even at
the time one without certainty regarding its long-term success.
The Federalists make explicit the insufficiency of the Articles of Confederation
for preserving the union; indeed, there is reference to the “impending anarchy” and the
need to be rescued from the “material imperfections” of the erstwhile system among
independent states (15, 69). The Federalist Papers offers and analyzes a history of
confederacies, which in essence reads as a history of failure. Previous confederacies
have ended either in natural or violent deaths. In the latter case, resort to armed force to
compel members has culminated in civil war and despotism. In the case of natural
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deaths, confederacies have dissolved because there is insufficient enforcement to compel
members. The “proud and selfish love of power” has led to fragmentation within
confederacies, as has the general reluctance of particular states to be the first making
sacrifices for the good of the whole. Even “the most considerable” of the confederacies
from antiquity, namely that of the Grecian republics under the Amphyctionic council,
ultimately resulted in weakness, disorder, and finally destruction (18, 84-5). As Madison
makes clear, such arrangements often seem sufficient in theory “and upon paper,” but
very different, in the end, is “the experiment from the theory.”
Hamilton directly exhorts his countrymen, in light of the weakness of the present
structure, in the following way: “let us make a firm stand for our safety, our tranquility,
our dignity, our reputation” (15, 70). Listing safety and tranquility first, Hamilton
underlines the primacy of national defense, while directly linking this with dignity and
reputation as well, all of which can only be achieved and maintained through an
independent people’s action in the world. A major flaw of the confederacy—a fact to
which all parties admit, irrespective of their views on the newly proposed constitution—
is that “the government of the United States is destitute of energy.” While the formal
authority granted to Congress by the Articles of Confederation was, at least in principle,
strong, in actual fact Congress was an agent of the sovereign state governments,
precluding any truly competent national power.308 A strong and independent national
government, was deemed the only means of avoiding anarchy. However, the true
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uniqueness of this government as constituted, especially when compared with the
European nations that Manent has in mind, is its structure of federalism. Federalism, as
devised by the American Founders, is America’s key to balancing the universal and the
particular—it is the central component of American moderation. After all, at the
Constitutional Convention in large part the solution to the impasse among advocates of a
unitary government versus those who advocated ultimately maintaining the sovereignty
of the states is known as the Great Compromise.
To recall what we have previously discussed, among the many things one learns
from studying Manent’s history of forms, is just how remarkable a process it was for the
European nation to come about, and how equally striking it is that Europeans are now
willing to reject it. It is as though the European discovery and implementation of the
principle of sovereignty was so successful as to be too successful. While certainly
unaware of what was in store for the European nations in the twentieth century, the
American Founders sought an alternative to the empires and city-states of past and
present, as well as something different from the traditional unitary form of state that
unfolded in Europe. Indeed, the distinctness of America resides in its “federative
system,” distinguished as a genuine attempt “to find a middle ground between anarchy
and empire through cooperative ventures among states”—that is, cooperative on the
national level among individual states within the union.309
It might be said that in founding a sovereign and united American state, the
Founders remained aware of the limitations of sovereignty even as they worked to
implement such a principle. After all, the federal government they constituted had to
reckon with the power and sovereignty of the existing states while establishing strength
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within the federal government. This challenge resulted in devising something new—
something akin to a layered republic, or a republic upon republics. Despite the strength
and energy of the national (or general) government, the states retain reserved powers,
derived from the states’ peoples in and through the respective state governments and their
constitutions. Each state remained a “self-governing political community…possessing all
the features of an independent state except a foreign service, including a legislature, an
executive, a judiciary, the power to tax and punish, and a militia.”310 American
federalism is, therefore, no mere form of decentralization, for the original states existed
before federation, do not owe their genesis to the central government, and could indeed
continue to exist in the event that the union was dissolved. In sum, As Madison notes in
The Federalist Papers, when examined closely, the government “appears to be of a
mixed character, presenting at least as many federal as national features” (39, 197;
emphasis in original). Depending on the various aspects that one examines, or the
questions and perspectives one brings to the Constitution, it can take on more or less of a
national or federal character; it is, therefore, “in strictness, neither national nor a federal
Constitution, but a composition of both” (39, 199).
The achievement of federalism in balancing the sovereignty of the general
government with the particular sovereignty of the states by no means precludes the
United States from entering into alliances and treaties with other sovereign nations.
However, it certainly makes for a less than likely scenario that America would disturb
this otherwise remarkable balance by pooling sovereignty with other nation-states or
granting powers and authority to supra-national organizations. There is, nonetheless,
“nothing absurd or impracticable, in the idea of a league or alliance between independent
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nations, for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty,” which otherwise
regulate “details of time, place, circumstance and quantity.” So much is a necessary and
an important part of diplomacy; it always has been. But, to reiterate, such treaties and
alliances are limited and are among independent sovereign nations. As is so often the
case, and as the Founders well knew, such treaties are regularly broken, which offers an
instructive “lesson to mankind,” regarding “how little dependence is to be placed on
treaties which have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith” (15, 72). The
only successful form of union is one where there is a “superintending power.” Of course,
the idea of world government with such authority and actual power to stand above
nations and punish them upon deviation from the treaty was something the Founders
hardly needed to consider given its remoteness in possibility. Not to mention, even
today’s advocates of global governance often sound like those criticized by the Federalist
for arguing “upon abstract principles” and tending to “set up supposition and theory
against fact and reality” (34, 162).
Any assumption that “common interest would preside over the conduct of the
respective members” of a confederate grouping, and that such interest would sufficiently
“beget a full compliance” could only appear to be “wild” (15, 73). The “ best oracle of
wisdom,” namely, experience, would suggest otherwise, for interest alone does not
sufficiently bind men; good will or good intentions are ineffectual in ultimately
restraining the passions or precluding conflict among particular interests. The present
United Nations is a perfect example of just how unlikely full compliance is among
nations operating without any superintending power and working on the basis of good

272

faith.311 The challenges that the United Nations, or even the European Union, face,
would be no surprise to the American Founders. Indeed, when Hamilton raises the very
question, “why has government been instituted at all?,” he answers it in the following
way: “Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice,
without constraint.” While such dictates exist, the most reasonable way in which to bring
men round to them is to establish a national government that legislates laws on the basis
of consent and one that can uphold them with the requisite energy and force.
Based on the evidence of the weakness of confederacies, the general tendencies of
human nature, and the constitutional achievement of a federal system for the United
States, there is good reason to believe that America has the political and philosophical—
the institutional and theoretical—resources to continue to tame both extremes of
universalism and particularism. Not only would the American Founders stand athwart to
any form of universal union of the world’s peoples, or an international arrangement set
above the central government of the United States, but most contemporary Americans are
skeptical, and many directly opposed, to such projects that would diminish America’s
sovereign ability to act as a particular nation among nations. To whatever extent
America aids the world’s peoples in their own national attempts at developing democratic
institutions, Manent is incorrect in suggesting America is analogous to Europe regarding
universalist tendencies. Rather, on the basis of its constitutional arrangement, America is
best seen to be, in Manentian fashion, one more “metamorphosis” of the “city” in which
the western dynamic of self-government is manifest and persists.
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8. CONCLUSION
“Our statesmen deny the relevance of differences—of other peoples’ loves and hates, calculations and
intrigues—treating all as if they were not foreign at all, confusing the human race with homo economicus
californianus. But you must keep in mind that foreign relations are about dealing with foreigners—people
whose identities and agendas are inalienably their own. Because this has ever been so, the art of
international affairs developed as it did over millennia”
—Angelo M. Codevilla, Advice to War Presidents, xvii

This essay opened with the example of President Obama’s being awarded the
Nobel Prize, partly given because it was the Nobel Committee’s belief he was more than
simply President of the United States, but a citizen of the world first. It was the Nobel
committee’s belief and hope, as shared by many European elites and internationalists the
world over, that President Obama would in fact subordinate American interests to the
values and interests of “humanity,” on the very presumption that such a singular
community of a unified form is emergent, if not already present. Whatever judgment one
may have of the Obama administration, his time in office has revealed a central truth of
this essay: in the political sphere the very values and interests of “humanity” are often
unclear and contested, for humanity consists of different peoples and polities, separated
as they are by opinions, beliefs, religions and cultures, sometimes as much as they are by
geography. Insofar as groups of individuals in certain communities so desire to act in the
world, upon their opinions and beliefs, they require the mediation of a particular political
form. Only by way of a concrete form, with a respective regime intact, does the
possibility emerge for a freely self-governing community.
Self-government is an achievement of politics, and the continued struggle for it is
central to understanding the dynamic of Western political development. Self-government
is something to be especially welcome in times of crisis, or when a community faces
questions of national security, for it presents the opportunity for a community and its
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representatives to deliberate, debate, and execute a course of action in the world, not
otherwise determined by extraneous forces, or the wills of others. To be sure, action in
the world on the part of one group is likely to impact others, causing disagreements,
conflicts, and suffering; however, so much is sometimes the price of freedom. While
peace is certainly a primary objective of any community, it is never the sole value of a
freely self-governing one. Thus, as the American case continues to demonstrate, the
United States does not simply consist of people, or peoples in general; rather, with a
government of, by, and for the people, it is constituted by the American people. Its free
activity of self-governing is therefore conducted with the specific interest of the
American people in mind, which need not necessarily, but may at times, be at odds with
the interests of other peoples—or, that is to say, with the so-called interests of
“humanity.”
Contrary to the hopes of some, a globalized economy and other mechanisms of
proposed unification will not bring the world’s peoples together into a single and unified
political form, nor will economic or cultural projects of one kind or another offer an
escape from politics, or from the fundamental political dilemmas—such matters best
addressed by way of respective governments among the world’s peoples. The diversity
of the world’s peoples is evident to the most casual observer, not least as indicated by the
inability for genuine global consensus on a host of issues, ranging from matters martial
and economic, to those environmental and ecological. So much indicates a deeper
variance of opinion regarding some of the most profound matters, such as regarding the
best form of life, of government, and the like—self-government itself may not necessarily
be something aspired to by all. Even on matters heralded as far too important to be left to
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individual nations or governments, insofar as they are alleged to affect all peoples
equally, unanimous agreement is a rare phenomenon. Despite the convictions of Western
elites and of the attendees of international conferences regarding such matters, not all the
world’s people aspire to live like and cherish the values held by such individuals. And
yet it nonetheless appears to be the case, as George Grant noted some years ago (and as
quoted in the Introduction of this essay), that, “The drive to the universal and
homogeneous state remains the dominant ethical ‘ideal’ to which our contemporary
society appeals for meaning in its activity.”
This very ideal for a global state, or a community of humanity, void of
distinctions and differences, is the antithesis of politics, and so too, therefore, of the
achievement of self-government: as a dominant ideal, it is predominantly anti-political.
The advocates of such an ideal fail to realize that political mediation is fundamental to a
happy, good, and satisfying human life. It is in and through the political community that
the various ideas and ideals, as well as other aspects of human life, are ultimately
manifest, and thereby contend, compete, and realize themselves. Particular political
communities offer the requisite circumscription, or embodiment, that the various human
goods require for their realization, which the undifferentiated plane of humanity can
never provide. It is telling that the most memorable acts associated with “humanity” are
precisely what we now call “crimes against humanity,” and yet such crimes are always
carried out by representatives of one particular community against another—the leading
example being a case where the victims were a diasporatic people, lacking sufficient
political mediation and thereby formal protection of any particular kind. In their
vehement drive towards the universal and homogeneous state, advocates disregard the
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potential dangers of universality and homogeneity as well as the benefits of a certain
degree of particularity and heterogeneity. Defenders of this ideal exaggerate in blaming
politics and political forms single-handedly for the evils they decry. There is no shortage
of irony to the fact that many of the same elites who praise “diversity” in so many things,
fail to acknowledge the importance and benefits of diversity across the political
landscape—that a political pluriverse of various particular communities is more
conducive to freedom than a singular universe of humanity.
The human condition being a political condition requires political mediation. In
fact, such political mediation is precisely the mode through which the particularities of
universal humanity best represent themselves. Presently, the modern national and state
forms to which early liberal political thought contributed in forming and articulating
remain the predominant form of such mediation. Thus, as we have seen herein, the
totality of globalization—the drive towards world government, or a universal and
homogeneous state—is no simple extension of liberalism, for there is a liberal tradition
that capably and thoughtfully considers, questions, probes, as well as endorses, certain
aspects of globalization. Liberalism, therefore, contains some of the resources with
which to moderate the tension between universalism and particularism. However, it is
through thinkers like Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and Manent, who each draw on
resources from outside modern liberal thought, that the liberal tradition becomes enriched
and moderate.
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